

factors in recent years. The two have been inextricably linked by virtue of the fact that any claimant to the succession needs to be backed up by informal sources of power as well as by formal ones. To oversimplify somewhat, the two most important informal career groupings since 1957 have been based on association with the Ukrainian and Leningrad party organizations, and Khrushchev has alternately favored a *dauphin* from each. Taking a leaf from Stalin's book, he has consciously balanced one against the other, as well as against smaller groupings and individuals. When Kirichenko was heir apparent, Kozlov was the countervailing force; early in 1960 Kozlov was elevated to the position of *dauphin*, but Brezhnev soon emerged as the countervailing force. Between the spring of 1962 and that of 1963, the royal favor shifted to Brezhnev, and it is not yet clear whether a new counterweight will emerge and, if so, who it will be. One of the most fascinating spectacles of recent Kremlinology has been the ebb and flow of ex-Ukrainian and ex-Leningrad officials in secondary

posts, parallel with these changes in the heir apparent. Without for one minute seeking to replace one magic "key" to Soviet politics by another, one may say that many of the ups and downs of recent years, which Mr. Linden interprets as clues to fluctuations in Khrushchev's dominance, can far more plausibly be viewed as shifts in the fortunes of these rival informal groupings and the contenders for the succession around whom the groupings were formed—shifts produced not only by their own efforts but by the changing distribution of Khrushchev's favor.

Finally, let me again urge acknowledgment of the multiplicity of conflicting interests, values and ambitions influencing Soviet politics, including the politics of the leadership, and—despite some relaxation of inhibitions which has stimulated the spontaneous interaction of these elements—the persistence of a specific political structure leading to considerable continuity in the way these conflicting elements have impinged upon power relationships between individuals.

After Khrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?

By Robert Conquest

IT IS GENERALLY agreed that the Soviet Union is passing through a transitional stage. What the transition is *from* is clear enough, though there may be various views about the other end of the process, set as it is in a not easily determinable future.

In any case, we may accept that transitions of this type, even such as may later appear to have been comparatively smooth, are marked by great political instability at the top. Moreover, Khrushchev is not politically invulnerable; and if he were, at least he is not immortal.

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Stalin succeeded in thoroughly institutionalizing his regime. The men who came up in it were as conditioned, both consciously in ideology and unconsciously in political habit, to his form of state as the bureaucrats and theorists of legitimism had been to the prevailing system of the 1830's and 1840's. This is not to say that among them there were not those who, either to a greater or to a lesser extent, were susceptible to the impact of facts which no longer accorded properly with their prejudices. But in all of them the heavy ballast from the past was clearly discernible.

After Stalin's death, the political leaders were faced with definite problems, some of which would clearly not admit of old-time solutions. To take but one example of many, the agricultural and—to a lesser extent—the industrial progress of the country was evidently hampered by methods which were no longer ap-

appropriate (if they ever had been). The hard facts of grain and livestock production, which were presented frankly to the Central Committee in 1953-54, gave little encouragement to any who might argue that the old methods would do with no more than minor changes. Yet when we look at the reforms that have been introduced under the auspices of Khrushchev and his entourage, all of whom seemed ready for drastic action, we can see that the supposedly enormous shifts brought about under the new regime have, in fact, looked revolutionary only if compared with the even more conservative projects of some of Khrushchev's colleagues. Neither the "virgin lands" campaign, nor the MTS reorganization, nor even the increased incentive schemes for collective farms, have really come to grips with the basic organization of Soviet agriculture.

The "Khrushchevite" Period

In general terms, the prevailing "Khrushchevite" view is well expressed as follows:

In overcoming the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, the party at the same time considers it necessary to come out against any attempts, under the pretext of struggle against the personality cult, to shake the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, against attempts to rehabilitate anti-Marxist views and tendencies long since smashed in the party.¹

We must make a distinction. The party and its Central Committee contain, in positions of influence, persons whose general views may be described as Stalinist, together with a number of individuals more ready than Khrushchev to move in the direction of concessions to reality. They do not include—or only as isolated individuals such as those occasionally denounced in the student or scientific branches of the party—any true radicals or progressives. The range, for purposes of practical power, runs from extreme right to, at most, left center. In the cultural disputes of 1962-63, for example, we may identify a reactionary policy aimed at bringing the writers to heel as in Zhdanov's time, and a centrist policy of making concessions to the writers and giving them some rope; but the notion of freeing them from party control, the notion, say, that abstract painting or sculpture are really to be tolerated, has no significance at the serious levels of politics. In fact, the current intra-party disputes may perhaps be best described as confrontations between repressionist and concessionist forces, both equally devoted to the notion

¹ *Pravda*, April 20, 1963—extract from the final chapter of the second edition of Lenin's biography.

of the divine right to rule of the self-perpetuating party leadership, but each convinced that its own recipe is the best way of perpetuating that rule.

NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS a real dispute. In the great struggle for power in 1957, the party was not split between progressive and reactionary factions, between right and left. Both the victorious and the vanquished factions contained elements of either political background. Malenkov's foreign policy proposals were evidently more "liberal" than any that Khrushchev was able to put into effect for several years; the same applies to his consumer goods policy. Shepilov's line on literary freedom was at least as advanced as anything which has succeeded it.

Khrushchev therefore found himself faced after 1957 with powerful allies not dependent upon him politically, and whose record, as seen in their previous speeches and alignments, had been definitely with the "left". As we have seen in the past few months, these elements retain great influence within the party.

Although there are no real portents of any relaxation of the grip of the *apparat* (whether in Khrushchevite or "conservative" hands) on the instruments of power, in more than one field there are stirrings or tendencies which may be taken as harbingers of a saner society. If the best should come to the best, it might well be that the Khrushchev era would rank with other attempts to combine despotism with relaxation, such as the Turgot-Necker period or the "Liberal Empire" of 1869-70 in France, both of which came to be regarded as symptomatic of the end of autocracy. Even economically, if we look on a free economy as a pyramid held together by natural laws, and that of Stalin's Russia as an essentially unstable structure held together only by the iron cables of brute force, we may think that *any* turn towards economic stability must automatically render such extraneous trusses less necessary and thereby hasten their decay. But though there are signs of hope, there is a long way to go even in this field.

It is true that one Communist party (in Hungary) did briefly and precariously fall into the hands of a leadership prepared to abandon the monolithic state. But it needs to be noted that the progressive forces which events brought into prominence came very largely from the intellectual, journalistic, academic and student sections of the party, and hardly at all from its *apparat*. Apparatus authorities have, under extreme pressures, abandoned—or rather shelved—collectivization, as in Poland and Yugoslavia. But they have never given up their own dynastic claims.

Moreover, it should be noted that in the Polish, Yugoslav and Hungarian cases a very strong element came into play which could not, as far as one can see, be paralleled in Soviet conditions. In all these cases, the immensely powerful force of nationalism galvanized social groups who otherwise would not have allied themselves with the reformers; and it was this force, too, that seemed to have demoralized the opposition. It is probably true that popular support for Khrushchev, and hence for his policies, is immensely strengthened at present by nationalist resentment against the Chinese. And this may perhaps be regarded as a constant. All the same, it is unlikely to be as effective as the similar anti-Russian feelings in Eastern Europe. It may be, nevertheless, that true progress in the USSR is not going to be possible without some such processes as took place in Warsaw and Budapest in 1956.

Some "Categorical Fallacies"

Observers often divide the Soviet political leadership into three groups. The first consists of seniors like Mikoyan and Khrushchev himself, who served throughout the Stalin period, but who have memories of other and better things and were not, so to speak, molded simply by the old dictator. The second group—sometimes referred to as "the middle generation"—includes men like Kozlov and Suslov, who are assumed to have risen simply as Stalin's creatures and to be thoroughly set in their ways. The third, the "later generation"—sometimes called the "Young Turks"—are assumed to be forward-looking and comparatively untainted by the stamp of Stalinist training.

It is this third group which, one hears, will inherit power. But leaving aside the fact that there is no set reason to assume the victory of any particular younger man over any particular older man (as was shown by Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov), there is still the question of just who these young men are. Let us look at the earlier careers of three of the most prominent "Young Turks":

Dmitri Stepanovich Polianski

Born 1917.

1934—in Komsomol work.

1939-40—Komsomol work in Kharkov.

1942—attended the Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

1942-45—Head of the Political Department of a Machine Tractor Station, then Secretary of a Party Raikom Committee in Novosibirsk.

1945-49—in the *apparatus* of the CC, CPSU.

1949-52—Second Secretary of the Crimean Provincial Committee, CPSU.

Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny

Born 1924.

From 1941—in leading Komsomol work.

1945-46—Second, then First, Secretary, Donets Provincial Committee of the Komsomol.

1946-50—Secretary, then First Secretary, of the Ukrainian Komsomol.

1950—Secretary of the CC, All-Union Komsomol.

Aleksandr Nikolaievich Shelepin

Born 1918.

1940-43—Instructor, Head of Department, then Secretary, Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol.

1943-52—Secretary, then Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol.

Such were the careers of the leading "Young Turks" up to 1952-53—that is, within Stalin's lifetime. And these are the young hopefuls! When we consider that the party's ideology is still in the charge of Stalin's editor of *Pravda*, Leonid Ilichev, and that its international relations are run by a veteran of the Comintern from the 1930's, Boris Ponomarev, we may feel even less sanguine.

And what of the "progressive" Khrushchevite cadre itself? The present Head of the Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, Aleksei Yepishev, followed Khrushchev from Kiev to Moscow in 1951, there to become Deputy Minister of State Security in the "Doctors' Plot" period, 1951-53! The present Head of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee, Nikolai Mironov, was also brought up from the Ukraine and put into "leading work" in the USSR MGB in 1951, remaining in state security posts until recently. The Head of the Party Organs Department (RSFSR), Churaiev, also followed Khrushchev to Moscow in 1951 and worked in the central *apparatus* through the worst period.

THE "YOUNG TURKS," in any case, are young in comparison with the present top leadership, but they are not young by the standards prevailing in periods of political change. The first Politburo in 1917 had only two members over 40 and none over 50. This is not to dispute that a younger cadre will eventually rise in the party. But here again we must ask ourselves: Who are the ones most likely to emerge?

Unless great changes occur, the answer is a depressing one. A new generation of political leaders will arise,

as ever, from among the party secretaries of the lower levels. These in turn will be the men who, in their late teens or early twenties, had been the most enthusiastic of Komsomol members and at the same time the most skilled committee intriguers in their university, technical college, or place of work. This would not be a very promising basis for a future leadership even within the Conservative or Labor parties in Britain—nor doubtless in their American equivalents. And even though we can be sure that the Komsomol is not so crudely or brutally managed a body as it was in the 1930's and 1940's, there is still considerable evidence that its spirit and its leadership have more in common with the Stalinist generation than with the Yevtushenkos or, for that matter, the Ehrenburgs. The youth gangs who wreck the poetry readings at the Mayakovsky statue, the young prigs who publicly censure girls' hairstyles or break into dance halls to stop excessive jazz—such are the activist rank and file. As for the secretaries, let us simply cite the words of the present Komsomol First Secretary, Sergei Pavlov:

We are amazed at the tendency of certain producers, scenario writers and playwrights to draw comparisons between Komsomol activists and workers and so-called ordinary people (as if the former were not ordinary people). In these films and plays the ordinary boys and girls at least bear a resemblance to normal people, but the youth leaders, the Komsomol activists, are invariably

² *Molodoi Kommunist*, Moscow, April 1958.

Leaders, Too, Are Mortal

Socialist society is strong in its organization and consciousness; in it all forces must be so deployed that there is rhythm in all phases of life, in the struggle for the further advance of this society to the great goal of mankind—communism. And who can and should organize this? The party of Communists! The party itself singles out from its midst a leading nucleus in which the most worthy and experienced leaders are assembled.

I think no one will assume that in talking of this I have my own particular position in the party in mind. I am already 69 years old and have the right to say this. [Stormy, prolonged applause.] After all, everyone understands that I cannot hold the posts I now occupy in the party and the government forever. Therefore, in talking about this, I am thinking not of myself but of our Leninist party, of the Soviet people, of the great cause of communism.

—Khrushchev, addressing the RSFSR Industrial and Construction Workers' Conference, *Pravda*, April 26, 1963.

hidebound bureaucrats, formalists and fools. . . . And really, the figure of the activist migrates from book to book, from play to play, from film to film, always wearing the same silly mask of a bureaucrat, a colorless, stupid person.²

The recent controversy about "fathers and sons" is certainly significant in this context. The notion, evidently prevalent among the genuine post-Stalin and anti-Stalin generation, that a certain conflict subsists between themselves and their elders was heatedly rebuffed by Khrushchev himself. Perhaps even more interesting, it was pointed out that a similar controversy took place in the 1920's; at that time it was unequivocally settled in favor of the party veterans and such of the younger men as accepted their line. In a formal statement by the veteran Stalin-and-Khrushchev spokesman V. Stepanov, "the problem of fathers and sons" was branded as "a rotten idea of Trotskyite doctrine."³ In fact, it is safe to assume that few of the real young men and women—*e.g.*, genuine "student" types—will be allowed to rise to prominent positions. Instead, a traditionalist Komsomol clique will most probably rise to the top.

Views and Policies

So far, all this is negative criticism. Is there anything more positive to say? I think there is. Though it is true that the young Khrushchevites were heavily indoctrinated under Stalin, they *may* yet turn out to be rather more open-minded than their immediate predecessors. In the first place, they seem to have risen quickly and without painful incident, so that their self-confidence may not have been sapped—or sapped as much as that of older men—by the continual, cumulative and ultimately exhausting friction of year upon year of Stalinist-style infighting. Secondly, some of them at least are fresh enough to have identified themselves, for factional purposes, with a more forward-looking policy. The ways in which power and policy considerations operate in Soviet political minds is a complex one. But it must at least seem likely to a Khrushchevite, to put it at its crudest, that his personal progress would not be great if he simply submitted to and supported a conservative take-over.

For purposes of comparison, let us take one clear example in which factional and personal attachment have affected policy decisions. In the military controversy of 1962 about the relative merits of the rocket and conventional forces, almost without exception the pro-

³ *Pravda*, April 16, 1963.

rocket men among the generals were those who had served along the southern fronts in World War II. This was obviously not the result of some geographic or climatic influence. The point was that these were the men who had worked most closely with Khrushchev. Thus we may conclude that on a matter which was in principle solely technical, opinions were determined to a large extent by the political or factional allegiance of the principals. We may similarly conclude that the young "Khrushchevites," too, support the opinions of the leader even though their training and background may dictate altogether different solutions to given problems. To be sure, the young party *apparatchiki* can abandon these opinions as soon as their patron is no more. But this is to assume a pure and conscious cynicism on their part: in practice, people become genuinely attached to the views with which they and their faction associate themselves. Indeed, the motives that lead them to such views in the first place may often be mixed: it is easy to attach oneself sincerely to opinions which suit one's career, but less easy to relinquish them when they seem to block it. This may be due as much to subjective reasons as to the fact that it is not easy for a man associated with a specific policy to convince his colleagues and rivals that he has given it up for purely meritorious reasons.

Some Possibilities

We may, therefore, see a continuation of Khrushchev-style "anti-Stalinism"—policies based on partial insight into the present condition of the Soviet Union and on willingness to undertake certain changes required by the objective situation. What seems unlikely is that either this group of leaders, or any other that might conceivably succeed it, would be willing to effect fundamental and necessary reforms, such as a virtual, even if not formal, abandonment of collectivization. Above all, one can trust them not to make the truly basic change of abandoning the principle of rule by the self-perpetuating *apparatchiki*.

But if genuine "liberalism" carries no weight at present in the higher councils, it most certainly does among the writers and students—and to dismiss its potential significance would be a mistake. In every great established empire with an entrenched bureaucracy and police system, the opposition view, and that is to say the potential revolution, has been carried initially by intellectuals without access to the political machinery. The histories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century show this clearly. It is

true that these countries allowed more scope for oppositional activity than is the case in the Soviet Union. But though overt organization in opposition to the regime is no more possible in Moscow now than it was in Budapest in 1955, it should be clear by now that even a totally unorganized and inchoate stratum of intellectuals can be the seedbed of future change.

The question is, rather, whether the forthcoming succession crisis will create a climate in which these possibilities may crystallize into political realities. On first glance the answer is No. The momentum of the bureaucracy can certainly be relied upon to keep the present political structure intact even during a phase of great instability at the top. The most intriguing question, however, is: How long will that phase last? A long-lasting series of crises, following one another in rapid succession, with second-rate and third-rate men miscalculating and wildly scrabbling for power, might result in opinions becoming truly "hardened." For, if the mechanism of political rule deteriorated to this extent, we might find in the *apparat* itself that crumbling of self-confidence on the part of the ruling class which Lenin speaks of as being one of the conditions of a successful revolution.

Alternatively, such circumstances might lead to the opposite—namely, a military dictatorship. Its viability, however, would be short-lived unless it came to terms with some form of political leadership. Military dictatorships have sometimes allied themselves with old and defeated bureaucracies. Yet sometimes, too, they have provided transitions to more democratic regimes. It should be noted, however, that in present-day Russia the liberal intellectuals are probably even more opposed to the ambitions of the military than to the regime.

Distant prospects? Perhaps. Carrying speculation too far? Surely not. For without considering all long-range possibilities it is impossible to appraise even the immediate picture.

The *Apparat*

Leaving aside a form of liberalization that could come about only as a result of political disintegration, let us cast a glance at the potential weakness of the *apparat*. It is twofold. In the first place the political struggle continues. In the second, there is no evidence of any leadership of any weight, or *mana*, ready to take over in case of Khrushchev's death or displacement. When a man of Kozlov's limited abilities can seriously be presented as a successor, we are clearly in a situation pregnant with instability.

Apart from Khrushchev himself, the one element of stability in the Soviet regime is the old *apparat*: yet it, too, is rife with clashes between Khrushchevite and more conservative attitudes and ideas. We have considered the possibility of a "Young Turk" Centrist regime. But we cannot ignore, not by any means, the contrary tendency. Khrushchev, by political skill and personal strength, has dragged the *apparat* into courses not necessarily palatable or natural to it. It is possible that a successor cadre is now adequately indoctrinated to continue his line. But it is equally possible that the conservative element will regain its grip and at least slow things down very considerably.

This likelihood presents itself not only because of the doubtful past of Khrushchev's own supporters, but also because of the power represented by the bulk of the ruling group, which is likely to have been less affected by recent counter-indoctrination. Men like Aleksandr Zasiadko and Dmitri Ustinov, veterans of Stalin's Council of Ministers, are even now Vice-Premiers. Old *apparatchiki* of great experience and prestige, though now often in lesser positions, have remained members of the Central Committee through thick and thin, purge or no purge. For example: Nikolai Patolichev, the experienced member of the central *apparat* whom Stalin made Secretary of the Central Committee in 1946; Nikolai Mikhailov, Stalin's First Secretary of the Kom-somol and later Secretary of the Central Committee; Nikolai Pegov, a departmental head in the Central Committee from 1946, and eventually a CC Secretary. Of the nine surviving members of Stalin's last Secretariat—that is, the leading party *apparatchiki* of his most iniquitous period—seven, including the then heads of the Party Organs and Agitprop Departments, remain members of the present Central Committee. These are men of great experience, representative of a very large group of experienced party functionaries whose good will any regime at present would be glad to secure; whose neutrality, even, would be beneficial;

and whose opposition would without doubt be a dangerous threat.

Moreover, after Stalin had executed Bukharin and the Rightists in 1938 and had at the same time liquidated Kirov, Ordzhonikidze and other leaders, there was in effect no alternative government. Except for the Old Bolshevik Grigori Petrovski, safely tucked away as deputy director of the Museum of Revolution in Moscow, and Trotsky in exile awaiting murder by ice-axe, there was no such thing as a living ex-member of the Politburo. The position now is different. Men who have held the highest positions in the party and government, including three ex-premiers, remain "available." It is true that they have been denounced and vilified, but it would be a mistake to assume that their political potentials have been effectively and irrecoverably destroyed. Indeed, there are prominent figures who have not been publicly attacked at all, or only barely so, such as Andrei Andreiev and Pantelemon Ponomarenko.

NONE OF THIS is to predict a truly "Stalinist" restoration. But it serves to remind us of the power of inertia, the possibility of a heavy, slow, clumsy swing to "conservatism"—perhaps irresistible to the low-grade "sub-Khrushchevites" who would survive the First Secretary. If even the most skilled operator has had difficulty in containing this tendency, then it should prove hard for any Brezhnev or Polianski to manage.

One thing, at any rate, is certain: the political struggle will go on. In all probability it will become more frenetic and unstable. Its immediate prospect is for the victory of a Khrushchev-type centrist faction. But the seeds of a more reactionary regime are in existence. These are the elements of the fairly immediate future. Beyond that one can only say that if the party is to cope with the circumstances facing the USSR, it will have to change a great deal and that such change cannot be simple and may not be peaceable.

The Communist States and Western Integration

By Marshall D. Shulman

IN DISCUSSING THE process of integration in Western Europe, Communist writings invariably put the word integration in quotation marks and often preface it with "so-called" in order to drive home the central point that, while technological progress does create a tendency toward international economic activity, the capitalist system is inherently incapable of an effective response to this necessity.

Nevertheless, the movement toward European integration, with or without quotation marks, has become a major factor in the evolution of Soviet ideology and policy. Despite its ups and downs, the Common Market in particular has resulted in profound modifications in Soviet ideas concerning contemporary capitalism and the present configuration of power; it has led to a radical revision of Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance—the Soviet counterpart organization for Eastern Europe); and it has greatly complicated Moscow's leadership of the world Communist movement. Over the long run, if the non-Communist nations are able to sustain a movement toward growth and integration, this development gives promise of leading to fundamental transformations in Soviet policies and in the Soviet system itself.

That this eventuality is contemplated with skepticism in Moscow should occasion no surprise, but there are

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interesting differences of tone and conviction in the skepticism expressed at various times and places within the Communist world. Indeed, the Soviet assessment of the Western integration movement has evolved considerably in recent years through lively debate and compromise, which have been implicitly reflected in the occasional formulations on which the Soviet analysis, like a suspension bridge, is supported.

A Brief Look Backward

From the first days of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union championed the cause of nationalism in Western Europe as an anti-coagulant against the impulse toward integration. "Raise the banner of nationalism!" Stalin urged the Communists outside the Soviet sphere in an effort to counter the integration tendencies of the European Recovery Program, which Moscow perceived as a device for establishing American hegemony in Europe and luring away the states of Eastern Europe from Soviet allegiance. The defense of sovereignty and national independence became the keynotes of the Communist campaign to organize an all-class opposition to the American aid programs. These themes also characterized the Communist attack on the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Coal and Steel Community, and they were significant factors in the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954.

The first phase of the Soviet response to the European Economic Community, from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to Prime Minister Macmillan's announcement toward the end of July 1961 of Britain's interest in joining, was characterized by a low-keyed denunciation