

DEMOCRATIC PREPARATIONS.

It is said to be the confident belief of a considerable number of shrewd men in the Democratic party that "Cleveland cannot be renominated," and all the subsiding and pipe-laying which is now going on in this State in preparation for the Convention next year is said to be conducted on this assumption. Of course, the reasons for this opinion are various, but the most powerful one is his unsatisfactory behavior both with regard to appointments and dismissals from office. He has kept too many Republicans in their places, and he has in filling vacancies paid too little attention to recommendations. In other words, he has taken the reform talk of his party in its platforms and on the stump too seriously, and he has not taken Congressmen into his confidence as much as party custom is thought to require. Whenever the tale of these woes is told to a listener on whom they do not seem to make sufficient impression, they are apt to be fortified by a whisper that "Cleveland does not really want a renomination, and would not take it if it were offered him to-morrow"; that he is tired of official life, and longs for retirement, with the accompaniment of domestic happiness, which is now for the first time within his reach. The authority for this statement is never given, but it is usually garnished with enough nods and winks to make it appear that it comes direct from either the President and Mrs. Cleveland, or Col. Lamont, his private secretary, and therefore there is no use in attacking it on the score of improbability.

Now, we do not propose to dispute with the various adroit gentlemen who are engaged in overhauling and oiling the nominating machinery in this State, either as to the merits of Mr. Cleveland's Administration or as to the chances of his renomination. They know as well as we do, and better than we, the uncertainties which attend the action of conventions, the frequency with which the politicians of one State find their most careful arrangements completely upset by countercurrents of sentiment from other States when the Convention meets. Delusion on this point is likely to be unusually great in New York this year, owing both to the fact that President Cleveland is a New York product, and to the fact that this is the only State in which the politicians have gone to work to manufacture a rival and successor for him. Those who go to the Convention to rail and intrigue against him from his own State will think themselves greatly strengthened, therefore, by being able to offer a substitute. What we have to suggest is, that they should take into account now the absolute ignorance of that portion of the community which lies outside the circle of managing politicians, about the things which most damage Mr. Cleveland in their eyes. The reasons why he cannot be renominated are, we venture to assert, not known to-day to over one thousand of the eleven or twelve millions who will cast ballots at the election of 1888.

This, it must be admitted, is for Mr. Cleveland's enemies a state of things which cannot be remedied too soon. It will not do to let the Southern and Western delegates get together

under the impression which, we venture to assert, now prevails among their constituents, that Mr. Cleveland has done so well that not only is there no reason why he should not be renominated, but that his renomination is an absolute necessity to the party if it wishes to retain control of the Government. This, of course, may be a very false impression. It may be that the managers in New York could destroy it if they chose. It is certain, however, that it cannot be destroyed suddenly. It will take time to do it. It is no easy matter, as every one knows who has had to do with the shaping of public opinion on any subject, to rid the popular mind of an opinion once formed. Anybody who undertakes the work cannot begin too early, or repeat himself too much. Any one, therefore, who means to have the Convention throw Mr. Cleveland overboard when it meets, unless he can count on a letter from Mr. Cleveland positively declining the nomination before the Convention meets, should go to work at once to prepare reasons against his nomination which will bear publicity.

All those reasons of which we have heard anything, or which are in circulation in the inner councils of party management, are in a certain sense secret and confidential. They are the kind of objection that men communicate to their friends after dinner, or over brandy and soda in clubs and cafés, which they have generally heard from somebody else, and which it would be base to give to a newspaper reporter. But something less delicate than this will be needed to affect the Convention. Arguments must be prepared which will bear publication of the widest kind on the stump and in the press; arguments which can not only be whispered but shouted, and which plain people who do not occupy themselves much with party machinery, can understand and appreciate. We do not say there are no such arguments. We simply say that they have not yet seen the light, and that it is time that they did. The delusion that Mr. Cleveland—if delusion it be—has made a good President is widespread and deep-seated. It would be little short of madness for his opponents in this State to allow delegates from other States to be elected under its influence, and to remain steeped in it between now and next year. We trust, therefore, we shall soon see the objections to him set out in black and white.

THE READJUSTER INCIDENT.

THE retirement of Mahone from the United States Senate marks the end of a curious incident in American politics. It is true that his colleague, Riddleberger, has two years still to serve, but Riddleberger is an utter nonentity, except when he makes himself a nuisance, and has no political weight whatever. When Mahone's term expired, the Mahone party virtually collapsed.

William Mahone was a "Confederate Brigadier" from Virginia during the civil war, and a leading Democrat in the years succeeding the war. He was openly charged by the Republicans with responsibility for some of the grossest frauds by which the negro voters were cheated out of their rights, and he remained in close affiliation with the Democratic Machine

until it refused to gratify his ambition for the Governorship. Finding that it was impossible for him to control his own party, he went to work to organize another party which he could boss. The debt question gave him just the opportunity which he needed. A considerable proportion of the white voters were ready to welcome a movement for partial repudiation. The ignorant mass of black voters could, of course, be easily solidified in support of such a movement. The only thing requisite was an unscrupulous man, familiar with the worst methods of Machine politics, and Mahone exactly filled the bill. The man and the opportunity met. In 1879 a Legislature was chosen which elected Mahone to the United States Senate as a Repudiator, under the more euphonious title of Readjuster.

Thus far the matter had been purely a State affair, with which the Republican party of the nation had nothing to do. But when, upon the opening of the special session of the Senate, after Garfield's inauguration in March, 1881, Mahone went up to Washington to take his seat, the Republican party of the nation was called upon to define its position towards him. There was but one thing for it to do. It had always opposed repudiation and prided itself upon its honorable financial record. Mahone's policy in Virginia had been opposed by the white Republicans of character and honor, and a fifth of the Republicans in the Legislature had voted against his election to the Senate. He was a boss of the most odious type, whose personal record was so bad as to forfeit the sympathy of good men. Every consideration of party and public policy forbade his receiving any support from the Republicans in the Senate.

But parties were so evenly divided just then that Mahone held the "balance of power" in the Senate. He was ready to support the Republicans if they would violate all their professions of fidelity to civil-service reform, turn out the efficient Democratic officials of the Senate, and give the place of Sergeant-at-Arms to his man Riddleberger. He held out also the hope that, if properly supported by "patronage," he could make a break in the "solid South," and turn over the electoral vote of Virginia to the Republican candidate for President in 1884. The Republicans yielded to the temptation, and Mr. George Frisbie Hoar, in a burst of bathos, thus welcomed this soldier of fortune, this boss, this repudiator:

"There are Democrats in the South who do not mean to live any longer in the graveyards and among the tombs, whose face is toward the morning, and on whose brow the rising sunlight of the future generations of this country is already beginning to be visible. Of such Democrats the *avant-courrier* has already reached the Senate-chamber after long waiting and yearning. The Republicans of the North desire to stretch forth a friendly hand."

The White House was as friendly as the Senate Chamber, and a Republican President turned over to Mahone all the patronage of Virginia. Six years have passed, and what is the result of this "*avant-courrier's*" work? The public sentiment of Virginia regarding the State debt has been utterly demoralized. The Republican party of the State has degenerated into a merely personal organization, controlled for the private ends of the ruling boss. The

standard of politics in the Old Dominion has been so lowered under his rule that the worst faults of the old Bourbons appear venial in comparison with his sway, and his downfall was welcomed scarcely less warmly by honest Republicans throughout the country than by honest Democrats in Virginia. The split in the solid South has not come, and the prejudice of the better class of whites against a Republican party which is represented by a repudiator is stronger than it was six years ago. Mahone himself can no longer give the Republicans in the Senate the assistance of his tainted vote, and the colleague whom he has left there, fit pupil of such a master, is a man so unscrupulous and untrustworthy that nobody feels any assurance that he will not go over to the Democrats for the remaining two years of his term.

It should not have required such an experience to convince anybody that a "party of moral ideas" could not touch the pitch of repudiation and escape being defiled; but nothing short of such a lesson could have taught anything to men who were in the state of frenzy which Mr. Hoar exhibited when he delivered his apostrophe to Mahone. Fortunately the lesson has been so effective that it may be hoped its effect will be lasting, and that we shall not soon see a great national party throwing away all its principles, in the hope that corruption will win more than honesty.

EMIGRATION FROM GERMANY.

THE influence of economic forces in determining the strength and direction of the emigration of man is beyond question, and the course of immigration into the United States from all parts of the world during the last twenty-five years is evidence of this influence. Natural causes, however, have been of greater importance during that period than artificial, and interest has centred more in this country and its conditions than in the countries where the migration originated. The introduction of a series of artificial influences offers a new feature which may command some notice, and nowhere has this feature been more prominent than in Germany.

Since 1878 the German Government has exercised a continually increasing control over the economy of its people, which has now reached an extent and thoroughness that, when considered with the rapidity with which the measures were conceived and carried into execution, surpass the efforts of any other European nation in that direction during the last fifty years. In 1878 a system of factory inspection was framed, still imperfect in its performance, but very useful in protecting the lives, health, and general interests of factory operatives; in 1879 the policy of protection to home industries was raised to a principle by the framing of a tariff designed to exclude foreign competition; then followed the legal institution of sick and invalid funds by employers and their men, and finally in October last the Accident Insurance Law, applying to workers on farms as well as to workers in factories, went into operation. The general intention of these measures was to improve the condition of the workingman, and to enlarge his opportuni-

ties for employment; and while it is difficult to say whether there has been a positive advance in wages or in the general welfare of the German workingman, the hope, at least, of a benefit has been held out to him, his rigid dependence upon his daily labor for his daily bread has been somewhat loosened, and age, sickness, or disability has no longer the same terrors for him. To these State measures should be added the efforts of individual firms, also tending to make the position of the laborer more endurable.

The general thrift of the German workingman would enable him to make the most of whatever improvement these reforms might involve; and a few pennies saved, as the reports of the inspectors of factories show, would widen materially the margin between sufficiency and want. Of the enlarged opportunity for employment there can be little doubt, for the development of mining and manufacturing industries has been very great. In 1883 207,577 men were employed in mining black coal, as compared with 170,509 in 1879. The copper mines gave employment to 14,326 miners in 1883, and 9,118 in 1879. The number of furnaces and foundries increased during the same period from 227 to 270, and the hands employed from 32,242 to 42,724. While this increase of employment has been especially marked in the metal and sugar industries, it has also occurred in other branches of manufacture. This great increase in the demand for labor in manufactures—though not commensurate with the rapid growth of the German population—and the consciousness that the Government is exercising a watchful care over their concerns, have doubtless deterred many from emigrating to the United States who would otherwise have gone.

Have these influences yet affected the emigration of skilled labor from Germany to the United States? The tide of German emigration has of late years been fed chiefly from the sparsely settled agricultural districts, like Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and not from the industrial districts, like Saxony and the Rhineland. The succession of bad harvests that followed 1873, resulting in the extensive absorption of small farms into large holdings, may explain the movement. It is not the farming element, however, that now interests us, but the skilled labor, and in this case skilled labor refers to domestic or *hand* skill, and not to mechanical skill. As the German Government keeps no records of the occupations of emigrants, the Treasury reports must supply the information.

Since 1873 the percentage of skilled labor of the total immigration from Germany has been:

1873.....	10.03	per cent.	1880.....	12.86	per cent.
1874.....	11.18	"	1881.....	11.41	"
1875.....	13.82	"	1882.....	10.58	"
1876.....	13.02	"	1883.....	12.93	"
1877.....	14.54	"	1884.....	12.31	"
1878.....	14.25	"	1885.....	10.44	"
1879.....	13.48	"	1886.....	11.01	"

The year 1873 was in great part a time of great inflation in this country, and during it the effects of the war between France and Prussia, also, may have swelled unduly the total emigration. 1879 marked the last of six years of almost universal stagnation and depression; while 1886 was a year of moderate depression. As skilled labor receives higher

wages and is in better demand than common labor, it is less likely to be so severely influenced in its power to emigrate by years of depression than is the latter; and, in fact, it does form a larger proportion of the emigration in a bad than in a good year, when it is overwhelmed by great movements in the lower and unskilled classes of population, who seize upon any temporary advantage to migrate. So that while the percentage in 1886 is, according to the table, about the same as it was in 1874, it really marks a decided falling off, as it should be nearer the percentage of 1877 or 1878.

There is another method of reaching the same conclusion. In 1873 48,792 skilled immigrants landed in the United States; in 1879 the number had fallen to 21,362, and in 1886 had again risen to 36,522. These figures represent 10.6, 12, and 11 per cent. of the total immigration in the respective years. Of the skilled immigrants Germany supplied 30.77 per cent. in 1873, 21.37 per cent. in 1879, and 25.45 per cent. in 1886, and did not therefore follow the general variations, but one peculiar to itself, giving a high average in 1873, a low one in 1879, and a medium in 1886, as compared with a low general average in 1873, and higher averages in 1879 and 1886. The conclusion is that the domestic policy of Germany has influenced unfavorably the movement of skilled labor to this country.

This influence can hardly be permanent, because it depends upon the continued success of artificial relations, relations, it may be added, that are working their own failure. The productive energies of the empire cannot be indefinitely expanded at a rapid rate, for the markets for the products are more and more difficult to obtain, and cannot be held by bounties and subsidies save at great cost. There are already indications of a partial break-down, more especially in the sugar and iron industries, where over-stimulation has resulted in over-production, and, as a further consequence, in bankrupt works, lower wages, and masses of labor without employment and willing to work for a pittance. The same extreme condition may not result in the less favored industries, but the immunity of Germany from the economic ills that have beset other nations since 1879 is being broken down, and labor must suffer. It is not a rash prediction to assert that unless a period of prosperity intervenes, the migration of skilled labor, and this time of labor familiar with the use of machinery, from Germany to the United States may be greater than ever in a few years. Assisted emigration to German colonies may for the time deflect the current from this country, but the advantages to be gained here are too great to be overthrown by any system of moderate State aid. The question is not without interest to the economist.

WHY HAS INTEREST IN POLITICS DECLINED IN ENGLAND?

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THE causes of a singular and perhaps permanent alteration in national character are in the main twofold:

(1.) The gradual transformation of an aristocratic into a democratic Constitution.

An aristocratic government means of necessity