

has been carrying on an envenomed crusade against Jews, Judaism, and especially the Talmud, for a decade and a half, the Socratic philosopher who was Lessing's model for his 'Nathan der Weise,' Don Isaac Abarbanel, the trusted minister of Catholic kings, and (with the exception of Spinoza) all the heroes of Friedländer's 'Geschichtsbilder,' must have been, as true "Talmud Jews," sworn deadly enemies of the human race, and particularly anxious to destroy Christian happiness and lives. For such is Prof. Rohling's view of the Talmud and its followers, a view defended by quotations from its contents and other rabbinical writings, so maliciously commented upon, distorted, and garbled, and in some instances forged, that the author (who, by the by, glorifies the Inquisition and abhors Luther, Calvin, and free-thinkers almost as much as Talmudists) has been very freely branded as a "liar" by such Protestant authorities as Franz Delitzsch. These attacks he endeavored to parry by repetitions and fresh garblings; but when Dr. Bloch, a rabbi and member of the Austrian Reichsrath, denounced him in the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* as a liar, forger, libeller, and perjurer, using among others the words, "The Professor of Hebrew Antiquities at Prague carries on lying as a trade," he sued him for defamation. The result was a protracted criminal suit before the jury of Vienna in 1884, in which Christian professors of Austrian and German universities acted as experts in Hebrew and Talmudical lore. The plaintiff was doomed to ignominious defeat, but forestalled it by dropping the prosecution. The counsel for defence, Dr. Joseph Kopp, a Christian member of the Reichsrath, subsequently summed up the conclusions to be drawn from the investigation of mixed anti-Talmudic and anti-Semitic charges in a volume entitled 'Zur Judenfrage nach den Akten des Prozesses Rohling-Bloch' (2d ed., Vienna, 1886). The book evinces serious study and reflection and a philosophical grasp of the question, but it is very painful reading.

#### A MISLEADING BOOK ON RAILWAYS.

*The Railways and the Republic.* By James F. Hudson. Harper & Brothers. 1886.

THIS book is likely to do harm. Not that it is by any means devoid of merit; but its merits are of a kind to render it all the more dangerous. Of certain phases of the railroad question the author writes with knowledge and ability. Of other phases, equally important, he has no knowledge at all, and seems hardly to suspect their existence. The result is, a brilliant treatise on railroads as viewed from a newspaper office by a man who has some familiarity with legislative investigations and judicial decisions, but none whatever with practical railroad business or the principles which underlie it. His presentation of abuses and dangers is clear and forcible; but the explanations which he gives are often unsatisfactory, while his remedy is one which has proved impracticable in the past, and would be sufficient to upset the business of the country if seriously applied at present.

The great evil in American railroad management at the present day is the existence of irresponsible power in the hands of a few men, which enables them to make arbitrary differences in charge. These differences, or "discriminations," are often given in favor of those who least need or least deserve them. The all-important problem for the community is, to find some means of checking this abuse; and if it can find the means, it will apply it and ought to apply it. The demand of some of the railroad men that they should be left to manage their own private business in their own way cannot be tolerated for a moment. It is not their own private business, it is a public du-

ty as common carriers which they are performing. In consideration of this public character they have been allowed to take land under the right of eminent domain. Having used the right, they must accept the obligation. The last vestige of doubt on the subject was removed by the Granger decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which asserted the right to regulate railroads on other grounds besides the one just given.

All this Mr. Hudson presents forcibly. He shows the abuses of discrimination, as illustrated in the Hepburn Committee testimony and in the history of the Standard Oil Company. He also shows the fallacy in the attempt to excuse the railroads from their public obligations. But in his attempt to show how these abuses have arisen he is less successful. He lays too much stress on the arbitrary action of individuals, and fails to see that this action is the result of natural laws which have affected the railroad system in nearly the same way all over the world. The American railroad system is not the creature of Vanderbilt or Scott, Jay Gould or Albert Fink; it is far truer to say that Vanderbilt, Scott, Gould, and Fink are creatures of the railroad system, each in his own way. Business has developed in such a manner as to bring men of certain types to the front; the men have done something to modify its course, but would have been powerless to alter its general direction.

Here is where Mr. Hudson makes his first great mistake. He attributes many things to the arbitrary purposes of individuals, when they are really due to the necessities of railroad business, and are carried out in much the same way by the state roads of Germany or Belgium as by the private roads of Vanderbilt or Gould. Take the matter of pooling as an instance. Mr. Hudson opposes it strongly. He believes it to be an agency for doing away with that healthful action of free competition which would result in basing rates on cost of service. When met by the fact that railroad competition, wherever it exists actively; brings rates below cost of service, he attributes this to the arbitrary action of railroad managers, who wish to force rival roads into a combination. In so doing, he falls into errors of fact.

"It may be shown," he says, "that every railway war which has carried rates below cost clearly arose, not from competition, but from the effort to compel combinations or agreements which would end it. The first railway war that reduced freights from Chicago below cost of service was waged to force the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to abandon its differential rate from that city to Baltimore; the last one was a struggle to crush or prevent competition in the local traffic of the New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroad."

He is obviously unaware of the fact that in August, 1869, five years before the Baltimore and Ohio completed its Chicago route, freight rates from Chicago to New York were nearly as low as they ever have been since, and, in proportion to cost of service, decidedly lower. Nor does he see what would have been the result if the New York Central had refused to wage its competitive fight with the West Shore. The West Shore was making rates below cost of service. The New York Central was forced either to follow suit or to lose its business. Undoubtedly its managers felt that the harder it fought the sooner the fight would be over; but a policy such as Mr. Hudson would have had it adopt, refusing to carry at ruinous rates, would have been out of the question. So large a part of the expenses of a railroad are independent of the volume of traffic, that business at any price is often better than no business at all.

The effect of active railroad competition generally is to place the more conservative roads at the mercy of the more reckless ones. The disgraceful contracts of the railroads with the Stan-

dard Oil Company were not due to the system of pooling, as Mr. Hudson alleges, but to the irregular warfare between the railroads of which the Standard Oil Company was able to take advantage at every turn. Had a pooling system existed in 1873 it is not probable that the Standard Oil Company could have risen to its present dominant position. The organization of the East-bound pool had the direct and immediate effect of breaking up the "Evener" system which had been doing for the cattle business what the Standard did for oil; but the oil monopoly was too firmly established to be broken up in this way.

Our courts at first assumed that free competition would be the best means of regulating railroad charges. Not merely in the United States; but everywhere else, this proved to be a mistake. It was gradually recognized, in various parts of the world, that this theory could not be completely carried out; and it is hardly too much to say that the growth of really effective control has coincided with the gradual abandonment of this theory. The United States has held to the principle longest—with what results, we all know. Within the last few years there have been signs that the courts are beginning to take more practical ground, insisting upon results rather than theories. But this movement has only just begun, and there is serious danger that Mr. Hudson's book may do something to retard it. The author not merely insists upon free competition, but he goes one step further back, and would have us treat the railroad as a public highway. Not mere competition between railroads, but competition of many carriers on the same line of railroad, is the result which he proposes.

The idea is as old as the railroad system itself. It was embodied in the early charters of England and Prussia, and, with some modifications, in parts of the United States. It is hard to find a place where it was completely carried out for any length of time; but there have been many attempts to recognize the principle to some extent, the most notable being those in England in 1854 and in some parts of Germany in 1872. In connection with this last attempt there was very active discussion; and a work by Richter ('Das Transport-Unwesen auf den Eisenbahnen Deutschlands,' Frankfurt, 1872) took almost exactly the ground occupied by Mr. Hudson, though the latter obviously is quite unaware of its existence. In spite of the fact that the system has never succeeded in practice, Mr. Hudson says so much in its favor that it is worth while to notice some of the difficulties which he overlooks. There are some others which he mentions; but his lack of knowledge of the detail of railroad business leads him to overlook the most serious ones. We may grant, for the sake of argument, what he says about the possibility of overcoming the technical difficulties of train-despatching for a number of clamorous train-owners; we may admit, to the utmost, his view of the legal rights in the case, yet we shall be far from having surmounted the chief obstacle to the plan, which Mr. Hudson calmly waves out of sight. "The question of tolls," he says, "presents little practical difficulty." As a matter of fact, the difficulties are enormous. A great deal of the low-grade or long-distance traffic of the railroads could not by any means pay its share of the fixed charges. This was realized even under the old canal system, where the tolls were frequently graded according to the quality and value of the goods. The author calculates as a fair toll for the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, 0.774 cents per ton per mile. For Nebraska or Dakota wheat this would mean 15 or 20 cents a bushel to Chicago, besides carrier's charge—a prohibitory rate. But if you cut off that part of the tonnage, you would have to increase the toll, because the smaller volume of business would no

longer pay fixed charges at the old toll. This again would cut off more business, forcing a further increase of tolls; and so on indefinitely. It may be that Mr. Hudson would have the railroads themselves carry the low-grade traffic, and leave outsiders the privilege of carrying the manufactured goods, etc., which pay the higher rates. If this plan were tried, it would mean a simple repetition of the experience of Wisconsin in the Granger movement. The reduction of rates on profitable traffic to the level of the long-distance or low-class rate left nothing to pay interest or even maintenance.

We cannot follow out this matter as it deserves; but let it be noticed, as a further illustration, that if it were applied to the passenger business, commutation would be impossible. This is obvious; and in the freight business a somewhat similar result, though not equally obvious, would be equally unavoidable. If the tolls were fixed, there would be no object in making extremely low rates to increase the volume of traffic. It is to the railroad company as a track owner, not as a carrier, that the increase in volume of business brings profit. If some one else owns the track, the carrier loses his chief incentive to offer low rates; nor will any competition which you are likely to secure make up for the loss of this stimulus.

#### AN ENGLISHMAN'S HISTORY OF MUSIC.

*A General History of Music, from the Infancy of the Greek Drama to the Present Period.* By W. S. Rockstro. Scribner & Welford. 1886. Pp. 535.

REFERENCE has been repeatedly made in these columns to an odd peculiarity of the average English writer on music, as revealed especially in Grove's otherwise excellent 'Dictionary of Music and Musicians,' which contains articles by almost all the leading English musicians and critics. The majority of them seem to be brimful of knowledge regarding everything that ever happened in the musical world up to twenty or thirty years ago; but beyond that their minds appear to be complete *tabula rasa*. Thus Mr. Rockstro, in the volume now before us, gives a very learned enumeration of various histories and dictionaries of music, beginning with 1647 and taking in Burney and Hawkins, Féti's, Kiesewetter, Ambros, and Mendel, but forgetting to mention the more recent and more readable histories by Brendel, Dommer, Nohl, and others. Then we are told deliberately that "there is indeed no volume of moderate size, embodying the entire history of music, available at the present moment to the English reader," although Dr. Ritter has edited such a work, which, though less extensive than Rockstro's, much better observes the principle of giving honor to whom honor is due.

The merits of Mr. Rockstro's History are that it is written in a very clear, concise style, and that the author's erudition insures almost absolute accuracy in the statement of facts and dates. With the technical intricacies of notation and composition he is so thoroughly familiar that even those who have made no special study of harmony, counterpoint, and fugue may see at a glance wherein lay the differences and changes of style in the music of various epochs. What could be clearer and more incisive, for instance, than his brief description of Monteverde's epoch-making invention—the employment of unprepared discords: "Every one knows that the only discords permitted in strict counterpoint are those of transition and suspension. The introduction of those of a fundamental nature, employed by direct percussion, destroyed the school of Palestrina at a blow. . . . And unprepared discords are ineffably beautiful. Without these, passionate utterance in music would be impossible; instrumen-

tal accompaniments would be too weak for effective employment; and the musical drama would degenerate into a vulgar caricature." Very readable also is the chapter on Gluck and the absurdly artificial rules which degraded opera to the level of art for the artist's sake in those days. And in the chapter on the origin of the stave and clefs he succeeds in making clear, even without the use of colored inks, the various curious steps in the evolution of musical notation.

These and other merits make it a matter of regret that Mr. Rockstro's book should be marred by so many shortcomings. Of the ancients, the Greeks alone are briefly considered; while, at the other end, the most important factor in modern music, the orchestra, is so far disregarded as to its evolution that we are told concerning Berlioz that he has not left a "lasting impression either upon dramatic or instrumental music." The device of printing musical terms in capital letters is carried to excess, and far too much space is devoted to the enumeration of lists of compositions and to biographies of third to tenth-rate composers. This takes up the space that ought to have been devoted to the development of the *Lied* or accompanied song, of pianoforte style, of orchestral arrangement, and various other topics on which the author is silent.

A woful want of proportion and perspective is indeed the besetting sin of this book. The fact that a disproportionate amount of space is assigned to English composers is admitted in the preface, and may be pardoned under the circumstances, although even an English student must be puzzled to find that Handel gets seventeen pages and Beethoven only five, while Bach gets only half as much space as Handel, although he has had ten times more influence on the great modern composers, however much Handel may have surpassed him in popularity. Such disproportion is objectionable, because it gives the reader a wrong idea regarding the relative importance of composers; and it ought to be self-evident that this relative importance is decided by a composer's originality and his influence on contemporaries and successors, and not by the frequency of performance of his works, else Offenbach and Milloecker would rank higher than Weber and Beethoven. In the case of Mendelssohn and Schumann, this disproportion becomes positively ludicrous. Schumann, who has contributed a hundred times as many original ideas of permanent value to music as Mendelssohn, is disposed of in four pages, while Mendelssohn gets almost twenty, in specially fine print, thus making him the most important personage in the whole history of music. Of these twenty pages, one and a half are devoted to a description of Mendelssohn's visit to the Queen, on which important occasion the Prince Consort changed the stops, the Queen, picked up some music that had fallen on the floor, and the parrot had to be carried out because it made so much noise.

In a history of music which devotes twenty pages to Mendelssohn, eight to Purcell, and four to Dr. Arne (whose name, outside of England, not one concert-goer in a thousand has heard), how many ought there to be for Chopin, one of the most original and quietly revolutionary minds the world has ever seen—Chopin, who effected as great a change in the style of pianoforte composition as Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven together did in orchestral style? Mr. Rockstro settles the question very simply. He pats Chopin on the back by calling him "ineffably original," adds ten more lines, without indicating a single feature of his style or mentioning one of his works, and then passes on to Liszt, who is dismissed with the same condescending brevity. Indeed, it is nothing less than a burlesque on musical history to find the author setting up as the

seven greatest composers the world has seen Palestrina, Handel, Bach, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven; then, as the "seven lesser lights" next following, Schubert, Weber, Spohr, Mendelssohn, Schumann, Cimarosa (!), Cherubini; and Chopin by inference placed as a third-rate composer—Chopin, who never had but one equal as a melodist (Schubert) and no superior as an original harmonist, not even Bach or Wagner. There is also something supremely absurd in the idea that Schumann, Schubert, and Weber do not rank as high as Handel, Mozart, and Haydn. They were not only greater from an absolute point of view because standing on the latter's shoulders, but also from a relative point of view, because more original in their own period.

Under these circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that Mr. Rockstro entirely ignores Rubinstein in the text, mentioning him only in two lines in a footnote. He protests, indeed, that a history does not deal with contemporaries; but why then does he devote two pages to Gounod, and more or less space to several other living musicians who are vastly the inferiors of Rubinstein? In the last chapter he bewails the absence of a leader to carry on the development of music. We do not hesitate to prophesy that Mr. Rockstro, if he lives ten years longer, will see Rubinstein placed on a par with Beethoven. He will find many of the most gifted amateurs of the present day preferring Rubinstein's dramatic symphony to any of Beethoven's; he will find them turning from Beethoven's chamber music to Rubinstein's as more sympathetic; and he will find that, *e. g.*, Rubinstein's cello sonatas are superior to Beethoven's not only as regards their musical contents, but as showing Rubinstein's better understanding of the cello as well as the piano. As between "Fidelio" and Rubinstein's operas, we frankly acknowledge our preference for the latter; and that Rubinstein's songs are infinitely more beautiful than Beethoven's, no sane person will deny. This may seem a bold comparison, but we speak advisedly.

However, there is hope that Mr. Rockstro and other English musicians will come to see, ere long, what a wonderful creative genius the Russian pianist is. This hope is based on the fact that Mr. Rockstro has quite recently entirely changed his mind regarding Wagner. A few years ago he told the readers of his articles in Grove's 'Dictionary' that "at present 'Non più andrai' and 'Madamina' still hold their ground, and may possibly win"; that the brilliant accessories of the Nibelung festival argued "a sign of great weakness" in the work itself; that "unless the experience of all history lies, Wagner will be lovingly remembered by *Senta's* Ballad (ballad is "English, you know"). 'Traft ihr das Schiff,' ages after his operas have ceased to be performed in their entirety," etc. In the volume now before us he frankly cries *peccavi!* "We do not hesitate to say that, during a certain stage of the controversy, we were led, in company with many others, into grievous misapprehension, through the repetition, *ad nauseam*, of unintelligent eulogies, which did more damage to the cause they were intended to support than could have been effected by any amount of vituperation culled from Herr von Tappert's 'Vocabulary.'"

It is amusing to note the intense hatred of recent converts to Wagnerism for those who had brains or opportunities enough to appreciate him from the beginning. Even Dr. Hanslick, after writing that it was a "torture" to listen to the Tetralogy, had the impudence to claim, after Wagner's death, that no one had ever opposed Wagner save only what Rockstro calls his "unintelligent eulogists"—*i. e.*, those who liked "Siegfried" better than *Senta's* ballad or the "Tannhäuser" march. However, it would be ungene-