



Which Road?

The Chicago Choice

JOSEPH C. HARSCH

Abilene. In Taft, the Republicans have a contender who reflects the concept of making the party the vehicle of a special social and economic cause with a definable philosophic point of view. In Eisenhower, they have a contender who reflects the contrary concept of the party's having the primary function of keeping itself in existence as an effective device for winning elections and serving the general public. The Taft concept puts the cause ahead of the party. The Eisenhower concept puts the party ahead of the cause.

With qualification, the distinction is between the continental European concept of the so-called "significant" party and the Anglo-Saxon concept of the pragmatic party. Under the "significant" concept, the party is only as strong as the cause to which it is tied. It rises or declines with the cause and goes out of existence if the cause dies. The pragmatic concept accepts or rejects causes as they may serve the continuing interests of the party and of the general public.

There is the subordinate question whether the Taft cause is the dominant issue in this election year. There are of course occasions in the United States, as there are in European countries, when a particular social and economic concept enjoys the support of a substantial majority of the voters. That is, there are times when it is sound strategy for the pragmatic party to tie itself to an ideological cause. Abraham Lincoln proved this. So did Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Both built powerful political combinations on ideological causes—Lincoln on the doctrine of the political integrity of the Union and Roosevelt on the social revolution of the New Deal.

If this is a year when a majority of the American people are in fact moti-

vated primarily by a desire to undo the Roosevelt revolution, then it would be sound strategy for the Republican Party to identify itself with that cause and expect to ride to victory with it. In this writer's opinion, the composite mass of primary-election results, straw ballots, public-opinion polls, and popular political writing make that hypothesis invalid. Therefore I assume it to be true that if the Republican Party decides in 1952 to do in reverse what the Democrats did from 1932 through 1948, it will condemn itself to defeat. I take it as axiomatic that, other things being equal, a majority of voters would prefer a change of personnel in Washington and a shift of emphasis away from social revolution. But there is no impressive body of evidence to indicate that the majority desires counter-revolution.

Those Who Hate

There can be no serious doubt that the Taft cause in the Republican Party is more ideological than pragmatic—that it is more concerned with attempting to undo the Roosevelt social revolution than it is with securing the victory of the party. The evidence lies in the frequency with which Taftians say they would rather lose with Taft than win with Eisenhower. It lies in the Taftians' lack of interest in attempting to attract independents and Democrats to the party. It lies in the easy definability of a Taftian. Scratch a Rotarian, a member of a Chamber of Commerce, a member of the American Medical Association, and nine times out of ten you will find a Taftian. People from the more exclusive suburbs are for Taft. People who resist organization of labor are for Taft.

Equally, there can be no serious doubt that the Taftians possess a body

IS THE Republican Party more interested in an ideological cause or in winning the next election?

In Chicago the men who march behind the symbol of the elephant must answer this question, and by the method of their answering they will probably decide their own fate in November, and very possibly also the shape and complexion of American politics for several years to come.

Two very different concepts of the function of a political party are involved in the choice the Republicans face between Robert A. Taft of Cincinnati and Dwight D. Eisenhower of

of dogma which identifies them as a semi-religious cult. They hold it as a matter of faith that socialism is identical with Communism and that the New Deal is the first step on the road to both. They believe that Roosevelt sold out to Stalin at Yalta. They believe that the loss of China was connived at by Dean Acheson. They believe that the recapture of China is more important to the security of the United States than the holding of Europe. They believe that air power can satisfy our security requirements. These are all articles of faith, not capable of objective proof. The possession of a body of articles of faith is a first characteristic of an ideological cause.

Another mark of a cause is depth of emotion. Taftians tend to feel strong emotions. They have created their own hierarchy of saints and devils. Herbert Hoover and Douglas MacArthur are their patron saints. Roosevelt is the archdevil and Acheson is the extant limb of Satan. That they feel bitterness and even hate for their opponents is too obvious to require documentation. Only people who feel intense emotions against fellow citizens could produce the literature of hate against Eisenhower which has been flooding our mails.

Those Who Like

The Eisenhower case may be identified primarily by its contrast with the above. There is no such easy way of identifying an Eisenhower supporter as there is of identifying a Taftian. A lot of all sorts of different people "like Ike." There are some Democrats, like Paul Douglas of Illinois, who are sick and tired of the cynicism and corruption of the Truman Administration. There are masses of political independents who want a change in Washington, but not a radical change. There are workingmen who resent the "planning" and regimentation of the New Deal, but who don't see Taft-Hartley as the answer to their problems. There are rich Wall Streeters, and rich industrialists from the hinterland, who like Eisenhower for the practical reason that they think he is the best means of getting the Democrats out of Washington. There are also a lot of plain people of all kinds who just like his smile.

The very verb "like" gives us a clue to Eisenhower and to the feeling about him. To like is to have a positive and

a friendly feeling. But the process of liking is a quiet one. It is only warm and friendly; it is not passionate. The antonym is only dislike, not hate. There is no deep or violent emotion engaged in the Eisenhower candidacy. People are drawn to him not because they feel violent antipathy to someone else, or passionate belief in his cause, but because they just quietly like a man who is inclined to be friendly and who only hates really "bad" people.

One of Eisenhower's favorite forms of relaxation has been the reading of Wild West thrillers. There is always a "bad" man in such stories, and it is the proper function of all "good" people to make common cause against the "bad" one. Ike is a sturdy fighter in crusades against obviously bad people. But they must be obvious and very bad for him to feel that he should draw his sword or his six-shooter. In the Wild West thriller, as in daily life, most peo-



ple are good or at least are on the good side, and therefore are allies of the posse. And the posse doesn't feel hatred toward the "bad guy." It only regards him as an impersonal evil, like the rattlesnake, which must be destroyed.

Also, the posse happily enlists all good citizens in its chase of the bandit,

horse thief, claim jumper, or despoiler of widows and orphans. It does not first inspect credentials to determine that the volunteer voted the straight Republican ticket from 1932 onward. Even an ex-New Dealer could be useful on such expeditions. Those people who desire to crusade only against the really obvious "bad guys" like Stalin, corruption, inflation, waste, and tyranny (all of which are impersonal evils) have seized upon Dwight D. Eisenhower as their chosen instrument.

Ike just doesn't feel it in his bones that this country either is or should be divided on ideological lines in an emotional civil war. He regards New Dealers as probably misguided, but not as conscious workers of evil. He thinks Roosevelt and Truman built too much centralized power into the Federal government, but he likes Harry Truman personally. He thinks Washington could probably have done much more than it did to save China, but he doesn't think Dean Acheson deliberately turned China over to Communism. He distrusts powerful labor unions, but because he has a primitive American distrust of concentrations of power of any kind, not because he is anti-labor. He is against compulsory FEPC, but because he dislikes compulsion of one American by another, not necessarily because he is anti-Negro or pro-segregation.

A man actually is known by his friends. Ike's friends are of all kinds. They include Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia and a platoon or so of former enlisted orderlies, cooks, and drivers; Roy Cullen of Texas, who distrusts Taft's "liberalism," and Averell Harriman, who might be his pro-New Deal November antagonist; Edward R. Murrow of CBS and Cyrus Sulzburger of the *New York Times*; a million salesgirls and the aristocratic Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., of Philadelphia; Paul Hoffman, who steered the Marshall Plan, and many an Air Force general who thinks that any dollar not spent on preparations for the bombing of Moscow is wasted.

Men Around Ike

Who are Eisenhower's principal political advisers? The superficial answer is that he listens to advice from everyone who comes to see him. The true answer is that he takes advice from a group of people marked by two char-

acteristics. First, they want to see the Republican Party returned to office this November. Second, they approach the problem from the pragmatic rather than the dogmatic point of view. Beyond those two distinguishing features there are many differences. Some are by inclination conservatives. Some believe in much of the New Deal. Most of them have no strong position on such matters, but, like Ike himself, think that the answers to specific problems should be the product of reason rather than of doctrine. They are dispassionate people.

Ike's adviser of longest standing is Kevin McCann, a big, boisterous, genial extrovert who is president of Defiance College in Defiance, Ohio, and who has been the General's principal speech writer from Pentagon days through the Columbia University and SHAPE periods. In politics as in life, Mr. McCann is an eclectic, with no perceptible bias, possessed of objectivity about his hero and just doing a professional ghost-writing and advising job for a friend who might well become President of the United States.

Next to McCann probably comes Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., son of the late Republican Senator, who approaches the problems of politics with the skill and calmness of his illustrious parent. Vandenberg and McCann together constituted the nearest thing Ike built to a pre-campaign "brain trust." Both visited SHAPE during the final weeks before Ike's emergence on the home political scene.

While these two men helped Ike work out his personal views on public issues, General Lucius Clay acted as his primary adviser on high-level personal strategy. General Clay had long since come to be Ike's closest and most trusted personal friend in the Army. It was Clay's advice that counted heavily in the decisions that kept Ike at SHAPE until the first of June, who counseled the strategy of being "available" without "campaigning" for the nomination. The Clay mind is as nearly ice as any the modern U. S. Army has produced. The ordeal of the Berlin blockade hardened him for last winter's ordeal of calming the anxieties of Eisenhower's political advisers, who veered between overoptimism and defeatism. When they argued that all was lost unless Ike came rushing home, Clay remained as unruffled as during the days

when the fate of Berlin depended on a miracle.

Those who built the Eisenhower political movement at home were many, but two groups counted most. The nuclear alliance was formed between the leading Kansas Republicans and those of the populous Eastern Sea-



board states. The Kansas leaders were Harry Darby and Frank Carlson, helped by Roy Roberts, president of the Kansas City *Star*. The Eastern Seaboard leaders were Senators Lodge and Saltonstall of Massachusetts, the Dewey machine from New York, and Senator James Duff of Pennsylvania. In some ways these are disparate groups. The Kansans are as conservative by inclination as Republicans can be. The New York and Massachusetts groups are probably best described as Republican moderns. The rough-riding liberalism of Teddy Roosevelt seems to live in "Big Jim" Duff.

Experts in Survival

One quality binds the groups together. They are all men who evolved effective formulas for keeping the Republican Party in their regions alive against the repeated New Deal offensives. They worked out strategies and tactics that differed in detail but employed the same central principle. Out of experience, they became convinced that the Democrats could be defeated best not by fighting the New Deal at every turn but by taking from it what seemed to fit local needs and by blending those elements with time-tested devices such as reasonably good government.

They were all pragmatists, and they made pragmatism work. This meant a large dose of New Dealism in New York and almost none in Kansas. The proportions could be varied to suit local conditions, but the approach had to be positive rather than negative. The important thing to all of them was not dogma but "Does it work?" They are men who have won elections consistently by forgetting about the emotional issues of the New Deal period and concentrating on the business of attracting votes by serving the public.

Eisenhower is the ideal candidate for such men if for no other reason than that he has been both mentally and physically apart from the whole pattern of domestic torment over the New Deal. He has hardly known that it existed. Ike's America is the Midwest of 1910, which to him was as near to paradise on earth as any political society ever evolved. He had a happy, successful boyhood in a community that practiced equality of opportunity. He moved from that into a brilliantly successful career involving technical jobs that called for technical skill rather than a political or ideological point of view. If people back home got their emotions all involved in loving or hating Roosevelt, Ike didn't know anything about it, and cared less. He was always off fighting the obvious "bad guys" like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, and assumed that all the people back at home were part of the posse.

The Fundamental Difference

To a large degree, Taft is the product of Roosevelt. Had there been no F.D.R. and no social revolution at home since 1932, there could have been none of the emotionalism that makes Taftians feel like the victims of Sherman's march through Georgia. Eisenhower, on the other hand, is the product of having lived away from this whole period of American history, so far away that he didn't know that Robert Lovett and John McCloy were Republicans working as civil servants in a Democratic Administration, or that the Supreme Court had ever ruled against Texas on tidelands oil.

Thus, Ike came home a monumental enigma to both New Dealers and Taftians. They have been so absorbed in and obsessed by their rivalries that they find it impossible to comprehend a man who has no part in their world.

To New Dealers, he sounds like a man to the right of Taft. To Taftians, he sounds like a man with no convictions. Both have been shocked by his lack of ideological perceptions, positions, and concerns. Both find it impossible to understand how a man can number among his personal friends both Harry Byrd and Averell Harriman. The essential point is that Eisenhower can, and sees no reason for not liking both men. Ike isn't mad at anyone except rattlesnakes and horse thieves and their kind, and he finds it extremely difficult to put any fellow American in that category. Eisenhower's background also makes it next to impossible for him to campaign against personalities.

Since Ike came home, many articles have been written purporting to show that in actual policy the Eisenhower and Taft positions are almost indistinguishable. Such writings miss the essence of Dwight Eisenhower. Ike differs from Taft not primarily on specific policies but rather on attitude toward people. If the Republicans choose Taft, they choose a man who likes and attracts one part of the American people and who dislikes and repels another and—if the elections since 1932 mean anything—larger part of the

American people. If the Republicans take Eisenhower, they choose a man who feels an identity with most Americans and therefore suffers from a difficulty unusual among post-1932 Americans of being unable to divide his fellow citizens into two irreconcilable categories. To Ike, co-existence is possible between Democrats and Republicans, between New Dealers and anti-New Dealers.

Thus, it seems to me, it follows that if the Republicans choose Taft, they choose to perpetuate the mental civil war of the New Deal era. Taftians can't be blamed for a desire to do this. They feel that they have been the victims of one era of history and naturally they desire to reverse the pattern and get their own innings. Their desire to regain power is characteristic of the victims of all revolutionary periods in history. The refugee and exile always dream of a restoration and yearn for a settling of old scores. Usually there is an attempted restoration. But the pages of history have yet to disclose a successful restoration of the old order.

It would follow that if the Republicans choose Ike they will be electing him to pursue the role of the binder of

civil wounds, of the restorer of civil harmony.

They would also be choosing to cut the "millstone" of the Truman Administration loose from the neck of a foreign policy of collective security. Eisenhower is the vehicle whereby the American people could have the foreign policy they have time and time again affirmed and approved, and have it free from the impassioned atmosphere of domestic civil war which has been generated at home over the New Deal issue and which would inevitably be protracted by a choice of Taft.

It really boils down to this: Do we Americans all join the posse to hunt down the really "bad guys" of the world, or do we divide between cattle ranchers and sheepmen and fight each other over local boundary lines, fences, and water rights regardless of what the "bad guys" may do in the meantime to both herd and flock?

The Republicans in Chicago will make that choice for all of us, because if they give priority to the local feud, then we must have our local feud, but if they give priority to the hunt for the horse thieves, then all of us can join the same posse.

'Availability'—the Magic Word

JAY FREID

IN THE curious lexicon of the American politician, "availability" has come to mean political appeal. Popularity symbols are the hub about which availability spins. Popularity symbols mean running qualities; running qualities mean votes.

Since a Presidential candidate must appeal to an electorate composed of many economic, social, political, and sectional groups, he will be successful to the extent that he can be identified with the most important of those groups. On the negative side, allowance must unfortunately be made for prejudice: Only one Catholic and no

Jew has been nominated by a major party. Protestantism is a prerequisite because we are still a predominantly Protestant country, a historic condition that in 1928's recrudescence of Know-Nothingism was overwhelmingly reaffirmed in Al Smith's defeat.

Today military leadership weighs heavier in the "availability" scales than it has in half a century. The record shows that there is a romantic focus upon military leadership and ardent fellowship—or perhaps "followship"—during a major war and the years immediately after one. Eleven of America's thirty-two Presidents have been

military leaders. But though every conflict except the First World War has given us a President who was also a military leader, only the elections of George Washington, Zachary Taylor, and Ulysses S. Grant were specifically accolades for war leadership.

All the generals had enhancing democratic qualities without which mere military heroism would not have sufficed. Andrew Jackson, the Hero of New Orleans, was above all a frontier chieftain and agrarian leader of the rising new democracy beyond the Alleghenies which was beginning to challenge the political supremacy of the