

already proving their capacity to grapple with this problem alone. Take for example South Carolina, which was in the most desperate condition. In 1874, under carpet-bag rule, there were only 110,416 pupils in her public schools. In 1884 the number had increased to 185,619. In Mississippi the number of pupils rose from 166,204 in 1876 to 266,996 in 1883. In Florida ten years increased the annual roll of scholars from 20,911 to 58,311. There is not a State where the gain has not been most gratifying. In most commonwealths the percentage of children of the school age who attend school already approaches that in the North—being, for instance, 65 per cent. in South Carolina and 68 per cent. in Maine—and the defects of the educational system are that the teachers are not so good and the terms not so long. But these defects can be overcome by the growing prosperity of the South, which will enable the States to raise more money for the schools. It must be remembered that the South has but just begun to realize the possibilities of her future under freedom. Every year will find her able to do more for education than the year before. At first the whites had to bear the expense of teaching both races, but already in Georgia the blacks pay into the Treasury most of what is spent upon colored schools.

Northern philanthropy may well contribute to the work of education in the South—the more Peabody and Slater funds, the better. But let not the nation make the fatal mistake of teaching the South to depend upon the Federal Government for the maintenance of its schools, and thus to lose that quality of self-reliance which no amount of education to short order can make up for. The best friends of the South are those Southerners who recognize the folly of this shortsighted policy. The North feels generously toward the South; it is in danger of yielding hastily to its first impulse in this matter. The most effective opposition can be made by Southern men who base their opposition upon the right ground. Ex-Governor Chamberlain, of South Carolina, who himself stoutly opposes the Blair bill, not only for its unconstitutionality but also for its wrong principle, quotes the words of one such Southerner, an ex-slaveholder and ex-Confederate soldier, who puts the strongest argument against the Blair bill in this most forcible style:

"You know my deep interest in the public-school system. Hence I am opposed to national aid. You cannot plaster the South with this system. It is a growth, and its certain and healthy growth can only be secured by each community providing for its own schools. The Blair bill is simply, in another form, the old hallucination, 'fifty acres and a mule,' which has caused more briars and sassafras bushes to grow in Southern fields than all else!"

PROHIBITION VS. HIGH LICENSE.

THE renewed attempt to secure a high-license law from the New York Legislature renders peculiarly timely any fresh study of the operation of that system, in contrast with the workings of prohibition, in other parts of the country. A letter which was published in the *Evening Post* of Friday, portrayed the situation under prohibition in Kansas, while

the *Christian Union* of last week presented a mass of valuable testimony regarding the state of things in Iowa, which, like Kansas, has a prohibitory law, and in Illinois, where a high-license system has been tried for some years. These are three representative States of the West, and the East ought to learn something from their experience.

The *Christian Union* recently addressed to its subscribers in Iowa and Illinois a circular letter asking what had been the effect of prohibition in the former State, and of high license in the latter, on the number and character of the saloons and the amount of drinking, drunkenness, and disorder. The replies from Iowa may be divided into two classes—those from the villages and small towns, and those from the large towns and cities. Correspondents living in the former places as a rule report that the prohibitory law is working well, but not a few of them confess that there never were any saloons in their neighborhoods before there was a prohibitory law. Public sentiment formerly forbade the liquor traffic, and naturally continues to do so now. On the other hand, the reports from large towns and cities almost uniformly represent that more liquor is sold and more men get drunk under prohibition than under the former license system. A few of the answers from such places are worth quoting:

Des Moines (population in 1880, 22,408).—Under license law 66 saloons; under prohibition 250; more sly drinking.

Dubuque (population, 22,254).—Last year 124 saloons; to-day City Marshal's list gives 143; city licenses read, "For keeping a saloon"; fully as much drinking.

Davenport (population, 21,831).—Increase from 20 to 30 per cent in number of saloons; new saloons of a worse character; amount of drinking increased; the law worse than a failure.

Burlington (population, 19,450).—Number of saloons more than double; character worse; drunkenness and disorder increased.

Council Bluffs (population, 18,063).—No effect from the law; under the so-called "Pop" ordinances—by which saloons are allowed to sell liquors not prohibited by law and not disturbed in selling what they please—licenses have been granted indiscriminately at low figures.

Keokuk (population, 12,117).—Liquor to-day sold as freely and openly as ever heretofore. The Marshal's report shows quarterly a great amount of drunkenness and disorder.

In short, a year and a half of experiment with the prohibitory law in Iowa conclusively proves that it cannot be enforced in cities and large towns, which are the very places where restrictions upon the liquor traffic are most imperatively demanded.

Kansas has fewer cities and a smaller foreign element than Iowa, so that the conditions were even more favorable to the Prohibitionists; yet the correspondent of the *Evening Post* shows that in the larger towns of Kansas the law is almost as much a farce as in similar places in Iowa. The provision by which a druggist may sell liquor to anybody, upon the customer's own certificate that he needs it "for medical purposes," is most demoralizing to druggists and public alike. Although liquor is not sold in most of the villages, this fact is not due to the law, but to the public sentiment, which, without the aid of a prohibitory statute, had previously forbidden the traffic, while in the cities there appears to be quite as much drunkenness as ever.

Contrast the condition of these two prohibitory States with that of Illinois, which has for

some time had a high-license law, with a minimum fee of \$500 for general liquor-selling, and a local-option clause that allows towns to increase the amount to any figure or prohibit the sale altogether. One-sixth of the whole population of Illinois is contained within the city limits of Chicago, and the *Christian Union's* correspondents from that city, with the exception of one opinionated Prohibitionist who "can see nothing but evil in any license system," agree that the high fee has reduced the number of saloons by several hundreds, the decrease being especially marked among those of the worst class, and that there is less drunkenness than formerly. If the investigation had been made a little later, official figures of the most convincing character might have been cited to support the impression of intelligent observers as to the workings of the system. The city Tax Collector has just issued a statement showing the number of saloon licenses issued for the last half dozen years, from which it appears that in 1882, before the high-license law was passed, there were 3,919 saloons, while in 1885 there were only 3,075 for a population probably a fifth larger, and the smaller number pay into the treasury \$1,721,474, against only \$195,490 for the larger number. Most of the smaller cities make similarly favorable reports, this from Rock Island being a fair sample: "Under low license, 84 saloons; under high license, 53; low groggeries rooted out; 30 per cent. less drunkenness and disorder."

More than one-third of the population of New York State is found in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and the smaller municipalities bring up the proportion of the inhabitants who live in cities to nearly half of the whole number. Every intelligent and candid person knows that prohibition cannot be enforced in a single one of these cities. There is no way of preventing all sale of liquor, but it is possible and feasible to put limits upon the traffic, and to make it bear some share of the burdens which it brings upon the State. The one practicable way of reaching this result is to impose a high license, which not only diminishes the number of saloons, but makes every licensee from self-interest alert to prevent the breaking of the law, and the consequent injury to his own interests, by unlicensed sellers.

AMERICOMANIA IN ENGLISH POLITICS.

OXFORD, December 28, 1885.

AN American observer who should now revisit England after an absence of from twenty to twenty-five years could not fail to be struck with a singular change in English sentiment toward the institutions of his country. From 1860 to 1865 all the well-to-do classes and (what is of far more consequence) all the thinkers and writers of England looked unfavorably on the political and social condition of America. The Union was often held up for the instruction, for the warning, for the reproof of Englishmen. It was rarely, except by one small body of politicians, mentioned with admiration or respect: Democracy, we were told, had broken down, and American experience bore witness to its failure. The Union during the war of secession was described by Carlyle in his peculiar language as the "dirtiest chimney which has ever got set on fire." The prevailing impression of reasonable Whigs was that the political arrangements of the United States were at best cheap and nasty, and at worst

nasty without being cheap. Even theorists so favorable to every form of freedom as was John Stuart Mill or Grote, seemed more than half to doubt whether political liberty was not in America purchased at the price of intellectual servility or uniformity, and certainly dwelt at least as strongly on the supposed subjection of Americans to the tyranny of the majority as on their certain exemption from all the more palpable forms of despotism. The ideas of the day were summed up in the constantly expressed determination that the English Constitution should not be "Americanized," and the most telling of the taunts aimed at John Bright was that he wished to introduce into England the habits and institutions of the United States. No doubt Bright himself and the small and then unpopular party which he led eulogized transatlantic republicanism. Even his praise, however, was in one sense negative. What he admired was the absence of evils, or supposed evils, which he saw existing around him. I can still remember the fervent applause with which a meeting of sympathizers with the North hailed his description of a "country where they had no State Church, no hereditary peerage, no emperor, no king." But indomitable as was his bravery in forcing upon the minds of his countrymen the grandeur of the great republic, and keen as was his insight into the moral aspects of the life-and-death struggle between freedom and slavery, it may be doubted whether the specific institutions, the constitutional mechanism, so to speak, of the United States ever excited very keen interest in the mind of John Bright, or received from him very careful examination.

Be this as it may, Bright was in 1860 a prophet, preaching only to the people, who repelled rather than guided the sentiment of average well-to-do Englishmen. The contrast between the current opinions of 1885 and 1860 is as marked as it is striking. Radicalism, as represented by Mr. Chamberlain or Sir Charles Dilke, has ceased to occupy itself deeply with America. A nation whose habits and polity are based upon individual freedom, and whose Constitution guarantees respect for the sanctity of contracts, does not in any sense realize the ideals of statesmen who hope, rightly or not, to accomplish great things for the mass of the people by means of the intervention of the State. It is not for a moment, of course, to be denied that there are many things in American institutions—as, for example, the absence throughout the Union of any State Church, and the establishment of free schools—which command the sympathy of English Radicals. Yet a very slight knowledge of America shows that it is not the land in which Socialism can flourish, and it is not to be expected that men who uphold theories which are more or less Socialistic should look with the same partiality on the United States as was naturally displayed by reformers like Bright and Cobden, who, but for the non-recognition of free-trade doctrines, might consider the Union (when delivered from slavery) to have satisfied the aspirations of the Manchester school. If, however, the United States no longer command the exclusive affection of English Radicals, the institutions of the Union now excite something like hopeless admiration on the part of thoughtful Conservatives. Whoever doubts this should read with care Sir Henry Maine's "Popular Government." He should note, also, the letters on the English Constitution and home rule which appear in the *Times*. Any one who does this will perceive that the current of Conservative speculation has changed its direction, and he may rest well assured that politicians will sooner or later follow the guidance of thinkers. The plain truth is, that educated Englishmen are slowly learning that the American republic affords the best example of a conservative democracy; and now

that England is becoming democratic, respectable Englishmen are beginning to consider whether the Constitution of the United States may not afford means by which, under new democratic forms, may be preserved the political conservatism dear and habitual to the governing classes of England.

A person skilful in drawing out antitheses might easily pen any number of sentences pointing out, in a more or less satirical form, the apparent contradiction between the Conservative sentiment of 1860 and the Conservative sentiment of 1885. But the general course of opinion is, under all apparent inconsistencies, never really self-contradictory. It is easy enough to harmonize the dislike of Americanism which prevailed twenty-five years ago with the Americomania of the present day. As long as it seemed possible to repel the inroads of democracy, English Conservatives naturally opposed all Americanization of the Constitution. Now that a democratic form of government is all but established in England, English Conservatives as naturally turn their eyes toward the United States, to see if they can borrow from the other side of the Atlantic devices for guiding democratic progress in an orderly and conservative direction. That this is the true explanation of the care and sympathy with which the American polity is at this moment investigated by English thinkers, is clear enough to any one who notes the points in your institutions which are singled out by English writers for admiration or respect. The President, they allege, occupies a position far more independent of temporary changes in public opinion than a Prime Minister; the Senate wields powers and exercises an influence never claimed or exerted by the House of Lords. Not the most trifling article in the Constitution of the United States can be changed without the most deliberate assent and the most lengthy consideration on the part of the American people; while it is at any rate conceivable that within a month or two, without any reference to the electors of Great Britain, the English Parliament might dissolve the union with Ireland or turn the United Kingdom into something like a Federal monarchy. The question, in fact, of the day is with many Englishmen rapidly becoming whether expiring Toryism may not, by alterations of the Constitution, be changed into Democratic Conservatism.

In another letter I may attempt to give some sort of answer to this inquiry. It is well, however, before considering how far any of the specific institutions of America can be transplanted to England, to weigh carefully a consideration which often apparently escapes the attention of those who propose reforms in our Constitution. The basis of the American polity is general acquiescence in the fundamental principle of democratic government, which, turn the matter as you will, is at bottom nothing more nor less than loyal submission to the will of the majority: the essence of a democracy is the rule of numbers. This rule may be, and, as every man of common sense must confess, often is, unenlightened, dull, and (occasionally) oppressive. But no one is really a democrat who does not hold that on the whole it is best in a given state or nation that the will of the majority should be supreme. Now any man who wishes to develop democratic conservatism must honestly acquiesce in democratic government, and it is open to question whether such acquiescence exists at present among educated Englishmen. Theorists who propose constitutional innovations appear often to aim, though unconsciously, at two different objects. At one moment they propose to check or counterbalance the power possessed under the present Constitution by the majority of the electors. This would certainly appear to be one, at least, of

the ends proposed to themselves by the fanatics or enthusiasts for the representation of minorities. The end proposed may or may not be good, or may or may not be attainable. But it assuredly is an end which cannot be attained without violating the fundamental principle of democratic government. At another moment our innovators propose schemes—such, for example, as changes in the constitution of the House of Lords or as limitations on the absolute sovereignty of Parliament—of which the avowed aim is not to restrain the influence of the majority, but to insure that the will of the majority shall in reality be supreme. This end may or may not be good or attainable, but it is an end perfectly consistent with the fullest belief or acquiescence in the principles of popular government. Now one thing appears to be perfectly certain: the Constitution has become in form, at least, democratic. The majority of the electors are nominally, at any rate, sovereign. Of this power they will not suffer themselves to be deprived by the most artful combinations devised by the most ingenious of doctrinaires; or (if this be not admitted) it is at least certain that whoever attempts to diminish the power of the democracy must do so openly and by appealing to anti-democratic feelings, and a policy of which this is the object receives no countenance from the example, and can derive no benefit from the imitation, of America. It is, however, possible that the English electors may countenance changes of which the true and sole aim is to give full effect to the deliberate will of the people. In considering what changes are calculated to produce this result, instruction of all kinds may be derived from studying the Constitution of the United States. The theorist, however, or statesman who hopes to derive any practical benefit from the transference to England of the safeguards by which American statesmanship has surrounded the action of democratic government, must before all things honestly accept American belief in the rule of the majority. Anglomaniacs have before this led Continental revolutionists to erect unstable and disastrous polities, which have displayed all the forms while omitting the essential spirit of the English Constitution. There is no small risk that Americomania may produce as untoward results in England. The authority of the President, the dignity of the Senate, the limited powers of the houses of Congress, the difficulties in the way of changing constitutional laws—these and other checks placed by the founders of the Union on the hasty action of the American people excite the admiration of conservative theorists. It is not so certain that they admire or share that respect for the popular voice which, for bad or for good, constitutes the essential spirit of American republicanism.

A. V. DICEY.

Correspondence.

REMOVAL OF INDIAN AGENTS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: I am a sincere admirer of the fearless and uncompromising justice with which President Cleveland has publicly righted certain open wrongs perpetrated upon the Indian. I welcomed the President's inaugural declaration in respect to the Indian, and still believe that it is the expression of his honest purpose and genuine conviction. It is therefore in no partisan or fault-finding spirit that I desire to call attention to what is, in my judgment, a most grave and far-reaching error in the Indian policy of the present Administration. I refer to the sweeping changes which have been and are being made in the Indian service—the great number