

THE SPANISH POLITICAL SCENE

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On November 20, 1975, General Francisco Franco died in Madrid. The passing of *El Caudillo* marked the end of an important era in 20th Century history, but it raised ominous questions for the country he had ruled since 1939. In 1969, Franco had designated Prince Juan Carlos de Bourbon as his heir and had decreed the restoration of the Spanish monarchy following his death. Juan Carlos is the grandson of King Alfonso XIII, who was deposed with the establishment of the Republic in 1931. Two days after Franco's death, the Prince was installed as King Juan Carlos I. He quickly embarked on a process of liberalization that, though sometimes checked, does not yet seem to have ended.

The freeing of 1,600 political prisoners, the granting of the right of assembly, the legalization of labor unions and strikes, the loosening of controls over the press and political expression, the legalization of opposition parties (including the Communist Party of Spain, or PCE, on April 9 1977) are aspects of the "progressive" reforms that have occurred in Spain since Franco's death. The King retained Carlos Arias Navarro, appointed by Franco, as Premier. But, in July, 1976, Arias resigned on the request of the King, and Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, generally represented as a "Centrist", who at present retains office. On December 15, 1976, in a referendum approved by the unicameral Francoist Cortes (Parliament), 76 per cent of the eligible Spanish electorate voted to approve by 94 per cent a largely democratic constitution which establishes a bicameral Parliament responsible to the King. It is under this constitution, expected to be revised shortly, that the June 15 elections were authorized and held.

Not everyone in Spain was pleased with this process of liberalization. A stable political democracy has never existed in Spanish history, although in the time of the Celts and the Visigoths the peninsula shared the traditional European political system of a monarchy advised by a Council of Nobles, whose decisions were periodically referred to an Assembly of the Freemen. Both the right and the left have criticized the new constitutional and polit-

ical developments. Other groups, including regional separatists in Catalonia, the Basque provinces, and the Canary Islands; anarchists and Maoists; and right-wing Catholic organizations, have resorted to different degrees of terrorism, ranging from beatings to kidnappings, bombings, and murder.

About 6,000 candidates representing some 160 legally recognized parties, contended for the 557 elective seats in the Parliamentary campaign, which began on May 24. There are several groupings — probably not parties in the Western sense — that command more support than most. So far, issues seem to play a minor role in Spanish politics. Campaigning revolved more around personalities and symbols from the Spanish past — relationships with Franco, in the Civil War, and to ideological posturing — than around a serious public discussion of national issues. The leading groups may be classified as Left, Right and Center, with more extreme groups bordering each wing.

The leading left-wing group in Spain is currently the *Socialist Worker's Party* (PSOE) led by Felipe Gonzalez 34, a lawyer from Seville. The PSOE is the mainstream socialist party, founded in 1879 and affiliated with the Socialist International. Gonzalez is a young man who never wears a tie in public and has boasted that no-one is to the left of him. He originally voiced a favorable attitude to the Communists, but has since backed off, due to pressure from other European socialist parties, such as the West German SDP. The SDP has financially supported the PSOE with \$20 million, as has Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez with about \$6 million last year. Gonzalez has also called for the termination of U.S. bases in Spain.

Another left-wing alliance is the Federation of Socialist Parties (PSP), which began as a university group and still retains an academic tinge. The economist, Tierno Galvan, leads this party. Its popularity since the early 1970's has dimmed somewhat, due to its tendency to characterize Spain as a Third World country and to its connection with exiled Saharans and with pro-Arab forces, as a result of which it has been associated with anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist views.

To the right of these groups is an anti-Communist social-democratic alliance composed of three organizations: the Federation of Social Democratic Socialist Party, and the Social Reform Party. These also tend to have academic leadership; prominent are Professors Lasuen and Arrarte (economists) and Antonio Garcia Lopez, an anti-Communist. Garcia is a lawyer from Madrid who is said to have the support of high military officers, but less support at the grass roots level.

The Spanish left seems to be divided by various persuasions of socialist ideology and by an ambivalent attitude towards Communism. On the one hand, the democratic left favors Communist participation in politics as a test of freedom. But, at the same time, because it is more moderate, it has a latent fear and distrust of the Communists. Thus, it is largely hesitant to exclude the PCE from politics but is also hesitant to allow them a role. Felipe Gonzalez was recently quoted on this issue: "The Communists have never yet respected the rules of democracy when in power. But it is unrealistic to try to exclude them from politics."(1)

If the Left becomes part of a coalition with Suarez, their ambivalence may disarm them in the event of a serious confrontation with the Communists.

The largest right-wing organization is the *Alianza Popular* (AP), a coalition of former supporters of Franco who now support the democratic constitution. The leader of the AP is Manuel Frago Iribarne, 54, former Minister of Interior and Information, who advocated liberalization under Franco. Other prominent leaders of the AP are Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, Minister of Public Works and builder of the modern Spanish highways, as well as a prominent political theorist; Laureano Lopez Rodo, Minister of Finance in the 1960's when Spain made significant economic progress; and Carlos Arias Navarro, former Premier under Franco and Juan Carlos. The AP has received support from Franz Josef Strauss's Bavarian party and has sought support from other European conservative parties. In addition to the AP, there are at least three other right-wing groups of minor importance: the *Fuerza Nueva* of Blas Pinar, the National Alliance of Antonio Giron, and the *Hermandad de Alfereces Provisionales*. These are Falangist in orientation.

The main group on the Center is the Democratic Center Union (UCD), a coalition of about fifteen centrist organizations. This is the group of Premier Suarez, and has combined with the Popular Party of Jose Maria de Areilza. Areilza is a former ambassador to the U.S. and served as Juan Carlos' first foreign minister. Another leading centrist group is the Christian Democratic Alliance. It consists of Joaquin Ruiz Jimenez, of the Democratic Left, and the conservative Popular Democratic Federation and other groups. Jimenez, refusing to join the UCD because of the latter's alleged Francoist leanings, has allied himself with the PSOE.

Suarez was widely expected to win the election, at least to the extent of being able to form a coalition government with the runners-up. One reason for this is his personal popularity, but also it is to be remembered that the

government-run election gave him an advantage. Only Suarez could use Spanish television to announce his candidacy, and the rural bias of the electoral system gives him (and the Conservatives) an edge. Suárez is probably further to the left than he has so far appeared. He seems to value political realism and "pragmatism" above ideology. Of the Center and Right in general, it can be said that their candidates display an impressive range of talent and experience. However, many do not appear to possess the ability or experience to cope effectively with the techniques and rhetoric of democracy, and it is questionable whether they will have much future on the electoral scene unless they can learn these skills quickly.

In addition to the fascist, Falangist, and Francoist groups, more extreme right and left wing organizations such as the Carlists, the ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), the Warriors of Christ the King, the Kamikaze Commandos and others have held public attention, if not power, in Spain until recently. They were not expected to gain much support in the election.

The Communist Party of Spain (PCE) was illegal in Spain from the beginning of the Franco regime until April 9, 1977. Its current leader is Santiago Carillo, 61, who was governor of Madrid in the Civil War when 12,000 Nationalist prisoners of war were murdered by the Republican troops. Its senior figure is Dolores Ibarruri, who has long been a Stalinist and a resident of the Soviet Union until her recent return to Spain. Ibarruri, nicknamed "La Pasionaria", has been accused of involvement in the murder of conservative leader Calvo Sotelo in the days prior to the Civil War. Despite its association with atrocities and extremism, the PCE now claims to be a democratic movement, part of the allegedly reformed "Eurocommunist" movement in France and Italy. However, Carillo's recent book, *Eurocommunism and the State*, advocates a highly centralized and ideologized regime that would use political forces to transform Spanish society. Carillo's heir apparent is a well-known economist, Ramon Tamames, 43.

The PCE has reportedly received considerable aid from the KGB, which has infiltrated other leftist organizations and much of the media. However, Moscow has not overtly supported the PCE, perhaps because it distrusts the Party's independence, and has tried to create another Communist structure in Spain. According to Spanish intelligence, the KGB provided 1.5 billion pesetas (about \$22.5 million) last year for the PCE. Also, several top level officers of the KGB have been identified in Spain: Viktor Lessiovsky, Yuri Ponomarev, Viktor Filipov, Alekei Osipov, Anatoly Krasikov, Vladimir Pertsov. The KGB has made overtures to the PSOE and given covert aid

to MPAIAC, a Canary Island guerrilla group as well as to the mainland separatists movements. Rumania also reportedly gives covert training to PCE members in terrorist and guerrilla techniques.

The object of the Soviet Communists is revealed in the "Oran Plan", which came to light in 1974. The goals of this plan were to overthrow the governments of Spain, Morocco, and Portugal, and to achieve Soviet control of the Western Mediterranean and West African coast. KGB activities in Spain, aside from aid and training for its allies, have consisted of penetration of the Spanish media, the use of sports events and religious gatherings as political actions, and the manipulation of other social activities to subvert and propagandize Spanish society. This covert Soviet intervention is probably the greatest internal problem that a new government has to face.

In the face of this type of aid from the Kremlin, the PCE cannot credibly claim that it has turned its back on the Soviet "style" of Communism. Nor can the Communists be regarded as loyal to the non-Communist government of Spain.

On June 15, about 80 percent of Spain's 23.5 million eligible voters went to the polls. The result was a fairly strong victory for the center and moderate left and a rebuff for the Communists and the right. The following table shows the results for the major winners.

PARTY	% OF POPULAR VOTE	SEATS IN CHAMBER	
		OF DEPUTIES	SEATS IN SENATE
UCD	34.0%	165	105
PSOE	18.5%	119	60
PCE	9.0%	20	8
AP	8.2%	17	

At the close of the polling, King Juan Carlos named 41 centrist Senators to fill the appointive seats in the upper house. The political fortunes of the leading candidates are also revealing. Suarez, Carillo, Ibarruri, and Gonzalez were all elected, but two leading rightists — Arias Navarro and Blas Pinar, were defeated.

If it is possible to infer trends in Spanish political culture from these results, one can say that the Spanish electorate feels very little nostalgia for the Franco years but that it equally rejects the Communist alternative, despite Carillo's efforts to refurbish his image; and that the electorate is

attracted to the center-left policies of increasing liberalization, economic distribution, and modernization.

These results point to a coalition of the center and left under Suarez and Gonzalez. The latter, however, whose party would profit from a more urban-oriented electoral system, has indicated that he looks on a coalition with the center unfavorably and has already called for a quick drafting of a new constitution and for new elections. Whether such a coalition would provide a stable government, given the political ambitions of its likely leaders, may well be doubted.

Governmental stability appears problematical also when one considers the problems the government must face. In addition to the infiltration of the KGB (and other foreign forces) discussed above, Spain has severe economic problems that only a very strong and stable government can deal with: 30 percent annual inflation, 8 percent unemployment, a balance of payments deficit of \$4.24 billion last year, a fall in its foreign reserves of \$900 million, a foreign debt of \$12 billion and a chronic flight of capital. Such problems call for austerity, but the recently legalized labor unions are unlikely to accept such measures passively. Their Communist and Socialist leaders will not ignore the political opportunities presented by the economy and a divided ministry.

The predominantly right-wing military forces of Spain, on the other hand, will probably be reluctant to permit a left-wing takeover. The military forces consist of 314,000 men (47,400 officers; 267,000 NCO's and privates). The army consists of 220,000 men and has played a major role in the preservation of internal order. This role has been supplemented by the three police forces: the General Police Corps, 10,000 men plus employees and informers; the Civil Guard, 63,000; and the riot police, 34,000. A military coup cannot be discounted, especially since the election returns do not point toward the possibility of either a right-wing democratic victory or even a stable centrist government. Since the armed forces also contain some liberal units observers consider civil war remotely possible. The government seriously feared a widespread reaction in the wake of its recent legalization of the PCE. For this reason, it announced the action without warning the day before Easter, when most Spaniards were dispersed on vacation. If Suarez should attempt to reform or scale down the police and army, as he has announced he will, this threat to their long-established power could also alienate many officers.

Finally, all these problems must be seen in the light of the general

cultural transformation as Spain becomes increasingly industrialized and urbanized. Demands for a regional autonomy, for economic integration into the EEC and military-political acceptance into NATO, for social liberalization (divorce, abortion, women's rights), and for economic innovations (wage increases, new housing, labor demands) could create a "revolution of rising expectations" that would overlap more insidious appetites for power. The Communist Party's Central Committee has issued a communique to its leading activists which, among other things, calls attention to the political uses of the highly popular and newly tolerated pornography in Spanish newstands:

The tolerance toward sex that is practised by government oligarchy is much to our advantage. Many of our newly affiliated youngsters have confessed that they were first attracted by pornography. *

In conclusion, then, we may say that the political structure of Spain is precarious. Despite the "success" of the election itself, a pre-election poll showed that only 26 percent of the Spanish people knew what they would be voting for. The results of the elections promise to be unstable, and it is not clear that the new government will even be strong enough to endure, let alone seriously try to resolve, conflicting forces now disturbing the Spanish scene.

* Quoted in *National Review*, June 10, 1977, p. 665.

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WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

By Robert S. McNamara
President of the World Bank

Short of thermonuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead.

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