

it would certainly bear on Dr. Walkin's problem of the organization of Russian society. The Russian gentry, the middle class, the professional men, the farmers, the workers, were all in the process of organization, but the latter two classes lagged behind. Perhaps, in retrospect,

it was the failure of an independent labor movement to take root that was most fateful of all in determining the outcome, since it was the capture of that movement by the Bolsheviks that made possible their seizure of power.

Chinese Communism, Past and Present

M. N. Roy's Mission to China, by Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin.

Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963.

The Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?

by W. A. Douglas Jackson. New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1962.

Communist China's Foreign Policy, by R. G. Boyd. New York, Praeger, 1962.

China's Cultural Diplomacy, by Herbert Passin. New York, Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Franz Michael

IF CHINESE COMMUNISM was once misunderstood and misrepresented by many as a movement that was not truly Communist but a brand of agrarian reformism, this myth has long since been dispelled. Today, however, the special role which Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants have recently assumed in the Communist bloc and international Communist movement through their challenge to Khrushchev's leadership in matters of policy has caused a new quarrel of the experts over the background of this challenge and raised again the question of a difference between the Chinese and Soviet brands of communism.

Some believe that Mao Tse-tung formed a divergent strain of Communist doctrine early in the game as a result of his experiences in the period of Communist cooperation with the Chinese Nationalists, which ended disastrously for the Communists in 1927. The policy that led to this catastrophe, it is held, was Stalin's blunder—a blunder allegedly still resented by Mao, who never accepted Stalin's emphasis on urban revolution and the necessity of Chinese Communist cooperation with the Kuomintang under the latter's leadership.

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Another reason for the current differences between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships is believed to lie in a strong element of nationalism which Chinese communism is thought to contain. Indeed, the thesis of a Chinese "national communism" that motivates Peking's foreign policy and determines China's conflict with the Soviet Union—a thesis which this reviewer considers as mistaken as the old image of the "agrarian reformers"—has gained wide currency abroad in recent years.

Most of the increasing number of books on Chinese communism and Soviet-Chinese relations are written within the frame of reference of these broader issues. Thus, the four books dealt with here, different as they are in subject matter and approach, can all be related to the basic questions of the character of Chinese communism, its relationship to the overall Communist movement and the Soviet leadership, and its attitudes towards the neutrals and the West.

In the crucial year 1927, when the Communist-Kuomintang split signalled the defeat of Communist strategy and the victory of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, as a Comintern agent in China, played an outstanding role in the policy decisions that led to the debacle. He has written his own account of those events in *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta, Ren-

aissance Publishers, 1946).¹ However, the documents that formed the basis of this account, containing unchallengeable evidence of the attitudes of the various Communist participants, have until now not been available to students. After returning to the USSR, Roy compiled his own speeches and articles, together with various party theses, manifestos, declarations, and proclamations concerning China, in a volume which was published in Moscow, but which remained inaccessible to outsiders, including Roy himself after he escaped from the Soviet Union in disgrace and was labelled a "Trotskyite". Copies of this invaluable record were finally discovered at the University of California library and the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University, and the compilation has now been translated and published with an introductory discussion by Robert North and Xenia Eudin relating the documents to the historical background of the time.

In their admirably argued introduction, the authors reassess the crucial issue then confronting the Communists in China on the basis of the newly-discovered material. This issue was the basic irreconcilability of two Communist strategies shortly to become known by the slogans "revolution from above" and "revolution from below." There was no disagreement on these strategies in themselves, but where controversy arose was over the relative emphasis to be placed on either method at any given time. "Revolution from above" involved Communist cooperation with all nationalist forces in the fight against "imperialism" as envisaged by Lenin, and in China it was this strategy that dictated the Communist alliance with the Kuomintang under Kuomintang leadership. On the other hand, "revolution from below," which in the Chinese context meant Communist support of the "agrarian revolution," was also a recognized part of Communist strategy in China from the outset—as it had been in Soviet Russia—but had to be soft-pedalled as long as the Communists continued to give priority to cooperation with the "national bourgeoisie" under the strategy of "revolution from above."

At what point the Chinese Communists should abandon their alliance with the Nationalists—first with Chiang Kai-shek and then with the Left Kuomintang—remained a moot political question. What the Roy documents suggest, and the analytical introduction by Mr. North and Miss Eudin brings out, is that there was not a clearcut confrontation of two opposing views, but rather a welter of divergent interpretations of Comin-

¹ Roy's book first appeared in a German edition, published in 1930: *Revolution und Konterrevolution in China*, Berlin, Soziologische Verlagsanstalt.

tern directives and a variety of stands taken by all concerned. It was only in retrospect that the dividing lines became oversimplified and that a distinction was drawn between those alleged to have blindly followed Moscow and those who supposedly knew better but were frustrated by Stalin's extreme inflexibility. Thus, the authors observe:

The truth of the matter seems to be that everyone—Trotsky not excluded—was a better prophet after the fact than beforehand. . . . The essential fact was not that the Chinese Communists were forced to submit themselves—against their better judgment—to a single, dogmatic, and uniquely mistaken line from Moscow. . . . [but rather] that virtually everyone "contended," that hardly anyone agreed with anyone else, and that the misperceptions, the errors, and the contradictory decisions were by no means attributable only to Stalin, but were widely shared by both the Chinese and the Russian Communists. (p. 7)

Roy himself, the documents show, argued consistently for reliance on agrarian revolution and adhered to this position even after a clash over the two conflicting strategies took place at the Fifth Congress of the CCP. The ultimate Communist victory in China, the authors believe, was the result of Mao Tse-tung's success—after the Soviet withdrawal in 1927—in working out "his own special mixture of so many revolutionary elements 'from below' and so many others 'from above'."

The basic contradiction between the two strategies nevertheless still remains a problem facing the Communist leaders in Moscow and Peking even today. For, in the underdeveloped countries, they find themselves confronted by the old question of whether to support a Nasser, a Nkrumah, a Sukarno—or, one might add, a Nehru, or even an Emperor of Ethiopia—or to work through local Communist parties for revolution from below, and how to reconcile these contradictory strategic policies. In spite of the present Chinese Communist claim to a monopoly on the revolution from below, no actual difference can be observed in the past use of both strategies by the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaderships. The documentation offered in the North-Eudin volume confirms this and refutes the belief that the Chinese Communists have a unique strategy of revolution derived from their history.

IF THE PRESENT Sino-Soviet conflict does not stem from any fundamental disagreement over strategy in the early association between the Soviet and Chinese Communists, does it have any basis in territorial issues? A view that has found expression both in Europe and in the United States holds that Chinese population pressure threatens the Soviet Asian borderlands, that this

threat has been instrumental in motivating Khrushchev's coexistence policy and may even lead him into a common front with the West against what promises to be a new "yellow peril." This view would not have to be taken seriously were it not for the fact that it has been espoused by recognized journalists and is claimed to have made an impression on some leading Western statesmen. In Europe the thesis was advanced by Dr. Wilhelm Starlinger, a German prisoner repatriated from Soviet Russia, in a book which reportedly came to the attention of Chancellor Adenauer and, through him, to the attention of General de Gaulle, whose vision of a European unity reaching to the Urals is said to have been shaped partly by it.² Similar ideas have been echoed by various political commentators in the United States. Again, much of recent discussion about Outer Mongolia has been concerned with a possible Soviet-Chinese conflict over control of this Central Asian border state. It is all the more useful, therefore, to have Professor Jackson's sober appraisal of the geographical conditions of the "borderlands" and their role in Soviet-Chinese relations, past and present.

The possibilities for economic development on both sides of the border, especially the Chinese side, are obviously still vast, but they require capital investment on the largest scale, and in this field obvious Soviet superiority would put the Chinese at a grave disadvantage in any race to settle the border territories. Indeed, what conflict there has been in the past resulted from the Russian, and later Soviet, push into territory across the Chinese border—a push that led to the establishment of Russian and Soviet interests in Sinkiang and Manchuria and to the Chinese loss of Outer Mongolia to Soviet control. However, the Russian-Soviet push, described in detail in Professor Jackson's chapter on the "Zone of Tension," ended with the Communist takeover in China, and the "Zone of Tension" became a "Zone of Stabilization." In the author's words, "the common ideology of Russian and Chinese communism has brought a stability to the borderlands which has hitherto not existed," and the minor discrepancies that have been found in Soviet and Chinese maps of the frontier areas, for instance in the Pamirs and along the Manchurian border, may not be deemed significant" (pp. 86-7). Indeed, the unprecedented Soviet surrender of Russia's historic interests in Sinkiang and Manchuria was all the more significant because it was voluntary, and it increased the possibilities of close Sino-Soviet

² For comments on Dr. Starlinger's book, *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht* (Wurzburg, Holzner-Verlag, 1955), see review by Eric Willenz in *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, 1955, pp. 48-50.

cooperation. In the author's view, these possibilities have not been basically affected by the recent conflict between Moscow and Peking because "the leaders of the two countries differ not in terms of their objective, but rather over the strategy and methods of achieving the objective" (p. 96). Even if one might now be inclined to ascribe greater seriousness to the conflict than Professor Jackson did in writing his book a year ago, the fact remains that the borderlands have not been a cause of friction. On the contrary, the Chinese Communists, in their most recent acrimonious attacks on the Soviet leadership, made a clear-cut distinction between China's territorial claims vis-à-vis Communist and non-Communist countries.

STILL, IT IS in the field of foreign policy that the most obvious points of friction in Sino-Soviet relations lie. It is generally assumed that since the current conflict became acute, there has no longer been consultation, let alone cooperation, between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships in most of their important foreign policy decisions and actions. Chinese indignation over Soviet action in the Cuban crisis and Soviet disapproval of China's action against India, as well as the two partners' clashing statements on "peaceful coexistence," are cited as evidences of a deep-seated conflict of international outlook and interest between the two Communist powers.

In his study, R. G. Boyd undertakes to evaluate the goals and objectives of Communist China's foreign policy and to explain its special character within the framework of world communism. The author sees no question that the Chinese Communists, in the words of Foreign Minister Chen Yi (1959), "have always considered their revolution as part of the world socialist revolution" (p. 40), that their major objective has been the establishment of world communism, and that "the truth of national salvation that the Chinese people found was Marxism-Leninism" (p. 39). From the outset, the Chinese Communists stressed the pioneer role and leadership of the Soviet party and the Communist purpose of all their policy.

Mr. Boyd recalls that in point of fact it was the Chinese Communists, rather than the Soviets, who initiated the formula of "peaceful coexistence," first enunciating it in their 1954 accord with India and fully expounding it at the Bandung Conference of 1955. This "peaceful coexistence" referred primarily to Chinese relations with the Afro-Asian countries and their nationalist non-Communist leaderships, but it also included Chou En-lai's offer to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of con-

flicts with the United States. The policy was soon followed by the Soviet leaders and has never been renounced by the Chinese Communist leadership, although since 1958—when Soviet successes in missile development were apparently interpreted by Mao as signifying a shift in the East-West balance of power—it has been overshadowed by Peking's demand for a more aggressive Communist-bloc line towards the West—without, however, risking a major war.

In Mr. Boyd's view, the growth of Sino-Soviet friction results from the "chauvinist spirit" of Chinese communism and the pull of Chinese "national interest." He sees this "chauvinist spirit" as impelling the Chinese leadership to seek to displace Soviet authority over the international Communist movement and to win for Communist China not simply equality with the Soviet Union but the leading position in the world Communist system. It might, he suggests, even bring a return to traditional Chinese values, replacing the Communist concept of "struggle" with the native one of "harmony," although for the present at least the author sees only "intense opposition to any search for values outside the crude and limited framework of Marxism-Leninism" (p. 51).

The author attempts to divide "national interest" into what he calls "objective national interest" and interest "posited by Communist doctrine." The first category is found, upon examination, to embrace the search for security of the state, avoidance of war, and stress on an economic development effort affording eventual independence from Soviet domination but eschewing Western support. However, the author himself sees no conflict between these "national" concerns and Communist objectives, except that Chinese "chauvinism" tends to produce a marked cautiousness in policy and an unwillingness to take undue national risks for a Communist cause. Indeed, he believes that "while China advocates stronger Soviet militancy towards the West, she will nevertheless oppose any trend towards her own involvement with the West" (p. 89). The author stresses that the Chinese attempt to project an image of aggressive dedication to global Communist goals involves no great risk because Peking's policy remains flexible enough to permit a retreat to "peaceful coexistence" in case of danger—which would seem to suggest that, in fact, Chinese policy does not differ essentially from that of the Soviet leadership.

All in all, Mr. Boyd's attempt to introduce the concepts of "chauvinism" and "national interest" into his explanation of Chinese Communist policy seems rather forced. A cautious chauvinism that lets the other fellow take the risks would appear to be something of a con-

tradiction in terms. And the goals of Mr. Boyd's so-called "national interests" in no way conflict with overall Communist objectives. What is important in his interpretation is that he correctly recognizes Chinese Communist policy as being cautious rather than recklessly aggressive. But it is hardly necessary to use the prop of "national interests" or "chauvinism" to explain that cautiousness.

ONE OF THE MOST fascinating aspects of the Chinese part in advancing overall Communist objectives is Peking's cultural diplomacy, treated in Herbert Passin's informative and perceptive study. Since China's military strength, though formidable in relation to that of her weaker neighbors such as India, does not yet make her a serious threat to the major Western powers, and since economic weakness restricts her capacity to compete in aid to underdeveloped and non-aligned countries, cultural diplomacy is the only area in which the Chinese can make a significant contribution to the international Communist offensive. Cultural propaganda requires mass organization and skillful manipulation of the propaganda image, but it involves comparatively little expense. The Chinese, as Passin shows, have been engaged in a "sustained and massive program" in this field—a program which has been even more active in promoting visits by foreigners to China than in the dispatch of Chinese technical, artistic, and scholarly delegations abroad.

By last year the Chinese had played host to an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 foreign guests, whose visits were mainly political or ceremonial in nature. Passin provides an interesting breakdown of these foreign visitors and delegations, ranging from the group of resident foreigners, "peace" champions such as the New Zealander Rewi Alley, and visitors from the Soviet Union and Communist-bloc countries, to businessmen, scholars, and journalists from the non-Communist Asian countries and countries of the West. Most important, he presents a detailed picture of how the Chinese manipulate and completely control the observations and experiences of their foreign guests, using cultural diplomacy as a tool of Communist policy.

Passin's evaluation of these Chinese Communist activities and their results is especially valuable in view of the pressure being exerted abroad in favor of facilitating visits to Communist China for the sake of better contacts and understanding. The author finds that the more political the purposes of the visit and the friendlier the visitor's attitude—and the less he knows about the country and the language—the more likely the Communists are to admit him. The visitor who is not