

McCarthy Can Still Be Beaten

JAMES G. MARCH

TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER, Senator Joseph McCarthy's impressive primary victory in Wisconsin—he ran more than one hundred thousand votes ahead of the combined total for all other candidates in both parties—would seem to indicate that the November election will be a mere formality to underwrite six more years of McCarthyism. A more careful analysis permits one to believe that McCarthy could still be beaten in November.

Although it is only a short time since the primary took place, it is already difficult to recall the events leading up to it. Many months before the start of the formal campaign in Wisconsin, there had been talk of finding a leading Republican to run against McCarthy. This agitation centered around two names: Walter Kohler, the present Governor of the state, and his immediate predecessor in that office, Oscar Rennebohm. Rennebohm, who had retired from office before the 1950 campaign on the advice of his doctors, again ruled himself out because of his health. Kohler ostentatiously flirted with the idea of running and was urged to do so by prominent Democratic leaders. Indeed, at one time it seemed quite probable that Kohler would oppose McCarthy in the primary. His subse-

quent withdrawal gave to the entire proceedings the appearance of an extraordinarily effective use of the old mousetrap play against the anti-McCarthyites. The Democrats were flustered, and there was no "respectable" Republican available to lead the opposition within the party. The Republican state Convention endorsed McCarthy, and Kohler and the others fell in line.

This left, as the leader of the Republican opposition to McCarthy, an independent Republican named Leonard F. Schmitt, who had been defeated by Kohler in the 1950 gubernatorial primary and whose Republicanism had been brought into question by his refusal to support Kohler in the 1950 general election and by his outspoken opposition to Thomas Coleman's powerful Republican Voluntary Committee.

Two Birds in the Bush


The Democrats were unable to agree on their campaign strategy after the Kohler boomlet petered out. The old Progressive tradition of voting in the Republican primary persists in Wisconsin, despite the fact that it has only served to weaken the over-all strength of the Democratic Party. The dream that two ineffective shots at an objectionable candidate are somehow better than a single effective one continued to animate such romanticists as William T. Evjue, editor of the *Madison Capital Times*, and a substantial number of the Progressive-Democrats who form an indispensable part of the Wisconsin Democratic Party.

As a result, one group of Democrats was providing the Republican Schmitt with such few words of support as he received from political leaders of any importance, and at the same time another group of influential Democrats

was working strenuously to hold onto the Democratic voting strength in the primary. To this latter purpose, at least in part, was directed the belated entrance into the Senatorial campaign of Thomas E. Fairchild. The strategy of providing a contest within the Democratic fold, admirable as it seemed, was robbed of effectiveness by the obvious halfheartedness with which it was adopted and pursued.

The general assumption that McCarthy was a sure bet in the primary, if not in the general election, prevailed until the final two weeks of the campaign. Then suddenly this basic acceptance underwent a profound change. In this change lies the first, and probably the most fundamental, misconception upon which the pessimistic post-primary analyses have been based. There was no factual basis for this change of attitudes about the campaign. No poll had indicated a radical switch of public opinion, and no important leaders in the Republican Party had come out for Schmitt. Unquestionably, the campaign had generated some excitement, but there was no indication at any time that Schmitt was gaining adherents.

Nevertheless, when an article in *Life* magazine indicated that the odds on



McCarthy were dropping, the rest of the press perked up its ears and the nation waited, with either hope or dread, for the news of McCarthy's defeat. As a result, what might have been considered merely a preliminary to the real battle came to be considered a crushing defeat of the anti-McCarthy forces in the state. The cardinal sin of political maneuver—a sin that nearly every newspaperman in the country had commented on during the Presidential preference primaries but which nearly every newspaperman in the country had forgotten by September—is to promise more than can be delivered, to give an overoptimistic definition of what constitutes victory and defeat. And yet this perfectly obvious political error has been largely ignored in evaluating McCarthy's victory.

Instead, the interpretation of the Wisconsin results has consistently gone something like this: "Yes indeed, the Democrats did cross the party lines to vote in the primary, but they didn't vote for Schmitt—they voted for McCarthy!" This interpretation has been picked up and echoed by newspapers all over the country.


Moving from this premise, the observers went on confidently to explain why the Democrats voted for McCarthy: "They resented outside interference," "They were disturbed by the question of Communism to the exclusion of all others," "The Catholic vote went to McCarthy," and "They didn't want to deprive Stevenson of a key issue." What's wrong with these explanations is that their basic premise—that the Democrats voted for McCarthy—is simply not valid.

Facts and Figures

The plain truth is that in so far as Democrats voted in the Republican primary, they voted overwhelmingly for Schmitt. What happened was just what everyone had expected to happen: The Democrats who crossed over voted for Schmitt, and the Republicans gave him relatively little support. It is possible that in some sections McCarthy did get a substantial portion of the Democratic vote, but there is no indication that this accounted for a significant part of the McCarthy vote or that a significant part of the Democratic vote went to Senator McCarthy.

If it were true that there was a significant Democratic vote for McCar-

thy, McCarthy should have done better where the Democrats were strong and where they voted in the Republican primary than he did where the Democrats were weak or stayed in their own primary. Table 1 lists the thirteen counties in which McCarthy did most poorly. These, according to the theory we



are examining, should be counties in which the Democrats are weak. It also shows the percentage of votes that were cast in the 1950 Senatorial elections for the Democratic candidate in each county. Since only a few of the more populous counties ever vote more than forty-five per cent Democratic in state elections, it is clear that ten of the thirteen "Schmitt" counties were counties in which the Democrats were relatively strong rather than relatively weak. Schmitt carried Douglas and Lincoln, and he almost carried Dane. Lincoln, Schmitt's home county, is small and generally Republican. Douglas and Dane are larger and are the most consistently Democratic counties in the state. They were Schmitt's best counties.

TABLE 1: "SCHMITT" COUNTIES

County	Dem. vote, 1950 (per cent)
Ashland	48
Bayfield	46
Chippewa	54
Dane	62
Douglas	57
Eau Claire	54
LaCrosse	50
Lincoln	35
Milwaukee	55
Ozaukee	38
Racine	48
Sheboygan	47
Waukesha	38

On the other hand, the eleven counties in which McCarthy did best, running five to one or better over Schmitt, should have been those counties in which there were Democratic votes for him.

Table 2 lists these eleven counties and indicates their voting records. Without exception, they are rock-ribbed Republican counties, in four of which the Republican candidate for Senator polled more than seventy per cent of the vote in 1950.

TABLE 2: "MC CARTHY" COUNTIES

County	Dem. vote, 1950 (per cent)
Calumet	30
Crawford	43
Grant	34
Green Lake	29
Kewaunee	34
Oconto	37
Pepin	44
Sawyer	35
Shawano	28
Waupaca	24
Waushara	24

It seems relatively clear that where Schmitt fell down was where there were relatively few Democrats to vote for him. But to examine this a little more closely, we can consider the ten most Democratic counties of the state, those which gave the Democratic candidates majorities in both the gubernatorial and Senatorial elections of 1950. In which of these counties did the Democrats cross over to vote Republican in substantial numbers? In which did they stay in their own primary? What were the consequences of the two types of behavior?

Table 3 provides some interesting answers. It shows, for each county, the percentage of the total 1950 primary vote (when there was little or no party jumping) that was cast in the Democratic primary. In the second column it shows the percentage of the total 1952 primary vote (for Schmitt, McCarthy, and the Democrats) that was cast in the Democratic primary. These two columns provide a rough indication of the counties in which there was a crossing of party lines in the 1952 primary. The third column indicates the number of McCarthy votes in each county for every Schmitt vote in that county. These figures must be compared with a state-wide McCarthy strength of approximately 2.6 votes for every Schmitt vote.

TABLE 3


County	% Voters, 1950 Dem. Primary	% Voters, 1952 Dem. Primary	McCarthy- Schmitt Ratio
Dane	51	22	1.1
Douglas	23	21	1.0
Eau Claire	28	16	1.5
Forest	49	29	4.8
Iron	34	32	2.9
Jackson	30	28	3.0
Kenosha	47	40	2.9
LaCrosse	15	8	2.2
Milwaukee	47	36	1.8
Portage	56	31	3.8

There are five counties—Dane, Eau Claire, Forest, Milwaukee, and Portage—where the Democratic primary vote dropped ten percentage points or more from 1950 to 1952 and where we may, therefore, conclude that there was a substantial number of Democrats voting in the Republican primary. In three of those five counties, McCarthy was unable to get even two votes for every one Schmitt vote (as compared with 2.6 state-wide), and these three counties accounted for 38.5 per cent of the total Democratic vote for Senator in 1950. In the other two counties, Forest and Portage, there is some indication that there may have been Democratic votes for McCarthy, but these are the *only* places where it is indicated. These two counties combined accounted for less than two per cent of the Democratic vote in 1950. In three of the five other Democratic counties, where the Democrats apparently voted in their own primary, McCarthy did better than he did state-wide.

The evidence seems conclusive that, with a few minor exceptions, Democrats in Wisconsin either abstained from voting in the primary, voted in the Democratic primary, or voted for Schmitt in the Republican primary. McCarthy did poorly where significant numbers of Democrats voted in the Republican primary. He did well where there were few Democrats or where they stayed in their own primary. There simply is no evidence for the widely held belief that Democratic votes provided McCarthy with significant support in the primary.

Reasons for Hope

The importance of this fact is considerable. In the first place, it eliminates the most important basis for the feelings of futility that overcame the anti-McCarthy forces immediately following the primary. Of course, McCar-



thy demonstrated in the primary that his position was strong. At the same time, however, there is no need for panic. McCarthy's strength was known at the outset; and, except for the brief period of pipe dreaming immediately before the primary, he was conceded an easy victory. He gained that easy victory. Now he faces what could be, if hope is not abandoned, a serious test. Thomas E. Fairchild, the Democratic nominee, has several reasons for hope.

In the first place, this is a Presidential election year, and the national ticket may bring out substantial numbers of normally apathetic voters, and change the entire picture.

Secondly, unless we believe that all of the votes for Schmitt represent Democratic votes—a completely untenable proposition—there would appear to be a number of Republicans with at least some predisposition to oppose McCarthy. Normally, intraparty primary opposition is difficult to translate into continued opposition in November, but there is a greater possibility that some Republicans will split their ticket to McCarthy's disadvantage than there has been in previous elections.

Finally, it is not unusual for Repub-

lican candidates to get more votes than their combined Republican and Democratic opposition in the primary, despite the large amount of comment this phenomenon has produced.

The Man on the Fence

Fairchild's candidacy, therefore, is not a hopeless one. The biggest blow to his chances has been the interpretation thus far placed on the primary results. The fact that this unrealistic interpretation could have been avoided by a little less unfounded optimism is plain, but scarcely comforting. The fact that that interpretation could have been avoided by some sober thought after the primary is likewise plain, and likewise disturbing. The impact of this interpretation cannot be underestimated. Every study of political and social attitudes indicates that the man on the fence, the person who is undecided, is extraordinarily sensitive to the subtle need for emotional support from relatives, neighbors, friends, and even the press.

It is among these many undecided voters, whose importance to the Fairchild candidacy is indisputable, that the popular pronouncement that the vast majority of Wisconsin citizens, Democrats and Republicans alike, appear to be solidly behind McCarthy has had and will have a devastating effect. Because of Senator McCarthy's singular importance on the national scene, this same misconception could play a part in elections throughout the country. The plain truth offers no excuse for complacency, but neither does it justify despair.



Soviet Production: Steel Before Shoes

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

AS THE Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union assembles in Moscow, one of the main points on its agenda is a "preview" of the current Five-Year Plan, which runs through 1955. Actually, the Plan's second year is now drawing to a close, and the Congress will undoubtedly accept it with little discussion or criticism and hail it as the greatest achievement of Stalin's era.

What does this plan promise to the Russian people? What is its significance to the world?

These are the over-all targets:

The Soviet Union is to increase its net national income by sixty per cent. Its gross industrial output is to grow by seventy per cent: eighty-two per cent in producer goods, sixty-four in consumer goods. Employment outside collective farming is to grow by fifteen per cent—about six million.

These figures may be somewhat enigmatic, but the following table gives a clear idea of recent and planned development of the fuel, iron, and steel industries:

Year	Pig Iron (Million Metric Tons)	Steel (Million Metric Tons)	Coal (Billion kwh)	Oil (Billion kwh)	Electricity (Billion kwh)
1940	15	18	166	31	48
1945	9	12	150	19	45
1950	19	28	264	38	88
1955	33	45	372	70	158


There is no reason to assume that the 1955 targets will not be achieved. We must even reckon with the probability that some will be surpassed, as were those for 1950. The output of steel is likely to approach fifty million tons; similarly, under the previous Plan the

target was twenty-five million, but actual output was about twenty-eight million. Ten years after the war Russia should nearly quadruple its production of iron, steel, and electricity, treble its extraction of oil, and more than double its output of coal.

The Plan for 1951-1955 marks a new phase in the industrial race against the West which Russia entered nearly a quarter of a century ago, engaging every ounce of its strength and all its national ambition.

Historically, this is not the first competition between Russia and the West. Over the centuries the Czarist empire was subjected to the constant pressure of superior western European power and civilization. To build up their military strength, some Czars made frenzied efforts to introduce western techniques and organization. Peter the Great made the most important and dramatic of those attempts. More quietly, less ambitiously, Czardom re-entered the contest at the end of the nineteenth century, shortly before its own downfall.

Czarist Russia lost each of these contests; and each left the nation exhausted and still further behind the West. It was not that Russia failed to make any progress, but the Czars had to strain all their despotic power to force their people into the rivalry and to keep them in it. Each time Russia's initial lag



proved far too great to be made good; and since western Europe was advancing so rapidly, it became more and more difficult for Russia to catch up.

An Exhausting Race

Twenty-five years ago Bolshevik Russia reopened the contest. The decision was taken after the long and bitter controversy between Stalin and Trotsky. Much earlier than Stalin, Trotsky had advocated industrialization; but he did not believe that Russia, even under Communist rule, could catch up with the West, let alone overtake it. He pointed to the tremendous historic lag which made him believe that the prospects of Communist Russia in a single-handed economic rivalry with the capitalist West would be hopeless. He concluded that only revolution in Europe could alter the balance in favor of Communism.

Stalin, seeing no chance for such a revolution, made the economic contest with the West the theme of his program: "Catch up with the capitalist countries and surpass them!"

The contest is now in its third decade; and at least some of the delegates attending the Nineteenth Congress of the party, as they listen to the report of M. Z. Saburov, who sponsors the new plan, must be silently pondering the question: Has Stalin's Russia really found the techniques which may enable it to win this time? Or is this merely a repetition, on a gigantic scale, of that peculiarly Russian tragedy, the desperate and exhausting race toward an ever more distant goal?

When the Stalinist call to "catch up