

3.

A VIEW FROM DJAKARTA

by
William Worthy

"Among the Western countries . . . in the period of Kapitalismus im Aufsteig, they had great men such as Disraeli, Bismarck and Gambetta. . . . Now in this age of the Universal Revolution of Man they have nobody. . . . They do not have some 'conceptor' whose voice is worth listening to by all mankind. . . . In the past I called America 'the centre of an idea.' Now I can no longer regard America as the centre of an idea."

—from a speech to the nation by President Sukarno, August 17, 1964 (the Indonesian "Fourth of July")

ARNOLD TOYNBEE has said that an affluent nation that has not known real suffering for decades, a well-armed nation that for 100 years has not known war on its own soil, is at a serious disadvantage in trying to understand and work with the driving forces in a revolutionary world.

One two-hour speech of a Sukarno or one "report to the people" by a Sihanouk can provide everyday Americans with the kind of heart-and-soul insights the development of understanding requires. But few will listen, and as the world closes in on the smuggest nation on earth, we remain hopelessly ignorant, hopelessly deaf to the warning thunder, and hopelessly arrogant. Even the concept of revolution is not widely understood in our culture. Most of the handful of Americans

capable of understanding fearfully look away from the revolutionary future.

Angrily and mistakenly, our editorial writers have begun hurling the "satellite" charge at non-bloc countries that are now opposing U. S. policies, not passively with non-alignment but vigorously with Sukarno's newly articulated concept of confrontation. However we choose to categorize such nations, it is unrealistic to expect them to accept our self-seeking assessments of American purposes and motivations. The suffering Asian is conditioned to reject the political wares of the affluent white bloc. With the Philippines now beginning to churn politically, and even Pakistan no longer in Washington's hip pocket, the market is shrinking for the *status quo* ideology by which most Americans live. "What have we not gone through?" asked President Sukarno of his 104 million countrymen last summer.

"The colonial court, colonial prisons, the poenale sanctie, lands of exile, the gallows? We have gone through that! Military Fascism? We have gone through that! Colonial aggression? We have gone through that! Imperialist intervention and subversion? We have gone through that! Counter-revolution? We have gone through that! And in opposing all those evils we have combined brain with brawn, tactics of struggle with the building of strength, legal action with illegal activities, guerrilla warfare with frontal warfare, diplomacy with confrontation. People with such experience behind them, a tempered nation like this, cannot easily be defeated!"

"Ampera," the title of a new Indonesian intellectual journal, means "the message of the suffering of the people." Officials here freely admit that the economy is not in good shape. Inflation and budget priorities for the military in the Malaysia dispute have helped to intensify the prevailing misery. Pragmatically, the constant political necessity of tuning in on the message of popular suffering binds a Sukarno to a Mao, a Nkrumah to a Kim Il Sung, a Nasser to a Ho Chi Minh, a Sihanouk to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Without exception, these chiefs of state have a dismaying array of domestic problems that demand their undivided attention. But the West fears that such concentration on the people's welfare would hasten the day of full decolonization. In a variety of ways, say the Asians, the United States and its NATO partners are keeping three continents in a state of turmoil. Now from more and more capitals comes the inevitable, unified response (e.g., as summed up editorially in the

WILLIAM WORTHY, a free lance international correspondent, has written for the Saturday Evening Post, Esquire and numerous other publications.

Indonesian Herald, Jan. 8, 1965). "The diplomacy of confrontation has to be transacted on all continents. Neo-colonialism must be resisted and made to fail wherever it threatens national freedom."

Belatedly but clearly, we must try to see where the New Emerging Forces, singly and collectively, are headed. But to gain a sense of the political and economic direction in which they are traveling, it is first necessary to reject *in toto* the contrived propaganda notions that leaders out of favor in Washington are (1) sinister; (2) incompetent and chaotic administrators (Indonesia has been "collapsing" for 15 years, according to segments of the American press, yet people in India are currently dying on the streets of starvation in increasing numbers, but virtually none of this news appears in our press since New Delhi's abandonment of non-alignment); (3) unpopular with their "fear-ridden" peoples; and (4) about to be overthrown.

Having led his fragmented victims of colonialism through the 40 years of unremitting trials, 63-year-old Sukarno belies the calumnies of the Western press, as do many of his counterparts. They have left their mark on every aspect throughout the newly emerging world. These are men of extraordinary personality. To understand the complex countries they rule, we should demand of our newspapers, periodicals and book publishers a maximum of objective information about these men, their writings and speeches. We should ask the television networks for more personal documentaries, free of superfluous editorial dissertations. Looking back at the extraordinary propaganda barrage about Fidel Castro during the first three years of the Cuban revolution, I still wonder why the discerning minority of our reading public — those who remember the lies and contradictions of yesteryear — never rose in wrath at government and mass media when, one by one, the myths and fabrications were quietly withdrawn and discarded.

Kidney troubles did not affect Sukarno's judgment, as one American newspaper speculated in its initial shock at his United Nations walkout. His decision was not "impulsive." The possibility never existed that Washington, London and Moscow could muster enough pressure or sweet talk to induce this political veteran to reverse a decision he fully understood. He did not receive cues or instructions from Peking.

Like Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, "Bung Karno," as he is popularly known inside Indonesia, knows where he wants to go and has firm ideas on how to get there. Art connoisseur, student of history, multilingual, widely traveled, and well informed (he has "read everything," his people tell me), he is clearly guided by a sense of the future so tragically lacking among rootless Americans. In 1930, when we "advanced" Americans thought of "the starving Chinese" within a patronizing missionary framework or in the

nonpolitical terms of *The Good Earth*, this 29-year-old East Javanese colonial was telling a Dutch colonial court in the now famous city of Bandung: "The present struggle for power in China has become the life-blood of the rivalry between the dragons of imperialism. The present struggle for power in China has become the basis of the foreign policies of Japan, America and Britain." A year earlier, the Dutch had thrown him into jail when he declared: "At the end of the world war which is coming, at the end of the Pacific War, at that time Indonesia will become independent." In March, 1933, he persuaded the nationalist movement to reject Dutch offers to elect a few Indonesians to their Parliament. He wrote: "We must pursue a principled policy of non-cooperation, rejecting in principle joining the Volksraad, the States General and the League of Nations."

Eight or nine days before the startling news of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, President Sukarno addressed a luncheon meeting of the American Men's Association in Djakarta. His non-controversial tone seemed in keeping with a monthly get-together of well-fed Americans residing in a revolutionary capital and dining in the country's most expensive hotel. From the gay and light presidential banter I perceived no foreign policy trends, nor projected any notion of better relations with Washington.

"Among my closest friends are Americans," he told his American audience. "For example, Howard Jones. I love him immensely! Mary Lou, I love her immensely! I hope Howard is not jealous about that. She is the only ambassador's wife whom I kiss publicly, because I love her."

Less than a month earlier, a mile away from that luncheon site, student demonstrators had sacked and burned a United States Information Service library to protest the United States-Belgian airlift at Stanleyville. Simultaneously, the Indonesian people as a whole, leaders included, had expressed strong disapproval of the Congo intervention. On November 10, while President Modibo Keita of Mali was on a state visit to Djakarta, his host publicly attacked the United Nations and the role of the Secretary General in Malaysia's birth. "To hell with U Thant!" he cried, repeating it a second time for the benefit of cue-conscious analysts.

Nevertheless, the American community took heart at the luncheon meeting just before Christmas. Even top-level embassy personnel were "reassured" when Sukarno reiterated his admiration for Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt. They chose to forget his direct thrusts at contemporary America in his important annual policy speech on August 17. Thus disarmed, they reacted with dismay on New Year's Day when the same charming head of state pulled his country out of the world organization. "And in that good speech at the luncheon he didn't give even a hint of what was com-

ing,” a surprised and somewhat indignant American remarked to me later.

This sample of Yankee *naïveté* has been widely matched elsewhere during the protracted cold-war period of declining U. S. prestige. Recently a New Yorker who, in the 1950s, worked for USIS in Phnom-Penh reminisced in a letter to this writer: “In Ambassador Strom’s day, Prince Sihanouk used to irritate hell out of the Ambassador, and keep everyone alternately hopping and guessing. . . . How they used to stew over whether or not Monseigneur would attend the Fourth of July reception – or whether he would dump this minister or that ‘haut fonctionnaire’ whom the top brass had been busy cultivating with Scotch and flattery! To me it was a kind of never-never-land operation.”

Despite great contrasts in size, history and leadership style, Cambodia and Indonesia exemplify neutralist disillusionment with a once admired nation. The small Buddhist kingdom and the sprawling island republic have become leaders in Asian efforts to arrest American policies in South Vietnam, the Congo, Cuba and other colonial conflict areas. “As long as I live,” said Prince Norodom Sihanouk on January 8, “I will fight for the disappearance of the despicable American imperialists from the Far East.” President Sukarno is forcefully demanding the world-wide elimination of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Last November, from the vantage point of North Vietnam, I was able to observe the new closeness between Hanoi and the hitherto non-aligned capitals of Phnom-Penh and Djakarta. Together with China, North Korea and conceivably Burma, they constitute the likely Asian nucleus for a revolutionary United Nations. In December, Chau Seng, a top aide to Prince Sihanouk, told me: “Cambodia, which tries to safeguard its strict neutrality, has leaned toward China only through the fault of the U. S. . . . It is the same process which has pushed Cuba toward the socialist camp.”

Revolution, says Sukarno, rejects yesterday. A revolution is a do-it-yourself outfit. A revolution is not a very polite thing. A revolution is forced to recognize a dividing line between friend and foe.

“Yesterday” is easily defined: outside domination in many guises, outside exploitation, outside interference, deliberate stagnation. Thus measured, thus judged, have our postwar policies pointed toward yesterday’s colonial enslavement or tomorrow’s universal liberation? Three months before the Bay of Pigs invasion, almost four years before the Congo airlift, the *Manchester Guardian* (Jan. 12, 1961) reported the verdict: the worldwide consensus that the U. S. has become “the arch imperialist.” At that time the list of countries cited as evidence was considerably shorter than today’s list. But the main instrument for implementing the policies regarded as imperialistic or neo-colonialist was then, and still is, the Central Intelligence Agency.

To Asians seeking their freedom and national sovereignty the name “CIA” has, for 18 years, connoted oil, minerals and blind reaction, political assassination, bribed journalists, corrupted rulers, covert arms drops and officially denied air attacks, piratical coastal forays, Uncle Tom diplomacy, coup d’état and fanatical anti-communism.

In *The Invisible Government* (pages 144-145), the authors report that, during Sukarno’s 1961 visit to Washington, (President) “Kennedy commented to one of his aides: ‘No wonder Sukarno doesn’t like us very much. He has to sit down with people who tried to overthrow him.’”

For CIA plots against Sukarno the British base at nearby Singapore is made to order. Whether or not one agrees with the Indonesians that Malaysia is a neo-colonialist project to protect British investments, Djakarta knows that Washington consorts with London in Kuala Lumpur in return for Whitehall’s moral support in South Vietnam. Both Tory and Labor spokesmen have publicly acknowledged the back-scratching deal. From other military bases in the North Borneo area of the Malaysian Federation, the British have long been



infiltrating arms, supplies and agents across the jungle border into Indonesian Borneo. No knowledgeable Indonesian believes that the CIA has remained aloof.

THESE WESTERN TACTICS have already backfired. D. N. Aidit, chairman of the powerful Indonesian Communist Party, knows this. "Everything is bad for the Americans," he told me joyfully. "There is no way out for the U. S. imperialists. They thought Malaysia as a member of the UN Security Council was a good thing for them. But, on the contrary, they got Malaysia and lost Indonesia." The discerning visitor to Asia can readily perceive the hollow ring "they got Malaysia" brings to Asian ears. But even the London press is speculating that, because of multiple forms of internal strife, the Federation of Malaysia will disintegrate and dissolve. The British miscalculated on their defunct Central African Federation and West Indies Federation. Wrote one Djakarta editorialist: "Such is the dynamics and durability of puppetry! In all but name the British still rule in Malaysia."

When Prince Sihanouk followed Sukarno on a state visit to the White House, President Kennedy's wry comment on the Indonesian head of state would have applied as well to the Cambodian leader. For over a decade, the Prince has also had to protect his government from would-be assassins, *putschs* and well-financed harassments. In the last several months the new vigor of his attacks on the U. S. may indicate that his patience is running out, or that he is under domestic pressure to force a halt. On overt military attacks the count is high: over 300 border violations by our client states of South Vietnam and Thailand with the toll of dead, missing and kidnapping running into dozens; 78 killed by chemicals sprayed from a plane last July; a U. S. "Special Forces" C-123 plane, with eight Americans aboard, shot down by Cambodian forces last October 24. The wreckage I saw on display in Phnom-Penh had been spat upon by angry Cambodians.

The Prince's closest personal brush with death came six years ago. Thanks to imperial rivalries over predominant "influence" in his country, he escaped. For years, the French and British have been unhappy when, ejected from one colonial situation after another, they observe soon afterwards a *de facto* American replacement. It was from them that he received a tip about an American plot hatched and broached at the September, 1958 Bangkok meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO, wrote Walter Lippmann on September 14, 1954, is "the first formal instrument in modern times which is designed to license international intervention in internal affairs." In that period of the '50s John Foster Dulles had branded the concept of neutrality "dangerous and immoral." Despite personal pleas by the Secretary of State and his CIA brother, Allen Dulles, Sihanouk persisted in his dan-

gerous "immorality" by declining to join SEATO.

"Never mind, SEATO will protect you just the same," U. S. Ambassador McClintock told the Prince. Sihanouk was firm: "But we reject SEATO 'protection.' We have never asked for it. We don't want it. We want absolutely nothing to do with SEATO or any other military pacts." The American *chargé d'affaires* bluntly warned: ". . . if Cambodia goes back on her desire to participate in the war against communism, it can provoke Congress into refusing to Cambodia not only military aid but economic aid as well."

But nothing worked. Although anti-Communist in domestic policy, Sihanouk began working with left wing elements in the interests of internal unity. Externally, to defend his neutrality, he journeyed to Moscow and Eastern Europe to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc. In 1958 he recognized China. Commented the British weekly *Peace News*: "Only a foolish man would attempt a dangerous street crossing with eyes to the right or to the left alone, and Norodom Sihanouk is no fool."

UNLIKE WASHINGTON, two of the old colonial powers in Asia have learned to move with the times. The French and the Dutch have abandoned "dark schemes hatched in secret." They maintain good relations with former colonies. As America's reputation in Asia has sunk to lower and lower levels, the prestige of President de Gaulle among anti-colonial forces has risen. He masterfully negotiated an end to the fighting in Algeria and accepted decolonization. Why, ask Asians, did not a man of John F. Kennedy's intellect display the same realism toward Cuba, Vietnam and China?

For years Walter Lippmann has written of "our moral and intellectual unpreparedness for the reality of things." He was keenly disappointed that the new and vigorous Chief Executive did not start to re-educate the American people during the momentum of his 100 day honeymoon. In mid-1961, on a television broadcast, he observed that Kennedy had missed an historic opportunity to build an indispensable popular base for a new and realistic foreign policy. Lippmann understood that, in the final analysis, all efforts to find solutions to international problems become domestic problems. In every government, for every proffered solution, someone has to account to a domestic public. The greatest irony is that the China and Cuba boycott policies have served neither national interest nor the wider needs of the world community. These two emotional binges have been a pandering to the lowest common denominator of popular American ignorance. From the start, policies on Vietnam have been made without any pretense of consulting the people and presenting them with all the facts.

Powerful though the presidency is, Kennedy was still only one man. His failure to puncture myths and to set the country right-side-up does not absolve other elements of the society, including the press, of the same overdue obligation. From half way around the world I perceive little at home to cheer, much to cause despair. Throughout the entire postwar era, when a frightened and misguided nation was slipping ever deeper into foredoomed support of Diems, wild political exiles, "former" Nazi generals and a politics of violence, the press at almost any moment could have forced a healthy national debate. By abdicating, by ignoring its historic duty, by becoming an uncritical instrument of a colonialist international line, the U. S. communications media have made themselves suspect among a billion revolutionary people.

Perhaps the most serious indictment of daily press performance can be made of its fuzzy criteria for newsworthiness. Both consciously and unconsciously, certain vital stories are killed because Communism is in some way involved. On news desks, deep visceral political reactions of ethically weak and emotionally insecure individuals can be decisive; one does not have to postulate a conspiracy theory.

When I conversed with President Sukarno at Bogor Palace, he referred to the lasting damage that the American press has often done to the cause of United States-Indonesian understanding. In a long article last May for *Le Monde Diplomatique* in Paris, he spelled out his strong feelings:

"The forces against which we struggled had still another weapon in their armory: propaganda, a weapon they turn against us without ceasing and without the least regard for the truth.

"Let there be a molehill, they will make a mountain of it. Let there be a mote in our eye, it is a beam to them—a beam put there 'accidentally on purpose'. If there is a mere difference of opinion among us, they cry havoc. If there is drought or flood and a bad harvest, they cry economic corruption and mismanagement. If there is an attempted coup, they have the whole country rising against a dictatorial government. If our youth demonstrates against some blatant act of neo-colonial domination, they have Dutch heads rolling in the gutters, or British women and children in peril of their lives. And always, at all times, on all occasions and at every opportunity, they chant: Communism, Communism, Communism—all is Communism.

"Thus cloaked by the anti-Communist cry and a furious smokescreen of abuse and misrepresentation and outright lies, the forces of the old order in the world fight tooth and claw to maintain their vested privileges and to protect the interests they claim as theirs as though by divine right. And in

this way, the difficulties natural to our situation have been willfully compounded by reaction many times over?"

ASIA OF COURSE has been victimized by the morally corrupt writers and propagandists. But equal damage to East-West understanding results when, for example, an American reporter makes no effort to remain detached and to weed out his strong personal antipathies. In February, U. S. Ambassador Jones asked Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani, the Indonesian Cabinet Minister who coordinates information programs, to grant an interview to Robert Kleiman, visiting correspondent of the *New York Times*. To accommodate the reporter's schedule, Dr. Abdulgani received him at his home on the evening of February 9. Later, following Kleiman's hasty departure from the country—so far as I have been able to ascertain, he was not deported—the Minister's account of an extraordinary half-hour appeared in the Indonesian press:

"Minister Abdulgani, who received the sting of an 'Ugly American,' related that Kleiman had described Indonesia's opinion as 'nonsense' when the Minister contended that Malaysia was created as a neo-colonial base encircling this country. . . . Kleiman accused Indonesia of being ungrateful when Minister Abdulgani outlined to him Indonesia's reasons for pulling out from the UN. Kleiman also said that Indonesia was ungrateful towards the USA which had helped this country in winning its independence. . . . He said Indonesia was also ungrateful to America for its efforts in winning back West Irian (New Guinea). . . . It was Robert Kennedy who returned West Irian to Indonesia's lap, Kleiman was reported by Minister Abdulgani as saying, despite the Minister's contention that West Irian was won by Indonesia herself. . . . Kleiman later told Minister Abdulgani that Indonesia would come kneeling to America to help it out from Communist China's grip. Minister Abdulgani cut short the interview and asked Kleiman to leave his house." Antara news agency later reported that President Sukarno fully backed Dr. Abdulgani's action.

Shortly before being transferred from Washington to another post, Indonesia's ambassador to the United States, Zairin Zain, told the *Baltimore Sun*, in late January, that "the costly 15-year United States aid program to Indonesia probably did more harm than good." The Ambassador made charges often levied elsewhere in Asia.

"During Indonesia's fledgling years foreign powers almost forced the Djakarta government to accept development loans which today are causing severe repayment problems. All too often, these loans were used to finance big prestige projects in population centers which disrupted rather than improved the nation's overall economy.

“Development grants were humiliating because they were given in a way that made recipients feel like beggars who should be profuse and specific in their thanks.

“Under the Food-for-Peace program surplus American crops have been sold to Indonesia for soft local currency. While this might have saved Indonesia the strain of payments in hard currencies, the rupiah payments for American foodstuffs disrupted the internal monetary structure and caused inflation. This in turn promoted smuggling. The people of Indonesia live on 3,000 islands. Smuggling has been a particular problem in the islands around Singapore.

“Many aid officials who went to Indonesia have shown no appreciation for the country’s history, no knowledge of its social structure, no sensitivity for its values and feelings.”

Early in February, the Japanese journal, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, reported that the United States has lost much of its enthusiasm for giving aid in competition with the Soviet Union in light of the prevailing *détente*. The *Indonesian Herald* cited the Japanese analysis as evidence that politics, not humanitarianism, has been the driving force behind the aid program.

Like other leaders of the New Emerging Forces, President Sukarno appears to be uneasy over India’s move from Nehru’s early neutrality policy into a position of “neo-alignment in the American camp.” Last April, some of the Asian-African foreign ministers met in Bandung to prepare for the Second Conference of Heads of State, now scheduled to open on June 29 in Algiers. Sukarno addressed the ministers. Without calling India by name, he referred to the deteriorating economic situation she finds herself in despite “special”

attention she is receiving from a host of Western aid specialists, leading banks and international institutions:


“I heard just now from the Geneva Conference on Trade and Development. It seems that there is a certain sub-continent which of recent years has received an inflow of capital and aid to the sum of \$23 billion. Flowing out of the same area in the same period, \$13.4 billion went in interest, profits and dividends. And the deterioration in the terms of trade accounted for a loss of some \$10.1 billion more.

“What sums are these—and what a balance! Twenty-three billion dollars flowing in; \$13.4 billion, plus \$10.1 billion flowing out. Five hundred million dollars more flowed out than ever flowed in! Five hundred million more flowed out of that region!

“What is this? The investment of capital that leads to the growth of the under-developed? The granting of aid to start off the process of self-propelling growth? I think not, Sisters and Brothers. What is it but a fresh pattern of domination and exploitation?”

After leading the fifth largest nation out of the United Nations, Sukarno promptly sent Foreign Minister Subandrio to Peking, first to “coordinate” the Chinese and Indonesian revolutions of 750,000,000 persons, and then to tie in more effectively with the world revolution, including the Negro revolution in the United States. Before 1965 ends, the world will see flesh and bones on the long-discussed concept of A-A and AAA (Asia, Africa and Latin America) solidarity.

Soon after the June A-A conference in Algiers, Sukarno almost certainly will convene a Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO). Early in Feb-



ruary he publicly suggested the site here in Djakarta. The distinction between the two gatherings will be clear. Based on geography, the June meeting will bring together countries as widely disparate as Haile Selassie's feudalistic, pro-American monarchy and the People's Republic of China. Except on the clearest issues, such as South Africa, the degree of possible cooperation is considerably circumscribed.

Political and ideological lines will become much easier to draw in CONEFO, which is a long time Sukarno dream. Since the U. S. and Britain will never permit a retooling of the UN in accord with A-A demands, CONEFO will logically lead to the establishment of a revolutionary rival. I believe the West, already alarmed by just the suggestion, will be surprised at the number of prospective members. The concept encompasses revolutionary governments, underground and exile revolutionary movements, and what Sukarno calls "progressive forces in the Capitalist countries."

BLAMING THE IDEA ON CHINA, attributing to it an anti-white motivation, the *New York Times* saw in its realization "a nightmare alliance." But to peoples still living under the nightmare of colonialism and racism, CONEFO and its follow-up permanent organization will have enormous appeal. Where neo-colonialism is deemed to hold sway — in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos, South Korea, Britain's new Federation of South Arabia, parts of Africa, virtually all of Latin America except Cuba — the new revolutionary body would play an agitational and financial role. By coordinating sources for arms, guerrilla training and other direct support, it could tip many scales for change in this decade.

Weak even in their own history, Americans are hardly expert at spotting historical turning points in the outer CONEFO world. In the early 1950s one such crossroads slipped by almost unnoticed. Fed up with her futile protests to Washington, the moderately Socialist and pro-Western government of Burma under U Nu indignantly renounced United States economic aid when the CIA stubbornly continued to finance disruptive activities by Koumintang military remnants in remote areas near the sensitive China border. U Nu, then Prime Minister, placed the dignity of Burmese sovereignty above the importance of dollar aid. His government has been succeeded by one far more radical, to which Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia paid a visit in January on his way to Peking. Perhaps Burma will

attend CONEFO as well as the Algiers session.

Sukarno's famous "Go to hell with your aid" remark to U. S. Ambassador Jones — closely followed Cambodia's renunciation of all aid. Once again, the CIA and the military were involved. The United States had decided to support the new and supposedly independent nation of Malaysia which, in fact, even some British Laborites conceded is run from London. A succession of other instances of aid renunciation will follow, marking the spreading conviction that the have-not nations will not collapse if United States aid, United States investment and Yankee tourists are cut off because of Washington's political displeasure. On crucial issues in the General Assembly, Adlai Stevenson will henceforth be scrounging for votes to replace some that heretofore have been automatic.

King Canute was objectively a fanatic. Our politicians today are also fanatics, standing athwart the revolutionary tide, projecting everywhere a cruel image of neo-colonialist backslashers. At home, a backlasher professes to favor racial equality; his objection, he argues, is against the movement's pace or method, or both. From aircraft carriers in distant waters and from billion dollar bases in other people's lands we claim to have retained our anti-colonial and anti-militarist traditions. But we behave remarkably like the camouflaged bigots who "aid" a civil rights organization with a \$5 contribution, try to slow down its progress and then strike out violently if a Negro moves next door.

Whatever it is we think we are defending, from Seoul to Caracas via Leopoldville and Johannesburg, will have been decisively taken from us before this decade expires. A rash of political arrests during February in South Korea where the desire for reunification with the prosperous and reconstructed North is strong; anti-Yankee demonstrations and resumption of Huk activity in the Philippines; a large and violent anti-Malaysia "Tommy Go Home" demonstration on February 13 in Malaysia's capital — these are among the unmistakable auguries.

Conditioned to conditioning, victimized by an effective if hidden domestic propaganda apparatus, we give every sign of continuing along the same path that is already strewn with disaster. The cost in lives and treasure, the enmity of unborn generations will be wholly without recompense. For a brief while it will be possible to go on solemnly believing that grace and deity are on the American side. But we'd be wiser to heed Sukarno's warning that "not even the gods in heaven can stop the flow of history."

4.

A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

by
Marcus Raskin

SINCE WORLD WAR II American policy makers have developed America's foreign relations role as that of world policeman. We assumed this role in Vietnam, a place where we did not begin to comprehend the complex cross-currents of politics, nationalism, personality, tradition, history, and other people's interests. To support this policeman policy our military and CIA programs in Southeast Asia grew to mammoth proportions without rhyme or reason. These programs often reflected little more than the power struggles of the agencies of American bureaucracy, rather than anything that went on in Asia. A report on *Vietnam and Southeast Asia* prepared for four Senators at the request of President Kennedy in 1963 stated:

"It should also be noted, in all frankness, that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act in uniform and enlarging patterns have resulted in an expansion of the U.S. commitment in some places to an extent which would appear to bear only the remotest relationship to what is essential, or even desirable, in terms of U.S. interests."

The United States, by the military and covert way it operated in Vietnam in the past ten years, has nurtured strong anti-white and anti-Western feelings in Southeast Asia. Whether we called it "responsibility" or empire, the facts were that the United States succeeded to the Japanese and French hegemony in Asia without

really knowing why or with what purpose. Empires are very seldom built by design. They start almost accidentally: their dynamics and actions define what they are. Each empire has its own characteristics, although historically they all seem to involve defense of some allies, suppression of certain regimes in favor of others, and a powerful ideology. Ultimately, there are common characteristics in the lack of judgment on the part of leaders who no longer are able to distinguish between real and chimerical interests because of the empire's octopus-like tentacles. Those tentacles, especially if they include extensive military involvement, strangle the judgment of its leaders.

Relating to Vietnam militarily has camouflaged America's real interests and distorted the type of diplomacy and politics which should be employed there. The methods we have followed in Vietnam may not be without their costs in terms of our own nation's stability and freedom of choice. Thus, when we ask the military to undertake projects which are inherently unmilitary, we are courting great danger. It is overdramatic to say that the United States will be faced with a French *Organisation de L'Armee Secrete* (OAS) situation with our military if we substantially expand the war, and then attempt an accommodation, but such seeds are easily sown. For example, the official American policy in South Vietnam is to support a civilian government, but the rank and file military, including high ranking American military officers on the scene, support the South Vietnamese military. Bad habits are learned in such wars and they may too easily be applied at home.

It is hard for American civilian leadership to learn that the military is not a machine which can be started and stopped by pressing a button. By definition of their mission, the military want to follow through to a military victory. We will find that each day American policy makers procrastinate on a political settlement, the war will escalate upward militarily on its own momentum. In this regard the military bureaucratic course of the war is quite instructive. The "special forces" and the army were the military forces under President Kennedy who were given responsibility for the war. After the apparent failure of these forces to pacify the country, the Air Force lobbied for involvement. Using the Gulf of Tonkin as the pretext, the Air

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