

it. The native government, once set up, was a landlord's government and obviously had no intention of disinherit itself. So finally AMG had to put it through by direction.

Seven months after the beginning of the Russian occupation of North Korea a land-reform program was put into effect, which was undoubtedly regarded by the people of the Northern zone as a most important innovation. It was also a most effective propaganda agent in the South, probably the best the Russians had.

Spotted for confiscation were lands of Japanese, "traitors," landlords (in excess of 12.25 acres), absentee owners, and shrines and temples (in excess of 12.25 acres).

The fact was that 981,390 chungbo, 50 per cent of the farmland in 1946, was distributed among 725,000 farm families under the program. Barring the most gross and unlikely shortcomings, scarcely any act could have had a wider impact. If land reform in North Korea were to press toward collectivization, however, this initial attitude of the Korean peasants might change profoundly. But that stage of Communist planning was still in the future.

Both American and Russian suzerains trained and organized Korean armies. The North Korean army is estimated at 150,000 men. "This army had been organized, equipped, and trained by the Soviets and was reported to be in excellent fighting condition," say the authors.

In South Korea an army-constabulary of 26,000 men was formed by the American command. It was rapidly enlarged. But neither in training, equipment, nor morale was it the equal of the Northerners. We were clearly responsible for the lack of training and equipment since we provided what there was. Were we equally responsible for the poor morale of the Southern forces?

The verdict of the authors is that our own revolutionary convictions are nearly 200 years old and we no longer appear to have the courage of them.

Jawaharlal Nehru's Book of Job

INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER. By Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: The John Day Co. 403 pp. \$4.

By DOROTHY NORMAN

BOTH the orthodox left and the orthodox right will be made uncomfortable by Jawaharlal Nehru's latest book to reach America—a collection of post-liberation speeches delivered mainly between Indian Independence Day, August 15, 1947, and 1949.

The orthodox left will be irritated because Nehru has committed the unpardonable sin of revising abstract social theory in conformity with changing social realities — and without forsaking principle.

The orthodox right will be disturbed because a popular revolutionary leader has proved himself capable of governing wisely upon becoming the responsible head of a new and highly complex state—again without sacrificing principle.

Since one of the major tragedies of our time is that so few practical idealists are ready selflessly to dedicate their lives to shouldering political responsibility, the fact that Nehru should now be functioning so successfully as free India's first Prime Minister should hearten everyone.

Indeed, the new collection of speeches should swiftly take its place on that same shelf of classics containing Nehru's earlier books. For, as in the case of so much of his previous writing, it includes both indispensable historical record and eloquent exposition of the ideas of perhaps the most fearless and civilized practising political philosopher of our day.

One particular joy for the reader is that Nehru's public statements are so warmly personal, that in the main they are delivered extemporaneously (and read that way), and that they are not ghost-written. But, so far as content is concerned, the new utter-


ances may well be described as fairly ridden with ghosts—ghosts from the past that might easily have destroyed the infant state of India had not the greatest care been exercised. And new obstacles and catastrophes that are deeply disturbing: the partition of India and Pakistan, "desecration" of Kashmir, violence in Hyderabad, the death of Gandhi, economic disequilibrium and disastrous shortages. All of which makes the new volume read like some modern Book of Job.

But, even as with Job himself, there is the indomitable strength to rise above all tribulation, the same intrepid spirit that made independence itself a reality.

Ghosts of a tragic past must be cast out and new paths opened. With extraordinary lack of bitterness or desire for vengeance obituaries are delivered to British rule and the princely states. India is exhorted to exorcise the lingering blight of empire, feudalism, Communism, separatism, provincialism; to adopt a new attitude with respect to political responsibility. It is no longer enough simply to blame all on "government"; to sit back and expect all to be done from on high, as under the British; to speak of rights without being ready to assume obligations. We are the Government now, warns Nehru. And *we are sentenced to hard labor.*

The voice of the new Nehru is heard: noncooperation—even strikes and demonstrations—, proclaims the former resistance leader, may all have had their value in the past. Now, however, we must cooperate, pull together, produce—establish our stability—all in the best interests of the country as a whole. Let there be no misunderstanding, either, about our joining the British Commonwealth now that we are free. Cooperation for the common good must be undertaken on the widest possible scale.

Antiquated slogans pertaining to



"Independence Day."

—From "Old Korea: The Land of Morning Calm."

Socialism, Communism, industrial capitalism must be scrapped. The theory according to which Socialism is equated with the taking over of existing industry is found by Nehru to be meaningless for India. Existing industry, he maintains, will soon be outmoded. Thus the task of the new Government is rather to build vast new power and irrigation projects according to the most modern methods so that extensive new industries, new efficiency, new productivity of the land may result. Let the State, he proposes, acquire "the new processes, the new changes, and not the old, except when the old obstructs . . ." And let there be no idle talk about distribution when there has as yet been so little production.

One heritage from the past, he pleads, is not to be overthrown: the teaching of Gandhi. Violence is not to be indulged in. It is claimed that there is no wish to dominate anyone. But—and if this were more clearly understood there would have been less surprise when India voted in favor of the recent U. N. Security Council resolution on Korea, despite her pronounced neutrality—if there is to be aggression anywhere force must be put down *even with force*. Everything must first be done to avoid conflict. But if one has not yet achieved the power to turn the other cheek empty words about nonviolence are without meaning. Evil and untruth in one's own life are themselves forms of violence. Indeed, violence committed in a narrow sphere is even more degrading than that occurring in a wider one. But there must be freedom to decide on the merits of each case of aggression as it arises—whether at home or abroad.

In many ways a new Nehru. One more flexible, more mature, perhaps. But one, nevertheless, dedicated as of old to wiping out untouchability, poverty, disease, ignorance; to fighting exploitation, bigotry, suppression, intolerance, injustice, materialism, narrow nationalism. And above all, fear.

A continuing wish is manifested to combine economic and political democracy; to help destroy existing empires and to see that no new ones are permitted to arise. There is the same respect as of old for self-discipline, fine craftsmanship, beauty, sensibility, a happy combination of open-mindedness and the best of tradition—all exquisitely reflected in Nehru's own style of address. There is the same engaging ability to challenge his own imperfections as well as those of his countrymen, to remain unspoiled by mass adulation. The same inability to play safe with ideas, pander to audiences, woo with oratorical flourish and bland promises.



Nehru: "We are sentenced to hard labor."

Since the West is frankly bewildered by so much of recent Indian policy it would do well to read "Independence and After." For it comes from the lips of the man who has done most to mold and direct that policy. But it should be remembered that that policy has evolved during a period when India has continued to suffer from wounds of empire and from a general distrust of a world that has permitted colonialism to persist so long.

Although many Indians have criticized the West for confusing the rising tide of nationalism in the East with Communism, and have even gone so far as to consider our so-called hysteria about Russia as a form of ideological interventionism, they have looked upon their own pleading in behalf of wiping out existing colonialism as entirely justifiable. No doubt it will take even more than Nehru's own most recent statement that Communism in Southeast Asia has been going against nationalist movements to destroy a firmly entrenched distrust that we ourselves are not sincerely interested in destroying colonial remnants. How else does distrust of America, in particular, manifest itself? It is felt by many Indians that our supposed hysteria has had even further disastrous repercussions: that it has caused us to sacrifice civil liberties at home and foment power-

bloc tensions abroad (precisely what we accuse the Russians of doing); to attach strings to aid we give and to give it only as a bulwark against Communism rather than because we have any humane feeling or respect for those in need. We are accused of excessive materialism and of building up a new dollar empire, of having color prejudice not only against Negroes but against all people of color everywhere.

Surely if we wish to be understood we must also understand. India and America, like all who are interested in maintaining freedom everywhere, need one another desperately in this crucial period—both to spread and to protect economic and political democracy for all. Nehru's new book, then, despite its many seeming paradoxes, is so eminently the expression of a fair and enlightened mind that it should help in breaking down some of the barriers and mutual mistrust that have been growing between the two countries. And it has the value of containing, in addition to all else, the most authentic record one is likely to find of the new India's plans and progress.

Dorothy Norman, editor of a number of volumes including "Art and Action" and "The Selected Writings of John Marin," has just returned from a trip to India.

Master Minds' Maneuvering Ground

THE STAKES OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By H. J. Van Mook. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 312 pp. \$3.75.

THE LEFT WING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. New York: William Sloane Assoc. 286 pp. \$4.

By EDGAR SNOW

BETWEEN China on the north and Australia on the south, lying athwart the Indian Ocean and the Far Pacific, are six nations which form the richest and most enchanting corner of Asia. Formerly they exported twice as much foodstuffs as India and China combined; before the war they were the world's chief source of rubber, tin, and quinine. They possess valuable mineral and oil resources, and great fertile areas are still in primeval forest. Until recently they meant little to Americans beyond the romantic images evoked by exotic place names such as Zamboanga, Pnom Penh, Saigon, Bangkok, Soerabaja. Now the political existence of Southeast Asia is being steadily hammered into our consciousness as newly independent nations there become a maneuvering ground for master minds.

Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Indo-China, and the Philippines cover a land area of about 1,600,000 square miles washed by vast strategic seas. Their combined population has increased from fewer than 100 millions in 1920 to something like 160 millions today. Demographic experts predict 300 millions by 1970—assuming that the region is not depopulated by H-bombs. There is a close ethnical kinship among the Malays, the Filipinos, and the Indonesians, on the one hand, and the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Thais, and Burmese, on the other hand. But this is a racially heterogeneous area, with ancient cultures in dramatic transition, varying from the gentle, fair-skinned Shans of Northern Burma to the fierce, frizzy-haired cannibals of New Guinea and the timid Negritos of the Philippines.

Each of these nations has the prerequisites of a nation. In each, also, a medley of minority peoples and tongues must be reconciled to domination by a major nationality. Not one of these states is a military power of much more consequence, say, than Korea. But they could one day combine a formidable array of might. A Southeast Asian federation is as logical a dream—if not necessity—as a West European union.

One cannot yet speak of the whole



—Scott Long in the Minneapolis Tribune.

“Storm Warning Over Southeast Asia.”

area as free: Indo-China and Malaya still have a semicolonial status. But Ho Chih-minh's Vietnamese nationalists tie down most of France's armed forces in a protracted struggle for independence, and only astute manipulation of Malay fears of the large indigenous Chinese population enables the British to retain their base—which used to be called a “stronghold”—in Singapore. With the restoration of native sovereignty across Southeast Asia, together with Indian independence and a radical, anti-imperialist revolution in China, the East has torn itself loose from more than a century of political control by Western Europe.

That is probably the most important result of World War II. In the long view it may prove of greater meaning than anything that has happened in Europe itself to change the balance of world power.

The authors of the two books reviewed here are plainly much concerned because America has been slow to realize that—and slow to devise effective means to win the allegiance of Southeast Asians as equal partners in a non-Communist world. H. J. Van Mook, former lieutenant-governor of Java, recognizes that “the nations of Southeast Asia are not democratic in the sense which we give to the word.” He also thinks that they are “not totalitarian.” They “wish to be enlightened and persuaded” in matters of science and technique but not bossed. To win their confidence “the Western powers must first concede their complete independence and equality” unequivocally and “beyond doubt.” Secondly, all economic aid must honestly be administered by men who accept “the

economic and social interests of the country to be assisted” as the “sole” and paramount “directive.”

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff share Van Mook's uneasy feeling that to date neither of those conditions has been fulfilled. “It is quite possible,” they write in “The Left Wing in Southeast Asia,” “that Communist propaganda regarding the motives now chiefly prompting the Western democracies' efforts . . . will prove effective. Southeast Asians are quite likely to believe Communist spokesmen when they say that such aid as is being offered Southeast Asia derives not from spontaneous altruism but from the West's fear of Communism's competitive appeal.”

Exactly why that assertion is labeled “Communist propaganda” is not clear to this reviewer. No one needs to be convinced that Communists indulge in falsehood. But the inference here appears to be that America's interest in aiding Southeast Asia does “derive from spontaneous altruism” rather than from “fear of Communism.” I'd like to buy that but first I'd like to see it proved.

Van Mook's book is less roundabout in its political judgments. It is divided into three parts, of roughly equal length. The first outlines the history of Southeast Asia from early times, down through the British and Dutch invasions and colonization to the birth of nationalism. A hundred pages are devoted to the Japanese Occupation and its aftermath and to what the author calls the “unforeseen peace”—Japanese surrender to the United States, rather than “liberation” of Indonesia by the Dutch—followed by native seizure of power, which is described as “the nationalist revolt.” A third section deals with the future of the region and covers events of the past five years, with some of which Van Mook was intimately connected. He analyzes failures of the democracies to find a common plan to deal with the colonial area. He gives some interesting case histories of the economic rivalries which continue to divide what he describes as “capitalist adventures.”

Speedily, he warns, “the West must develop a clear program of what democracy has to offer Southeast Asia in preference to totalitarian Communism.” Time is running out fast, as Korea amply demonstrates. “The moment may come soon when one country after another will have to give up the struggle” and Communism, which the author identifies with “disorder, anarchy, and permanent economic decline,” will take over. Dr. Van Mook would like to see a “voluntary association” of the new republics—discussed in a final chapter—along