

right of procession, and virtually hands over the streets to every sort of parade, even of those who carry black flags, red flags, or foreign flags, and who avow the intention to subvert the Government. The law of Illinois, as quoted by the Mayor of Chicago the other day, is much more rational. No procession can use the streets without the permission of the chief officer of the city, who may prescribe such conditions and regulations in each particular case as he chooses.

The brief letter of Mr. Gladstone shows that the London procession, although avowedly political in its character, was a dangerous collection. There was mixed up with it a large element of "the unemployed." The unemployed paraded last year in the shop windows along Piccadilly and Oxford Street, and helped themselves to a large amount of portable property. When a procession of this sort gets under way, it is joined by all the tramps, roughs, pickpockets, and ticket-of-leave men, all who have committed crime, and all who are on the lookout for a chance to commit crime. A great hurly-burly where the police cannot act freely, and where nobody can be identified, is what they are always on the lookout for. The employment they are in want of is robbery shorn of unpleasant consequences. Evidently the usual amount of this material had been sopped up along the road to Trafalgar Square. The Government was bound to anticipate these accessions to the crowd, because it had had sufficient warning of their character last year. It was bound accordingly to prevent the meeting in Trafalgar Square upon the same principles that it would prevent a bonfire from being started in close proximity to a lot of combustible material. That the Government had the legal right to prevent the meeting in Trafalgar Square is undoubted.

The recent Anarchist parade in New York was both a disgrace and a danger. It was a disgrace to permit a polyglot foreign rabble to march through the streets with black flags and red flags, or any flag except that of the American republic. It was a danger to permit such a rabble to collect together at all, considering that their fundamental creed is that violent death should be visited upon all who have property and refuse to hand it over to the first comer. Since the laws do not vest the police, or the Mayor with authority to prevent such assemblages, the Legislature should lose no time in conferring such authority upon them.

#### A NARROW MARGIN.

SINCE the result of last week's election in New York State was known, it has been universally accepted by both parties throughout the country as settled that President Cleveland will be renominated by the Democrats without any opposition. In view of the result in Virginia, it is also generally admitted by Republicans, and is certainly not doubted by any unprejudiced observer, that the Democratic candidate in 1888 will again receive the support of the entire South.

Many Democrats take it for granted that Mr. Cleveland's reelection is also assured. In one contingency there is no doubt that

they are right. If the Republicans should renominate Mr. Blaine, Mr. Cleveland would unquestionably beat him far worse than before. Mr. Blaine could not again conduct a successful intrigue for "the Irish vote," and, on the other hand, he could not again hold to his support the tens of thousands of Republicans who only supported him under protest before, because they believed that Mr. Cleveland's election would "ruin the country." If the Republicans are to be guilty of such stupendous folly as presenting again the tainted and dangerous candidate whose nomination defeated them in 1884, then indeed is the election of 1888 already decided in Mr. Cleveland's favor.

But it is safe to take it for granted that the Republicans will not be so crazy as to renominate Mr. Blaine. Suppose that they offer the country neither Mr. Blaine nor a Blaine dummy (who would be scarcely less weak than Mr. Blaine himself), but a first-class candidate upon a first-class platform. What then will be the situation? Mr. Cleveland will have 153 electoral votes from the "Solid South," and must have 201 to win. In 1884 he secured 219, carrying New York (36), Indiana (15), New Jersey (9), and Connecticut (6). He could have spared from the list either Indiana alone, or New Jersey and Connecticut together; but New York was essential in any case, and with it either the large Western State or both of the small Eastern States.

It is possible that Mr. Cleveland may carry some Northern State in 1888 which he did not in 1884. New Hampshire gave only 961 Republican plurality on the vote for Congressmen last year, and only 461 for Governor, and although the poll was not a full one, it is evident that the Republicans will have enough to keep them busy in holding the State next year. There are one or two other Northern States that voted against Mr. Cleveland before, which it is within the range of possibility for him to carry next time. But the Democrats will place no dependence upon what would be at best but happy accidents. They will rest their hopes upon carrying New York, and with it the other three Northern States which they had in 1884.

It is worth while for all concerned to keep in mind that in every one of these four States the margin is very narrow. Indiana gave Mr. Cleveland only 6,427 plurality over Mr. Blaine in 1884, and in 1886 it elected a Republican Lieutenant-Governor by 3,324 plurality, and seven Republican Congressmen out of thirteen. New Jersey gave Mr. Cleveland only 4,412 plurality over Mr. Blaine in 1884, and in 1886 gave the Republican candidates for Congress 6,906 more votes than the Democratic. Connecticut gave Mr. Cleveland only 1,276 plurality over Mr. Blaine in 1884, and in 1886 elected a Republican Governor by 1,898 plurality. New York gave Mr. Cleveland but 1,047 plurality over Mr. Blaine in 1884, and in 1887 has given the Democratic candidate for Secretary of State only about 18,000 plurality.

Each one of these four States is so close that the scales are turned by the independent vote. New York would have gone Republican this year if the Republican ticket plat-

form, and party management had not caused the independent voters to give the preference to the Democrats. Connecticut rejected a bad Democratic candidate for Governor by independent votes in 1886, as she had, by the same votes, rejected a bad Republican candidate for President in 1884. Indiana elected a Republican Lieutenant-Governor in 1886 because her independent voters were displeased with the record of Democratic administration and legislation in the State during the previous two years. New Jersey has just elected a Republican Legislature because her independent voters were disgusted with the last Democratic Legislature.

It is thus plain that the margin in each of these States is a very narrow one. How any one of them will go next year depends absolutely upon the independent vote. The Republican managers can so affront that vote as to insure a Democratic plurality in each by offering it only the old alternative of 1884. The Democratic Administration can disaffect it by yielding to the spoilsmen, and incline it to support a good Republican candidate. Mr. Cleveland was persuaded by the Democratic managers to express the opinion that "every man in Massachusetts who is in sympathy with the Administration and wishes to secure victory next year, should heartily support Lovering in Massachusetts in this campaign." The Massachusetts Mugwumps replied by voting against Lovering, whom they considered a bad candidate, and thus nearly doubling last year's plurality for Ames. The moral is plain: the independent vote can only be secured by deserving it.

#### THE SILVER QUESTION.

THE silver question has not been a topic of public discussion for the better part of a year. International bimetalism has been on the anvil very much as usual, but this is not what is meant by the silver question in the United States. The silver party in this country never cared a fig what other nations were willing to do. Their ideas were aptly phrased in the query, "What have we to do with abroad?" And in all this they were quite right. What they wanted was a cheap dollar. They believed they should get it by coining silver dollars at a certain monthly rate, regardless of the public demand for them. As their opponents believed this also, they became more set than ever in their determination to multiply silver dollars, and less inclined to give heed to M. Cernuschi, Mr. Dana Horton, and the other academic bimetalists, whose warnings that silver coinage in the United States was hurting the good cause in Europe have always fallen upon deaf ears in Congress.

The silence that has fallen upon this vexed theme is due to a doubt that has been rising, among both silver and anti-silver men, whether the continued coinage of that metal under existing law will ever bring a cheaper dollar into the channels of business, or enable anybody to pay his debts at less than one hundred cents gold value. In other words, the question engaging the thoughts of those who really think on the subject at all is, whether any conceivable addition to the Government's

stock of silver dollars will, of its own force and without further legislation, upset the gold standard and substitute that of silver in its place. If this question be answered in the negative, the silver men will have no motive to keep the mint going after the currency demand of the country is fully satisfied. On the other hand, their opponents will cease to borrow trouble about silver, will look upon the accumulation of that class of dollars in the Treasury as they look upon other unnecessary taxes, of which we have an over-plentiful supply. When both parties shall have reached this state of mind, the law will be changed and silver coinage will be limited to the wants of the community, just as the subsidiary coinage is; for unless the silver men are strong enough to pass a free-coinage act, their game will have been lost, and they can have no more reason than others have to maintain an unnecessary tax.

We ventured some time since to express the belief that the manufacture of silver dollars on Government account would not of itself change the standard of value from gold to silver. We have not seen any argument controverting that position. It was manifestly impossible, at the time when the Silver Act was passed, to foresee its ultimate effects, because it was a complete anomaly in the world of finance. Nothing like it had ever been seen or imagined. No Government had ever before bought bullion and made money of full legal tender out of it, for sale to its own people at a profit. There was a whole chapter of paradoxes in the law as it was finally passed. No analogy could be drawn from the experience of any other country, because none had had such an experience. There had been single-standard countries and double-standard countries and "limping standard" countries—the last being the condition of France and the nations of the Latin Union that have ceased coining silver, but still retain a great quantity of it in circulation as full legal tender. There had never been an experiment made like ours. Therefore nobody could tell how it would turn out.

There were also unknowable elements in the problem. Nobody could then foresee the decay of the national-bank circulation. Still less could anybody predict what would be the demand for paper currency arising from the growth of the country, the settlement of the far West and Southwest, the development of industry, and the influx of immigration. What we see now is, that all these things have conspired to give room for more than \$200,000,000 of silver certificates, and that the demand for them has not ceased. While we consider this kind of circulating medium costly and unscientific, and a bad speculation in metal, it is nevertheless true that there has been an efficient demand for more currency than could be legally supplied in any other way, either by the banks or by the Government, and that this demand has reimbursed to the Government about all that it has thus far expended for silver bullion.

The demand for silver certificates is simply a demand for something that will serve the purpose of domestic exchanges. Greenbacks or bank notes would be taken with equal readi-

ness if they were to be had. As they are not to be had, the next best thing is taken, and this happens to be silver certificates, since gold certificates are not issued of a less denomination than \$20. What the future demand for them may be, it would be idle to speculate. Of course a time will come when the country will be saturated with them and can absorb no more. When the public cease to buy them, the excess of silver dollars will lie where they are made. They will become an idle and inert hoard, but they will not, without further legislation of a radical kind, change the monetary standard of the country from gold to silver.

#### ITALY AND THE VATICAN.

ITALY, October 25, 1887.

THE Papal jubilee and the presence of jubilee pilgrims in Rome, so far from reopening the question of reconciliation between Italy and the Vatican, are but fresh proofs that there is no special question to be settled, or at all events the present Italian Ministry are bent on ignoring it. Despite the declarations to this effect made by Crispi and Zanardelli on entering the Cabinet, nothing could persuade the extreme parties, namely, the ultra-clericals and the ultra-radicals, that Crispi's journey to Friedrichsruhe had not for its chief, or sole, object to consult with Bismarck as to the best means of finding a *modus vivendi*. Simple Conservatives and old-school Liberals did not fall into this error. For one of the chief leaders of the party of action outside and of the Left in Parliament to have opened his lips to a foreign statesman on the question would have implied the renunciation of the very corner-stone of the Liberal creed. When Rome was first proclaimed capital of Italy, the Liberals opposed the law on Papal guarantees, but were outvoted on the main question, and the law proclaiming the person of the Pope sacred and inviolable, to whom, as to the King, royal honors were to be paid, and providing an income of 3,325,000 francs, exempt from all taxes, the free possession of the Vatican, of Sa. Maria Maggiore, of the villa of Castel-Gandolfo, with all the edifices, gardens, and lands appertaining, is still the law of the land. But when it was proposed that the Papal guarantees should be made a subject of international discussion and law, the Liberals, by their vigorous and unanimous protest, won the day. We are but just freed from the material oppression of foreign armies, and you would place Italy under the moral tutorship of the Catholic Powers? they asked; and, the republic being just then proclaimed in France, and monarchy not yet firmly established in Rome, the point was yielded with regret.

That same law, however, rendered it binding on the Italian Government to defend, even by force, all future councils and conclaves, and it so happened that at the death of Pio Nono, which occurred on the 7th of February, 1878, just one month after that of Victor Emanuel, Crispi was Home Minister, with Depretis President of the Cabinet; and the House, prorogued after the new King had taken the oath, had been reconvoled for the 20th of February. In the young King's first speech there was not a single allusion to the Vatican, to the Pope, or even to religion, save where he promised "religious observance of free institutions as the one safeguard against all perils." Crispi, on whom devolved the "defence of the conclave," learning that the cardinals trusted so little to the Government that they had actually decided on holding the conclave elsewhere than in Rome,

took his precautions to exclude the shadow of pretence for foreign intervention, and, instead of convoking Parliament at once, delayed doing so until the 7th of March—this, of course, with the full concurrence of the young King. "Never," says a Catholic writer, "did the fathers," as he classically calls the cardinals, "enjoy such unlimited liberty as during the conclave of 1878, to the infinite surprise of the oldest among them, who had a vivid remembrance of the foreign and Roman pressure brought to bear during the conclaves of Leo XII., Pius VIII., Gregory XVI., and Pius IX." In two days the conclave commenced and ended with the proclamation of Leo XIII., who, if he had had his own way, would have blessed the populace from the *outer* balcony of St. Peter's, thus initiating a reconciliation with the Italian Government—all gain to the Vatican, all loss to the Quirinal. This postponement of Parliament gave umbrage to a large section of the Liberal party, who styled it "a truckling to the Papacy, an offence to the King and the representatives of the nation." The protests, coupled with animadversions on an act of an entirely private character, induced Crispi to resign on the 3d of March, before Parliament met, but he had had time to define his Vatican policy. It was not a caving in, but simply the avoidance of the appearance of pressure.

As with the conclave, so with the jubilee and jubilee pilgrims: common law and common courtesy are duly enforced, there has been no need for the display of military or police. A few good-humored articles in the officious newspapers, reminding the Romans that *noblesse oblige*, that pilgrims to the Vatican are as much their guests as pilgrims to the Pantheon; some significant warnings to the pilgrims to put on their best manners with their best clothes, that offences against the law or insults to the Government or people will no more be permitted in guests than in citizens, have sufficed. The pilgrimage causes no disorder, and no other sensation in Rome save content to the shopkeepers, omnibus and cab drivers—if we except a strike on the part of the latter because the former were supposed to have received an undue share from the purses of the pious pilgrims.

These being the facts, it is scarcely needful to repeat that, so far from Crispi and Bismarck having met to discuss the Vatican, it was a subject not alluded to between them, unless with a smile. Even that meeting occasioned no surprise among the members or friends of the old historical Left. A Prussian alliance was their ideal long before it took place; Bismarck versus Napoleon, a to-be-united Germany against imperial France, was the dream dreamt out by those who desired moral as well as material unity, who dreaded Napoleonic influence far more than imperial soldiers. I remember that Francesco Cucchi, who paid us a visit at Garibaldi's headquarters in France, to inform the survivors of the Mille that they had forfeited their pension by taking arms under the French Republic, was even then on a return visit from Berlin. But the general public were only made aware of the fact when Bismarck asked Crispi after "his old friend Cucchi." Quite other subjects than Vatican policy or any other internal question led to the very natural meeting between the two statesmen. There is no country in Europe by which peace is so desired, or to which it is so absolutely necessary, as Italy; and whereas the alliance between Italy, Germany, and Austria is an accomplished fact, nothing would be now more distasteful to the party in power and their partisans than a war between Germany and France. Despite the constant provocations of the French press