

from the compromised interests and desires of human beings. If the world had to wait for a race of saints and vestal virgins it would have to wait too long. While public spirit and social responsibility are icy heights towards which the path is concealed by the barriers of income and deference and the pedant's fear of being wrong, few people will scale them, few people will even look toward them. As a matter of fact, all these heights are a delusion; the technicality and the timidity, the detachment and the reservations of thinkers and reformers are signs not that they have become more than human, but that they have lost the vitality and the courage which the earth exhales.

The reformer does not differ in motive or character from the men who suspect him. His actions do not arise from a different source; they are merely pointed sometimes to a different end. His selfishness, his hobbies, and his desires happen now and then to produce effects larger than himself; not always, not even most of the time. The public aspect of any person is only a fragment of his life. There are moments which come and go when passion is well directed, interest is informed, and imagination touched with fortunate insight. At these moments, perhaps, we who are fret and drudgery and pre-occupation contribute something.

## A Substitute for Violence

ONLY an insignificant number of people believe that violence can redeem society, and of those who believe it almost none have the courage to act. Most of them are content to talk, to enjoy the panic of newspapers and the applause of tea-parties. Of those who actually set off bombs, some are caught and the others live a miserable, hunted existence. They receive no thanks whatever from the poor whom they intended to help, and by all active labor leaders and socialists they are hated as the devil himself. From Bakunin to the Mac-Namaras and Alexander Berkman, the terrorist has been more of a nuisance to the labor movement than to the social order which in his fatuous feebleness he hoped to replace.

The puzzling form of violence is that which accompanies strikes like those in Colorado, West Virginia, or Calumet. It is based on no theory and engineered by no conspiracy. Disorder simply seems to break out, and though we investigate it by commissions until the end of time, fair-minded people will be unable to agree on the culprit. No sooner has it been pointed out that so-and-so fired the first shot, than someone rises to insist that he was provoked beyond endurance. We investigate

the utter bewilderment of thought and the blunting of action. Do mine-owners employ brutal mine-guards because the miners are brutal? Are the miners brutal because the conditions brutalize them? Are conditions brutalizing because the men are uncivilized?

What we need most is to break out of this circle. The way to break out is to cease asking who is guilty, and to begin formulating a method of action. The search for some one to blame must give place to the search for a plan. No engineer would feel that he had dealt with the Culebra slides because he had been able to show that the geological formation was guilty of not having been adapted to the convenience of the canal. He would try to find a theory which would put him in a position not to judge of ultimate responsibility, but to act toward reconstruction.

But where in the passion and ignorance and unreason of industrial warfare is a plan of action to be found? What experience is there that offers anything like the assurance which is to be found in bayonets, clubs, and machine guns? It is to be traced, we think, in the history of political government. The difficulty of our thinking about industrial relations is that we have failed to grasp a simple and illuminating idea. The idea is that the management of modern industry is a problem of government, that the control of an industrial corporation is as political as the control of a city or state. In every industry are to be found all those issues which we call political: who is to legislate, what is the scope of the executive, how are special interests to be represented? The fact that we speak of boards of directors instead of a Senate and House, of managers rather than of mayors, of foremen and superintendents rather than of judges or bureau chiefs, does not impair the observation that a great modern industry is a big human relationship, and that its problems are the problems of politics.

But how does it help to recognize that the management of industry is an example of government? It helps because it puts us in a position to apply the long experience of politics to the newer issues of business. The corporation as we know it is comparatively novel, but the state is an institution with a long history which is rich in suggestion.

One of the reasons, for example, why it is better to live in the United States than in Mexico is that we have learned to change our government by means of an election rather than by means of a revolution. We have a definite opportunity every so often to oust the party in power. We can change the policy of the state without assassinating the head of it. We have not obliterated our differences, we have raised them to the political level. Now in

policy of the business, they have generally to threaten revolt, and every important difference is solved by a trial of strength. As business is conducted to-day, the demands of the workers are *prima facie* illegal, for industry has not yet developed representative government under constitutional forms.

The problem of law and order is to develop for business some constitutional representative government. In the protocol trades of the garment manufactures we see the beginnings. There an actual assemblage has been created, and those interested have an opportunity to legislate for their industry. No one supposes that the protocol is a final blessing; the habit of representative government in industry is so little developed that all sorts of difficulties constantly arise. Moreover, while citizenship in industry is newer and more untried than citizenship in the state, the problems of industry are as technical as the problems of politics. But at least the protocol is something to work on, something to evoke loyalty. It enables us to speak of law and order without blushing, for there is some law and some order. But in the Colorado mines, for example, the autocracy is absolute, no glimmer of representation exists, no responsibility is permitted to the men, there is no government by consent, and nothing but brute force to compel obedience.

These believers in absolutism persist. They may smother rebellion, it will break out again; and all they will have done is to delay the time when men can begin to learn the difficult art of governing industry. By refusing any representation, they are closing the school in which men practice and grow to democracy. By refusing responsibility to the men, they make them irresponsible. By making it difficult to remedy abuses or express dissatisfaction except through revolt, they breed the habit of rebellion. They are doing what every foolish autocrat has always done—they are trying to purchase temporary absolutism, and they will pay for it by constant disorder and fearful waste.

We have no idea that a fine civilization can be produced by riots, or beating "scabs," or by heroic men in the mountains. An industrial democracy will have to be based on long experience in an atmosphere clear enough for reason to live. This experience can be got only in one way, by creating recognized channels in which it can develop. We do not expect to jump straight from the present absolutism into a cooperative democracy. Industry will have to pass through the intermediate steps, through limited monarchy, through representative government, before self-government is possible. By those steps men must learn. But we must begin sometime to take those steps. We must at least

## Socialist Degeneration

THE election of 1914, like that of 1912, reveals the fact that the Socialist party of America is ceasing to be a Socialist party, or a revolutionary party, or even a party of wage-earners, and is becoming a vague, ungeneralized, democratic organization. It is appealing to farmers, middlemen, and small capitalists as well as to wage-earners, is minimizing or even denying the class struggle, is ignoring the social philosophy of which the party is supposed to be the representative, and is manifesting a willingness to exchange old principles for new votes. For better or worse, the Socialist party suffers that democratic "degeneration" which the Syndicalists maintain is the fate of all political parties.

This thesis could be maintained by a mass of evidence so large that it would overflow these pages and spill over incontinently into future issues. But a very few figures from the electoral returns of 1912 (those for 1914 being still too fragmentary) will suffice. If the Socialist party were the party of the wage-earners, it would be strong where the wage-earners are many, and weak where the wage-earners are few. But it is in the great industrial states of the Union, with cities and factories and dense masses of workmen, that the Socialists are the weakest. In New York State, after more than forty years of propaganda, the Socialist party vote (1912) is only 4 per cent of the vote of the State. In other words, only one voter in every twenty-five votes the Socialist ticket. In Massachusetts, a typically industrial state, only 2.6 per cent of the votes are Socialist; in Rhode Island only 2.6 per cent; in New Jersey only 3.7 per cent; in Maryland only 1.7 per cent. In many densely settled industrial states, covered with great factories employing armies of wage-earners, the great mass of workmen hold aloof, and the Socialist party remains weak.

On the other hand, in certain agricultural states, where there are few wage-earners, and where farm owners and tenants who wish to become farm owners do not even know what wage-slavery is, the Socialist vote is comparatively strong. In Kansas, in Minnesota, in Texas, in several other preponderantly agricultural states, the proportionate Socialist vote is much larger than in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and other industrial states. In the South, where there is hardly any industrial proletariat, the Socialist vote is growing. In Florida, 9.3 per cent of all the votes cast in 1912 were for Mr. Debs. The Socialist proportion of votes in Florida was considerably over twice as great as in New York and over three times as