

justly deserved. It is as if we now shelved everything that has been said here, and indeed, if we do not want the masses to hear it, we must shelve it. But if we tell the masses what the situation is, we must also show them the road, we must lead them on the road to battle, for this road is much easier in many nations of Latin America than it was in Cuba.³⁴

Such a statement can only be interpreted as an expression of Castro's will to impose his leadership and his policy of armed insurrection on the Communist movements of other Latin American countries. But since he spoke the above words, he has been forced to take a step backwards. The Soviet-Cuban joint communiqué which he signed in his capacity as First Secretary of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) and Prime Minister of Cuba includes the following passage:

The policy of both the Soviet and Cuban parties is based on the fact that the main concern of our area is the transition from capitalism to socialism, which began with the great socialist October revolution. This inevitable historical process is the same for all countries in that which is basic—in the essence of the economic-social and political-social transformations—but takes a different course, with different concrete forms, depending on the

³⁴ Translated from the Prensa Latina version of the speech, as published by *El Siglo*, January 18, 1963.

domestic and foreign conditions and peculiarities of each country. The PURS and the CPSU consider that the question of peaceful or non-peaceful transition to socialism, in one country or the other, will be definitely solved by the peoples themselves and in accordance with the practical ratio of class forces and the degree of resistance of the exploiting classes to the socialist transformation of society.³⁵

This statement will certainly be used by the Old Guard leaders of Latin American communism as an argument against Castro's claim that the Cuban example is valid for their countries. Yet if he had not agreed to sign the communiqué, he would hardly have obtained Soviet recognition of his PURS as a fraternal party and full member of the world Communist movement. It would be rash indeed to assume that he will now give up his efforts to persuade or force the other Communist parties of Latin America to follow his road to socialism—the road of terrorism and guerrilla war.

The mere fact that a party of such heretical tenets as the Cuban PURS is now admitted to the Communist fraternity is a striking indication of how far ideological diversification and disintegration of discipline have already spread in the Communist camp.

³⁵ Cuban-Soviet joint communiqué, Prensa Latina text, *El Siglo*, May 28, 1963.

Castro Between Moscow and Peking

By Andres Suarez

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT places the regime of Fidel Castro in a difficult position. To appreciate the seriousness of the Cuban predicament, it is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between Cuba and the two largest Communist states. It is the purpose of this article to reconsider the development of Cuba's external relations since 1959 and thus throw some light on Castro's current dilemma.

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During his first few months in power, the Cuban leader appeared to have the most serious doubts about his future relationship with the world Communist movement. In a speech made on May 8, 1959, upon his return from the United States and South America, he reaffirmed his humanist aims and insisted that power was "firmly" held by the 26th of July Movement. A few days later, he signed the Agrarian Reform Act, sent Ernesto Che Guevara, one of his closest associates, on a trip to the Far East, and on May 21, during one of his television interviews, branded as counterrevolutionary the disorders which the Communists had instigated in Oriente Province. At the same time, *Revolución*, the official organ of the 26th of July Movement, published a strong attack

against the Communist party (PSP-Partido Socialista Popular) newspaper *Hoy*, which was shortly seconded by a resolution of the Sugar Workers' Congress. The somber tones of Blas Roca's report to the Plenum of the party's National Directorate, which had been hastily summoned to discuss the ominous events, was easily understandable. "We are living through a critical moment of the revolution," the veteran Cuban Communist leader said, adding that "all this threatens to break the over-all revolutionary solidarity."¹

But events soon proved that Roca's fears were unfounded. By June 12, 1959, Castro reshuffled his cabinet, eliminating some of the ministers whom the PSP had called "Plattists" and "laggards"—*i.e.*, those who had acted as brakes on the revolution. He did not, however, substitute Communists for those ousted. Four days later, the Revolutionary Students' Council (DER), after interviewing Castro at the presidential palace, issued a statement supporting "unity," that is, collaboration with the PSP. On July 3, Castro declared that he considered it "hardly honorable" to press his attack on the Communists just to avoid being called a Communist himself. The PSP thus achieved what it had been waiting for: a gesture which would allow them to "ratify and strengthen the party's support of the government and its Prime Minister, Fidel Castro."²

In order to understand Castro's peculiar tactics, it is useful to re-examine briefly his political position at that time. He knew by mid-1959 that, as his brother Raul had expressed it in a May Day speech, "if the revolution stops, the revolution dies."³ He also knew that if the revolution were to spread abroad, he might gain even firmer national support at home. He could then definitely assert his dominance over the increasingly rebellious 26th of July Movement, and all internal changes could be justified in the name of the sacred national interest. If, on the other hand, that road should be closed, Castro had two other alternatives. He could adapt his program to the confused wishes of the majority, *i.e.*, the 26th of July Movement, and govern us a *primus inter pares*; or, he could try to crush the majority with the help of the minority, the PSP, which not only had a clear program to offer, but also showed docility because of its lack of participation in the war against Batista. With the Communists and with the external support of the USSR, Castro could set up a regime that would legitimize his personal power and allow him to break the bonds which his former comrades-in-arms were trying to impose upon him.

¹ *Hoy*, May 26, 1959.

² *Ibid.*, July 4, 1959.

³ *Ibid.*, May 3, 1959.

Castro decided to try the path of conquest first. While continuing to eulogize the 26th of July Movement and censure the Communists (so as to keep his second choice open), he organized, and on June 14 began, the invasion of the Dominican Republic. This operation was of extraordinary importance to him; indeed, he became so involved in it that he asked the public to support it one day and denied its existence the next.⁴ But the invasion failed completely, and the man who still claims to have changed the revolutionary strategy of the hemisphere suffered total defeat. Not only were almost all the members of the expedition killed, but the Cuban leader of the group, Commander Delio Gomez Ochoa, who had enjoyed Castro's absolute confidence, became Trujillo's collaborator after being taken prisoner.⁵ Everything that has happened in Cuba since has had some relation to this failure. While the meaning of the defeat remained blurred in Cuba, it proved disastrous for Castro's relations with the United States Government, which had been watching with some anxiety the new "agrarian reformer's" indiscriminate efforts to buy armaments and seagoing vessels.⁶ The Dominican adventure and the threat it posed to stability in the Caribbean seemed to justify the apprehensions felt in the United States as well as within the Organization of American States.

In Castro's view, on the other hand, the revolution now had to be deepened and intensified in order to survive isolated on a small island 90 miles off the coast of the most powerful nation on earth. That meant that more social reforms had to be promulgated—a decision that resulted in new and increased resistance to the government. In turn, this resistance became a lever in the hands of Castro's enemies, his rivals, and even his supporters, who, having shared with him the same risks, were unwilling to acknowledge his right to total power.

Seeking Alliance With Moscow

Castro therefore looked to the Communists for support. He knew, of course, that he would thus increase the misgivings of the United States; and he knew equally well that he would then have to look for external allies. Under the circumstances, he had only one possible choice—the Soviet Union.

By mid-1959, however, the USSR was pursuing the "spirit of Camp David," which was incompatible with

⁴ Castro's exhortation, *Hoy*, June 16, 1959; denial, *ibid.*, June 17, 1959.

⁵ In his report to the October Plenum, Blas Roca said that "Gomez Ochoa strongly recommended to Trujillo that he keep Hubert Matos in mind." *Hoy*, November 8, 1959.

⁶ See, *New York Times*, June 26, 1959.

Castro's aspirations. Characteristically, Castro appears to have made known his displeasure with the new turn of Soviet-American relations since the PSP, in a resolution of its National Directorate, felt obliged to make the following comment on the subject of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting:

There have been doubts and reservations in our country regarding those talks on the assumption—for which no reasons are given—that they might result in agreements . . . harmful to small countries such as Cuba. . . . To harbor such doubts would only serve the interests of those who favor the cold war and international reaction.⁷

But censure has never stopped Castro. When in October 1959 the United States requested the British Government not to supply Cuba with military planes, the Cuban Ambassador to Washington declared that "if this opposition prevails, the Government of Cuba might consider the possibility of surmounting its supply difficulties by resorting to other sources open to them."⁸ On November 3, *Revolución* suggested that Mikoyan, then visiting Mexico, be invited to Cuba. The visit took place in January 1960. It resulted in the signing of a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement which caused much irritation in the United States and in turn provoked a number of political errors in Washington.

When early in March a bill was sent to the United States Congress reducing the import quota for Cuban sugar by 192,000 tons, Castro's internal position was strengthened immeasurably. This time even the PSP found it necessary to rally to Castro's side. A resolution passed by the Plenum of its National Directorate charged that the United States Government was transforming its hostile attitude towards Cuba into direct action and open support of aggression." It expressed its thanks for the help extended to Cuba by the "socialist" countries and concluded that "at the present time we need even more of their solidarity, and we are sure that we shall have it."⁹ This strong statement, it should be noted, was adopted in spite of the moderate report of the PSP Secretary General, Blas Roca.

It may indeed have been this unexpectedly rebellious mood within the party that moved Roca to decide on a trip to China and the Soviet Union. He saw Khrushchev in Moscow at the beginning of May, shortly after the U-2 incident, and it may be that by then the Soviet Premier had already made up his mind to wreck the forthcoming Paris summit conference. He may therefore have been ready to listen to the Cuban in a sympathetic frame of mind. While we do not know what

particular decisions were reached on that occasion, it is significant that on May 7, during Roca's visit, diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR were established, and that a few days later Khrushchev sent his first greetings to the Cuban people.

May and June 1960 were decisive months for the Cuban revolution, and Castro was, as always, on the offensive. On May 21, President Dorticós began a trip through Latin America. At the end of May, William Galvez, Inspector General of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, was in Peking visiting Mao Tse-tung. In Moscow, early in June, Nuñez Jimenez, director of INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Reform), was inviting Khrushchev to visit Cuba, and on June 23, Raul Castro left Cuba "to attend the Spartakiade" in Prague, Czechoslovakia.¹⁰ On July 7, the appointment of Sergei Kudriavtsev as Soviet Ambassador to Cuba was announced, and the very next day Castro pledged that automatic weapons would soon be distributed to his militiamen. On July 26, he confirmed that the weapons had already arrived in Cuba.

These gun shipments through Preston, a small port in Oriente Province, have been obscured by the public interest in Khrushchev's symbolic allusion to the use of Soviet rockets in the defense of the Cuban regime. "Figuratively speaking," the Soviet Premier stated on July 9, 1960, "Soviet artillerymen, in the event of necessity, can support the Cuban people with their rocket firepower if the aggressor forces in the Pentagon dare begin an intervention against Cuba."¹¹ Undoubtedly to Khrushchev's great dismay, Castro was quick to seize upon this somewhat enigmatic pronouncement.¹² The very next day, from his sickbed, he thanked the Soviet Union for "the totally spontaneous" gesture, asserting, in contradiction to Khrushchev, that the rockets in question were real and not token.¹³ Thereafter the younger Castro was summoned to Moscow, and, significantly, the communiqué that was issued at the conclusion of the discussions there made no mention of rockets and

⁷ This is an explanation for the trip given in *Hoy*, June 29, 1960.

⁸ *Revolucion*, July 11, 1960.

⁹ The following autumn, in an interview with Carlos Franqui, the then Editor-in-Chief of *Revolucion*, Khrushchev again refused to give any concrete meaning to his July 9 pronouncement: "I should like such statements to be really symbolic, as the enemies of the Cuban revolution say. For this purpose it is essential that the imperialist threat of intervention against Cuba does not resolve itself into military operations. Then there will be no need to test the reality of our statements concerning armed assistance to the Cuban people against aggression. Is this clear?" *Revolucion*, October 28, 1960; *Pravda*, October 30, 1960.

¹⁰ *Hoy*, July 12, 1960.

⁷ *Ibid.*, October 8, 1959.

⁸ *Ibid.*, October 18, 1959.

⁹ *Ibid.*, March 16, 1960.

nuclear arms.¹⁴ Fidel Castro, however, paid no notice. In the Havana Declaration issued the following September, he again expressed his thanks for "the rocket support of the Soviet Union."¹⁵

Relations with China

Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956 and the destalinization process that followed had caused a veritable turmoil in the PSP—until then one of the staunchest followers of the Stalinist line among the Communist parties of the world. Towards the end of 1956, just about at the time that Fidel Castro was landing in Oriente "to be free or die," Blas Roca was applying for a passport to travel to China as an ordinary citizen.¹⁶ (He needed to protect his position within the national Communist movement.) The trip—from the Chinese point of view at least—was a success. After this journey, Roca invariably spoke of Mao as a "truly wise man" and throughout 1959 repeatedly referred to the Chinese experience as an example for the Cuban revolution.

The Chinese followed the Cuban developments of 1959 with much interest. By the spring of 1960 they were convinced, as Kuo Mo-Jo was to say in a ceremony marking the founding of the Association for Chinese-Latin-American Friendship, that "the storm of the national and democratic revolution had arrived in Latin America."¹⁷

During his trip to Peking in March 1960, Blas Roca saw Mao, and at their farewell meeting the Chinese leader promised the Cuban revolution the support of his 650 million countrymen.¹⁸ The meeting appears to have been a cordial one, but difficulties in the relationship between the two Communist parties soon made themselves felt.

On his return trip, as we already know, Roca was received by Khrushchev in the Kremlin. The Cuban Communist was not only aware by then of the disputes between the Chinese and the Russians, but also apprehensive lest the "leftist deviation" to which Castro was inclined threaten the monolithic power of the PSP. Having been forgiven for his Stalinist sins, Roca apparently decided then to disengage himself from the Chinese and return to the bosom of his traditional bosses in Moscow.

Castro's course of alignment within the Communist camp was quite different. On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower virtually excluded Cuban sugar from the United States market, and in August the Cuban Premier responded by nationalizing most American enterprises in Cuba. Khrushchev thereafter rushed to Castro's rescue, promising to buy the 700,000 tons of sugar which the United States had refused to take. The Soviet intervention brought danger as well as relief to Cuba, for the island would now be dependent on the USSR for economic survival. This was a development that was not unwelcome to the PSP—by that time about as docile and well-organized a mercenary corps as Khrushchev has ever had; Castro, however, had not fought to escape from the claws of the "Yankee paper tiger" in order to fall into the clutches of the Russian bear.

The Cuban Premier perceived only one way out of the dilemma: to exploit the angry Sino-Soviet dispute and seek protection of his interests in Peking. In July 1960, Odon Alvarez de la Campa, the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Cuban Labor Federation (CTC), traveled to China and at the conclusion of his visit signed with Chinese union leaders a joint statement fully supporting the Peking party line.¹⁹ At about the same time, Cuba and China signed a trade agreement which *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) praised as an example of good relations between states "with different social systems."²⁰

During the months that followed, Castro pressed on for Sino-Cuban amity. His progress reached an important milestone on September 2, 1960, when he announced in the Declaration of Havana formal diplomatic recognition of the Peking regime. Relations which, in the words of Castro, "Cuba had up to now maintained with the Formosan puppet regime supported by the Yankee Seventh Fleet," were suspended.²¹

In exchange for this gesture, there came the following October a generous Chinese response. Arriving in Peking empty-handed from Moscow, Che Guevara was offered by Mao a trump-card which in the future the Cubans could use to extract better economic terms from the Soviets: a trade agreement providing for the purchase by the Chinese of 1,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar per annum and a credit of \$60,000,000 to Havana.

On April 16, 1961, on the eve of the doomed Bay of Pigs invasion, Fidel Castro spoke in Havana about "the

¹⁴ *Pravda*, July 21, 1960; *Hoy*, July 22, 1960.

¹⁵ *Revolucion*, September 3, 1960.

¹⁶ See *Hoy*, May 6, 1959.

¹⁷ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 20, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2228, March 31, 1960).

¹⁸ *Revolucion*, May 5, 1960.

¹⁹ A few days later, however, after a meeting with Soviet Union leaders, Alvarez de la Campa signed a communiqué in Moscow supporting the Soviet view. See *Hoy*, Aug. 3, 1960.

²⁰ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 26, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2308, August 2, 1960).

²¹ *Revolucion*, September 3, 1960.

socialist context of our revolution." Next day, *Revolución* carried a banner that read, "Long live our socialist revolution!" while the Communist *Hoy*, as if trying to hide its confusion, could only say: "The USSR will help us." In the days that followed, *Hoy* referred timidly to the "patriotic, democratic, and socialist" revolution, but on April 28, it announced that "the people were waiting for Fidel's statement," and asserted that "Cuba will continue building its socialism."

This is not the place to dwell in detail on the anguish experienced in those days by the PSP theoreticians, or on the struggle that led to the compromise agreement of July 26, 1961, between Castro and the Communist leaders. Suffice it to say that on that date Castro accepted the Communist thesis regarding the stage reached by the Cuban revolution ("to say that our revolution is a socialist one," he declared, "means that the revolution is advancing toward a socialist regime"), and that the PSP, on its part, agreed that the establishment of a single unified party would be preceded by a preparatory period during which the 26th of July Movement, the Revolutionary Students' Council, and the PSP would operate still as self-contained groups, within the framework of ORI, the newly formed Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. Thus the exigencies of Marxist-Leninist dialectics were satisfied and Castro remained in power as before—alone.

Quest for Admission to the Camp

Things were not so easy, however, when recognition for Castro's brand of socialism was sought from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The difficulties that arose are easily explained. First, there was an ideological problem. It was precisely with countries such as Cuba, Guinea and Mali in mind that the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties in November 1960 devised the concept of the "national-democratic" state which, providing for the collaboration of all the "progressive" forces, was to represent in many underdeveloped countries a transitional stage on the road from pre-capitalist and semi-feudal conditions to "socialism." Obviously, from a Marxist point of view, Cuba could not progress within only five months from "semi-feudalism" to "socialism."

The Soviets, however, had another and more important reason for their reluctance to accept Cuba as a full-fledged member of the Communist camp. They wanted to avoid further commitments to the Cubans, fearing the danger of being drawn by Castro into a conflict with the United States. Yet the guarantees that come with membership in the Communist camp

was precisely what Havana wanted. It was therefore no accident when Castro announced on April 16, 1961, that the Cuban revolution was a "socialist" one.

Castro's need to join the camp had become urgent in December 1960 when, on his way back from Peking, Guevara signed in Moscow a trade treaty with the USSR. In the communiqué announcing the agreement, the Soviets once again failed to make any reference to rockets and simply stated that they would "render Cuba full support in defending its independence against aggression." "Both parties declare emphatically," the statement concluded, "that world peace will never be endangered or violated in any way by actions of the Soviet Union or Cuba."²² The Soviets thus made their attitude quite clear, and Castro could no longer talk about rockets. If he wanted to receive the guarantees he had sought when he approached the Communist bloc, there was no other alternative for him but to advance full speed towards communism at home and worm his way into the bloc. The Soviet leaders probably knew well what Castro meant by his proclamation of a "socialist" revolution in Cuba, but they were in no mood to renew Khrushchev's early rocket commitment, of which they had rid themselves in the treaty communiqué four months before.

It would take Castro more than a year to break down Moscow's resistance, and space does not allow discussing here all the events that marked that long and hard-fought battle. The first signs of success came on April 15, 1962, when greetings to "the heroic people of Cuba, who have embarked on the path of building socialism" were included among the slogans prepared by the Central Committee of the CPSU for the forthcoming May Day celebrations.²³ But even this statement did not quite satisfy Castro; it was only with the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba that his country's equal status with the other members of the Communist bloc seemed assured.

The problems of Castro's relations with Communist China were somewhat different since the difficulties with Peking were mainly of an ideological nature. Until Guevara's visit to Peking in December 1960, the Chinese considered the Cuban revolution a movement of national liberation headed by the country's democratic forces under Fidel Castro, and the PSP.²⁴ Guevara cleared up this "confusion," and thenceforth all statements from Peking about the Castro regime referred simply to the

²² *Pravda*, December 20, 1960.

²³ *Ibid.*, April 15, 1962.

²⁴ See, for example, *Hung ch'i: Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2332, September 1, 1960; and *Ta-Kung Pao, Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2336, September 6, 1960.

Cuban "national liberation movement headed by Prime Minister Castro."

During that same visit in Peking, Guevara pointedly declared that "the [Cuban] revolution has entered into a second phase with the October 14 nationalization of all banks and private enterprises and with the October 15 law of urban reform."²⁵ But the Chinese leaders would not take the hint, and they appeared just as surprised as the PSP and the Soviets by Castro's April 16 proclamation of a "socialist" revolution in Cuba. The Second Havana Declaration which followed on February 4, 1962, undoubtedly played a key role in Peking's recognition of Castroite socialism. Formal recognition, however, followed only after the publication of the CPSU May Day greetings.

The October Crisis and Its Aftermath

July 26, 1962, marked the highest point achieved thus far in Fidel Castro's Communist career. By then he knew that the rockets he had dreamt of for so long were on their way, that Russia and China had sent messages explicitly recognizing Socialist Cuba; and, thanks to the procedural plan devised by himself, he had the assurance that it would be only much later, perhaps never, that a single United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) would be formed. Less than three months later, however, Castro was confronted by the most serious crisis of his turbulent political career. The way he handled and overcame it, emerging virtually unscathed, confirms how erroneous it is to underestimate the cleverness and audacity of the Cuban leader.

Even after the Soviet answer to President Kennedy's speech of October 22, Castro reaffirmed his faith in the USSR, referring to it as "firm, calm, fully backed by arguments and reasons."²⁶ However, when Khrushchev ordered the diversion of Soviet ships en route to Cuba, Castro promptly countered with orders to fire upon US military aircraft violating Cuban air space, and his determination was underscored by the shooting down of an American plane. Later, when it became clear that he had been abandoned by Khrushchev, Castro came out with his "Five Points," and this, together with his order to shoot down intruding aircraft, prevented the resolution of the crisis from prejudicing his position. U.N. Secretary General U Thant's subsequent visit to Cuba constituted recognition of that fact and signified that the worst was already over for Castro.

²⁵ NCNA, November 18, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2384, November 25, 1960).

²⁶ *Hoy*, October 24, 1962.

But the Cuban leader was not content simply to survive the crisis: he wanted to recover the position he had held before October. This he could accomplish only through the Russians since they were the ones who had taken away the guarantees previously extended. First, however, he had to pave the way by appropriate internal measures.

During the October crisis, the Communists controlling *Hoy* had shown signs of faltering in their "Fidelista" faith. For example, *Hoy* did not publish Castro's Five Points until November 1, and the newspaper's editorial of November 3, entitled "Peace with Dignity," was strongly slanted in favor of the Russians. Further, on November 7, the Communist organ devoted a full page to an itemized listing of Soviet economic assistance to Cuba, thus violating the secrecy customarily maintained in such matters. It was then that Castro began bringing back from limbo some of his early supporters in the struggle against Batista—such as Efigenio Ameijeiras, Universo Sánchez, Faustino Perez, and Enrique Oltunski—reinstating them in high positions in the army and the administration. Another person brought back from

"Dear Nikita — It Was Interesting To See Your Test-Ban Treaty, Which You Can Put Away In The Same Place You Keep Your Missiles"



—Reprinted from *The Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1963.

oblivion was Euclides Vázquez Candelas, who had played the chief role in the 1959 Fidelist dispute with *Hoy*. Writing in the November 3, 1962, issue of *Bohemia*, Vázquez hailed Castro's speech of two days before as "the international complement of the thesis expounded by the Prime Minister on March 26 of this year regarding the incorrect handling of our internal contradictions."

At the same time, Castro made use of the Chinese, who warmly supported him throughout the crisis. Chinese statements backing Cuba were prominently displayed in the newspapers, including an editorial from the Peking *Jen-min jih-pao* entitled "The People Urge Defense of the Cuban Revolution," which was reprinted by *Revolución* on October 31 and by *El Mundo* on November 1.

NEXT, CASTRO confronted Mikoyan. The exact content of their protracted talks is not known, but one aspect of the conversations—or at least the Cuban attitude concerning it—can be conjectured from reading a statement made by the Cuban Revolutionary Government on November 22, while Mikoyan was still in Cuba. The government declaration explicitly denied "the speculations of American news agencies regarding the alleged signing of a new agreement on economic assistance between the Soviet Union and Cuba." This was not because the Cubans considered such speculations inappropriate while questions of principle were being discussed; rather it was a simple statement of fact. For, as the declaration added, "during the course of the present crisis, Cuba has not entered into any agreement whatever with the government of the Soviet Union."²⁷

The fact that no communiqué was published at the conclusion of the talks clearly confirmed the absence of any accord. This was further underlined by statements which the ORI and the Council of Ministers issued at the time of Mikoyan's departure, explicitly reaffirming that "an armed conflict has been avoided, but peace has not been achieved." Further, they reserved to Cuba "the right to acquire armaments of any type for her defense," and they refused to recognize any value in non-aggression pledges made by the United States.²⁸ Needless to say, these statements received immediate support from the Chinese government.

All this served to strengthen Sino-Cuban friendship. *Revolución*, *Hoy* and *Bohemia* all reprinted a *Jen-min jih-pao* editorial of December 15 entitled, "Proletariats of all countries, let us unite against our common enemy!"

²⁷ *Ibid.*, November 22, 1962.

²⁸ *Revolucion*, November 26, 1962.

This editorial, it may be noted, was subsequently cited in the letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of June 14, 1963, explaining the CCP's position vis-à-vis the Soviets.

Meanwhile, early in December 1962, a Cuban economic mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez went to Moscow. Although, in a communiqué issued on December 20, the leader of the mission expressed his "satisfaction with the development of the negotiations," it was nevertheless announced that further talks would be conducted in Moscow. The man designated to carry on the negotiations for Cuba was Alberto Mora, president of the Foreign Trade Bank, a young man belonging to the Revolutionary Students' Council and endowed with a courage matched only by his ignorance. All this suggested that Rodríguez was somewhat premature in voicing satisfaction with the results of the negotiations, and that actually little or nothing had been accomplished.

From Estrangement to Reconciliation

The impression of continued coolness between Havana and Moscow was heightened by Castro's speech of January 2, 1963, commemorating the fourth anniversary of the revolutionary victory. The Cuban leader, who had kept quiet until then, made his first reference to the Sino-Soviet dispute, though only to plead for "unity within [Socialist] principles" and to stress that the Cubans must strive for "unity within and outside" their country.²⁹ Thirteen days later, however, addressing the Congress of Women of America, Castro was not so cautious. He criticized "conformism," the "policy of waiting forever to start a revolution," the viability of the "peaceful road" to socialism (which he did not deny but which, he said, has yet to be demonstrated), and forgetfulness of the revolutionary Second Declaration of Havana. In conclusion, he reiterated that he would go on fighting for unity within the Socialist camp, but that he would do so according to "proper criteria—not those of a *caudillo*, but of a Marxist-Leninist."³⁰

Then, on February 8, a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement for 1963 was at last concluded. Under it Cuba obtained a long-term credit on "favorable terms" to offset the balance of payments deficit resulting from her inability to cover Soviet imports. According to a *New York Times* report (June 2), the agreement also authorized Cuba to sell one million tons of sugar from

²⁹ *Ibid.*, January 3, 1963.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, January 16, 1963.

the Soviet quota in the world market, although this proviso had not been mentioned in the communiqué announcing the accord.

From then on, there was a conspicuous waning of pro-Chinese enthusiasm in the Cuban press. Moreover, Castro, who had let the opportunity presented by the first anniversary of the Second Havana Declaration pass by without uttering a word, finally broke silence on February 22, but only to discuss certain problems connected with the organization of the PURS—a clear sign that he had returned to the fold of Soviet orthodoxy. This was further indicated by Castro's reading, in the course of his speech, of a cable from Marshal Malinowski.³¹

The reconciliation between Havana and Moscow reached its culmination with Castro's visit to the Soviet Union. The Cuban leader must have had powerful reasons for accepting the Soviet invitation because he could not have doubted that the Chinese would regard the visit as an open show of partiality for the Soviets. The communiqué issued at the end of Castro's official stay in the USSR and the speech he made on his return to Havana both served to confirm the Chinese in such a view. Castro, like Blas Roca, found in Khrushchev "one of the most brilliant intellectuals I have ever known," a "serious adversary of imperialism," an "extraordinarily human man . . . a very simple man."³² The question now is this: Has Castro really come down to the level of a Blas Roca? Or—as in July 1962, when he shouted, "Long live Cuba's great friend, Nikita Khrushchev!"³³ just as his brother Raul was leaving for Moscow to complete the arrangements for the installation of Soviet rockets in Cuba—has he been lavishing praise on the Soviet leader simply because the latter granted all his requests?

Castro, Moscow, and Peking

Those who claim that on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro was a naive and romantic youth concerned only with the welfare of the Cuban people and the economic development of the country not only ignore the established facts of his life, but also bar themselves from comprehending the whole revolutionary process in Cuba which bears the profound and indelible stamp of Castro's personality.

The fact is that Castro never has been such a person.

³¹ *Cuba Socialista*. March, 1963.

³² *Revolucion*. June 5, 1963.

³³ See Castro's farewell speech to the Soviet technicians, *Hoy*, July 1, 1962.

COINCIDENCE

For us, the Sino-Soviet dispute is one of the saddest events. We do not participate in this dispute. We are trying to mediate. But as it {the dispute} is a fact, we inform the people about it and it is discussed by the party. Our party's attitude is not to analyze who is in the right and who is not. We have our own position, and as they say in the American movies, any resemblance is purely coincidental.

—Che Guevara, interview with student group reported in *Revolución*, August 2, 1963.

He is a cunning politician bred by a continent as yet only superficially touched by modern ideologies, and who has emerged in an age in which the leaders of the masses, as well as those who aspire to such leadership, have lost both religious faith and confidence in the excellence of Western cultural values. Furthermore, lacking a native and ancient culture, and living in an environment in which nature has not yet been conquered by technology, these Latin American leaders pour all their energies into political action and focus their attention solely on those physical realities that are susceptible of being exploited for political ends—*i.e.* the masses, the nation, and the race.

When he reached Havana in January 1959, Castro faced a dilemma. Either he could try to adapt the Cuban revolution to the historical and natural limitations of the environment—limitations which, though not inflexible, were nonetheless real and could be manipulated only by a leadership possessing ideological maturity and strong discipline, characteristics that Castro lacked. Or he could undertake the formidable task of overcoming those limitations by expanding the revolution. The Dominican fiasco, however, closed the latter road. From then on, Castro had no alternative other than to seek assistance from the only foreign power capable of restraining the adversary he himself had antagonized by his unbridled ambitions.

But when Moscow promised Castro the protection he sought, the Soviet Union had long since passed beyond the stage of revolutionary fervor. Moreover, it already had an agency of its own in Cuba whereby it could exert its influence on the internal situation. Thus, Castro found himself facing a dual danger: on the one hand, he ran the risk of being forsaken by his Soviet protector in a moment of serious crisis; and, on the other, he had to live with the threat of being smothered inside Cuba

by the PSP whose first loyalty continued to lay with Moscow.

To guard against the first danger, Castro had to accentuate his identification with the Soviet regime in order to obtain guarantees sufficient to remove his dread of being abandoned by Moscow. This meant that Cuba would either have to gain admission to the Warsaw Pact or obtain a supply of weapons so powerful that they would enable Castro to drag the USSR into an armed conflict. And for a man of Castro's temperament, the prospect of armed conflict, in the author's judgment, is one that has irresistible attraction.

To avoid being smothered by Moscow's Cuban supporters, Castro looked to China. But in view of his scorn for ideological factors, it seems extremely doubtful that the Cuban leader has ever been deeply attracted by the doctrinal fervor of the Chinese, and the wary prudence he has shown in dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute thus far suggests that he has always been aware that China can play only a subordinate, if nonetheless indispensable, role in his strategy. China, after all, can neither give him the military guarantees he seeks, nor finance his revolution.

To take Castro's pilgrimage to the USSR as a sign of readiness to drop the Chinese completely would, however, be to ignore his characteristic political cunning. In this context, it appears highly significant that José Matar, president of Cuba's all-powerful Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, left for Peking on April 11, six days before the announcement of Castro's trip to Moscow. During his stay, which lasted until the first part of May, Matar was received by Mao, and abundant homage was paid to Sino-Cuban solidarity. Castro is very fond of this kind of diplomacy, as already evidenced by the Galvez visit to Mao in May 1959 and Nunez Jimenez's visit to Khrushchev in June of the same year.

But if Matar's mission was to maintain Sino-Cuban cordiality, it appears to have had little effect. From the moment that Castro arrived in the Soviet Union, the interest of the Chinese press in Cuban events decreased noticeably. Moreover, the June 14 letter from the CCP Central Committee to its Soviet counterpart, made no further mention of Cuba. The CPSU's reply, however, ironically asked, "Why is it, then, that our Chinese comrades stubbornly ignore the approval given by the

Cuban leaders to the Soviet government's policy, which they consider a policy of fraternal solidarity and genuine internationalism?"³⁴

* * *

At this time of writing (early August), it appears that Castro's position is once again becoming critical. The Soviet-American talks confront the Cuban leader, at the very least, with the danger that Khrushchev may impose his own conditions for protecting Cuba. In his speech of July 26, Castro voiced approval of the nuclear test ban treaty, but at the same time his anxiety for the future was reflected in his call for further revolutions in Latin America and his renewed attacks on the United States. The impression of uneasiness was not lessened by Castro's rather vague assurance to Latin American revolutionaries that "whenever a people does what the Cuban people did, it is sure to receive the decisive support of the Soviet Union."³⁵

As for the Sino-Soviet schism, it is quite evident that the Cuban leaders are painfully aware of its implications for them. According to a *New York Times* report of July 28, Guevara stated that the Cubans "would not decide who is right in this conflict," explaining this neutral posture by saying, "We are too small"—a consideration that both he and Castro obviously ignored in 1959 when they plunged Cuba into the maelstrom of the cold war.

Castro's worries over the schism are easily understood. For if the time comes when he must definitely take sides, he will have to choose between two highly unpalatable alternatives. On the one hand, by siding with Peking, he can gain Communist China's support of his ambition to become the leader of the hemispheric Communist movement and Chinese benevolence towards his personal despotism in Cuba—but only at the sacrifice of Soviet military guarantees and economic assistance. On the other, he can stick with Moscow and retain such guarantees and assistance—at the cost, however, of renouncing his continental ambitions and remaining strictly subservient to Khrushchev's orders.

The words of Guevara cited above reflect the seriousness of this dilemma. For the first time in their careers, Castro and his lieutenant—born enemies of neutralism—find themselves forced to raise what they themselves always held to be a "cowardly" flag.

³⁴ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

³⁵ *Revolucion*, July 27, 1961.

Conflict and Authority: A Discussion

EDITORS' NOTE: The life, the vigor, and the political condition of the man who stands at the helm of the USSR are always subjects of intense interest to students of Soviet affairs. When, furthermore, a political crisis or the pressure of advancing years casts a shadow over the man's progress, the interest heightens. On both these counts considerable speculation has arisen in recent months over the political fortunes of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. In the first two articles below, Khrushchev's position in the Soviet leadership is reexamined. Mr. Linden concludes, largely on the basis of policy analysis, that the First Secretary's rule has been enfeebled during the past years by continuous and lively opposition within the party leadership. Mr. Rigby, on the other hand, proceeding mainly from an institutional argument in his rejoinder, fails to find any signs of serious disagreement with Khrushchev, and indeed asserts that the Soviet Premier is sufficiently strong not to tolerate from any of his colleagues persistent opposition on basic policy questions. In the third article, Mr. Conquest looks beyond the present controversy, examining with some pessimism the question of Khrushchev's succession.

Khrushchev and the Party Battle

By Carl Linden

ANYONE WHO STUDIES the pattern of Khrushchev's political behavior over the past several years will be struck not only by the underlying consistency of purpose which has informed and guided his policies, but also by the constant backing and filling that has accompanied their implementation. Again and again one sees him returning to the same themes: agriculture, consumer goods production, resource allocations, chemicals—the parts and pieces of his persistent and seemingly elusive quest for a more abundant Soviet society.

An American student of Soviet affairs, Mr. Linden here makes his first appearance in Problems of Communism.

One wonders why a leader so amply endowed with political power should be condemned to this seemingly futile toil of pushing the same stone up the same endless slope. Part of the explanation can, of course, be found in the weight of the stone—the complexity of the problems with which Khrushchev has to deal; the inefficiency of the bureaucratic instruments with which he must work; the mutually competitive character of various policies, foreign and domestic, which require constant adjustments and reschedulings of programs. But part of the explanation can also be found in the limitations of Khrushchev's political strength. It is this author's view that Khrushchev has been fighting an