

Carter's toast to the shah

What unshakable alliance?

LAST MONTH, WHEN THE SHAH of Iran came to visit, the White House threw a lavish party. And, as is the custom at these parties—or state dinners, as they are called—President Carter offered a toast to his guest. According to the news accounts, he spoke of the “unbreakable ties of friendship” that bind the United States and Iran, and declared that “our military alliance is unshakable.” The latter statement especially is something of an exaggeration. As President Carter should know—or if he doesn’t, someone should tell him before it’s too late—the United States is not now, nor has it ever been, party to a military alliance with Iran.

Perhaps the president was laboring under the illusion that the United States is a member of CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization. If so, he would not be the only one to make this mistake. Earlier this year, in an article about U.S. collective-security agreements, the *New York Times* did it too, listing the United States, Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan as members of CENTO. But the fact is that the United States never was a member of CENTO; it never signed the treaty. One of the State Department’s own publications, *Treaties in Force*, bears out this fact.

How does it happen that two such presumably well-informed sources as the president of the United States and the *New York Times* should be so wrong? Or, more important, how does it happen that despite the lack of any treaty commitment to Iran, the United States, for at least the past 20 years, has been acting as if there were a military alliance, unshakable or otherwise, between this country and Iran? The answer to both questions lies in an extraconstitutional practice of U.S. foreign policy known as *executive agreement*. Under the Constitution, all treaties with other countries are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Under executive agreement, the president can involve the United States, by fiat, in the affairs of other countries.

Although the United States has never been a signatory to CENTO (or to the Baghdad Pact, which preceded the Central Treaty Organization), since 1956 it has had a military liaison office at CENTO headquarters, and has been represented as an observer at meetings of the CENTO Ministerial Council. All these activities stem from agreements made in the 1950s by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, under the Eisenhower doctrine of resisting Communism in the Mideast. All subsequent presidents have reaffirmed this basic but unofficial commitment. Under Richard Nixon—whose doctrine in-

involved strengthening certain client states in order to promote regional stability—it was decided, again by a decision of the executive, to supply Iran with the most sophisticated weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

Today, as a result of various agreements, most of which authorize the sale of advanced weapons to Iran, there are about 30,000 Americans, military personnel and civilians, under contract to the military in Iran. Most of them are involved in training Iran’s armed forces to operate the highly complicated weaponry. It is likely that by 1980 there will be 50,000 to 60,000. What this means, as Leslie H. Gelb, the former diplomatic correspondent for the *New York Times* who is now a State Department official, wrote in 1976, is that Iran is now “in a position where it could not fight without thousands of Americans on the scene.” Furthermore, Gelb points out—as many others have done—that under these circumstances, if Iran were to become involved in a conflict, “the Americans [stationed in Iran] could become hostages as well as trainers.”

Iran is by no means the only country with which the United States has become militarily involved through executive agreements. According to an excellent article by Loch Johnson and James M. McCormick in the Fall 1977 issue of *Foreign Policy*, “Foreign Policy by Executive Fiat,” about 70 percent of the 105 most significant military commitments made by the United States during the years 1946–1974 were made by executive agreement. These include the military use of the British island Diego Garcia (1966); the establishment of a military mission in Iran (1974); and the “understanding” under which the United States agreed to send military personnel to serve as monitors of the Sinai disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel (1975).

The obvious result is that Congress is excluded from major decisions involving U.S. foreign and military policy. As Senator William Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once observed, “The Senate is asked to convene solemnly to approve by a two-thirds vote a treaty to preserve cultural artifacts in a friendly neighboring country. At the same time, the chief executive is moving military men and material around the globe like so many pawns in a chess game.” And, of course, the instrument by which these moves are made is the executive agreement.

Today, according to a recent study by the Center for Defense Information, the United States has executive agreements on military matters with 84 countries. These include agreements authorizing the stationing of U.S. troops abroad, the establishment of U.S. bases on foreign soil, gifts of military equipment, the sale of weapons, the extension of credit for weapons sales, weapons development programs, and mutual defense pacts. About half of these agreements are made without any treaty existing between the United States and the other country.

As President Carter’s toast to the shah reminds us, our foreign policy is out of control. To make this a safer world, for ourselves and for everyone else, we must begin to cut back our foreign military involvements of all kinds. A sensible place to begin is with the commitments that have been made by executive agreements. □

Trade war with Japan

IN MID-NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, President Carter's Special Representative Robert S. Strauss warned Japanese leaders that relations between the United States and Japan were near a "bursting point." Repeatedly, U.S. officials have told Japan to make what they call "extraordinary" and "drastic" changes in its behavior. *Newsweek* of November 21 reported that a "mood of determination to crack down on Japan has now reached all levels of the Carter administration."

What, exactly, has Japan done? Has it attacked some hapless country in Asia? Has it violated human rights by torturing dissidents? Has it desecrated the American flag in Tokyo? No. What it has done—or rather, what Japanese citizens and business firms have done—is to sell to the rest of the world (and particularly to the United States) considerably more than they have purchased from abroad. This continuing and increasing export surplus is estimated to be \$18 billion this year, of which about \$8 billion is sold to buyers in the United States. The American government is now leveling its big guns to threaten Japan because the United States wants to eliminate or even reverse that surplus. The United States has demanded that Japan (1) set a definite time by which the surplus will be eliminated; and (2) take certain specific economic policy measures. In the words of one astute observer, the United States is "even going so far as to tell the Japanese how to run their domestic economy."

But what's so terrible about Japan having an export surplus? If a chronic "imbalance" of this sort requires "drastic" action by the government, why shouldn't the United States be required to do something draconian about its own 30-year balance-of-payments deficit, a deficit that is expected to reach a record \$30 billion this year?

Actually, the United States doesn't care at all about Japan's overall balance; what upsets it is the big Japanese export surplus with the United States. Yet concern over one's balance of payments with any particular country died out in economic theory—and deservedly so—with the seventeenth century. It's as if New York worried about its balance with Connecticut or New Jersey. And why are no American leaders worried about our export surplus to the Common Market?

If we peel off the various obfuscatory layers of outdated monetary theory, then, we find that the real concern of the United States is very simple: special privilege for different groups of American business. The United States wants to foist American exports on Japan, expanding the markets for our numerous export industries. But in the current situation, it is even more concerned with setting up a protective wall for American industries that face competition from the increasingly more efficient Japanese. At present, Japanese competition is intensifying and spreading into numerous industries: different varieties of steel, shoes, color TV sets, CB radios,

motorcycles, automobiles, and other items. The Carter administration has already surrendered to protectionism in several areas; it would prefer that the Japanese take steps to restrict exports via voluntary Japanese quotas, as Japan has already done with shoes, color TVs, and certain steel products. For this would allow the Carter administration to pretend that it is devoted to free trade—a devotion that is traditional with Democratic administrations but has long been more rhetoric than fact.

As we watch the spectacle of Special Representative Strauss, Vice President Mondale, and other high American officials stepping up the pressure on Japan, we should note some of the more amusing aspects of the affair. The United States has been trying to get Japan to buy more American products—and yet it continues to levy a partial embargo on the sale of American lumber to Japan, in an attempt to keep down its price. Meanwhile, as surplus wheat piles up in American silos because of Carter's expanded farm price-support program, the United States has been demanding that the Japanese triple their purchases of American wheat. When the Japanese replied that the higher humidity in Japan would ruin a greatly increased inventory of wheat, the American government magnanimously offered to store the wheat in the United States indefinitely. Perhaps it would be simpler to cut out the ad hoc measures. Maybe the U.S. government should simply submit to Japan a master list of U.S. firms and tell the Japanese how many dollars they should send to each as annual tribute. □



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THE THERAPEUTIC STATE

THOMAS SZASZ

Soviet psychiatry: Its supporters in the West

THE CURRENTLY POPULAR protest against Soviet psychiatric abuses is not only a flagrant case of selective indignation; it is, insofar as prominent American psychiatrists and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) are concerned, also a case of crass hypocrisy. Since the late 1960s, many leading American psychiatrists as well as the APA have heaped praise on the Soviet mental health system and on several leading Russian psychiatric criminals. I propose to exhume this body of American (and British) support for Soviet psychiatry and use it, much as a pathologist might use a corpse, to establish the fact that Western psychiatric totalitarians share with their Soviet colleagues the responsibility for Russian psychiatric repressions.

Western awareness of, and concern with, psychiatric abuses in the Soviet Union began in 1965, with the publication in Britain of Valery Tarsis's *Ward 7*, a thinly disguised autobiographical novel setting forth the psychiatric persecution, incarceration, and torture of a writer critical of the Soviet system. The title of Tarsis's book (still probably the best account of Soviet psychiatry that we have) was carefully chosen to alert the reader to the fundamental similarities between Soviet psychiatry as he exposes it and Czarist psychiatry as Anton Chekhov exposed it in 1892 in his story, "Ward No. 6." Nevertheless, the Western press and Western psychiatrists have stubbornly ignored the historical continuity characteristic of institutional psychiatry throughout the world. Tarsis recognized that the real enemy was psychiatric power, wherever it existed and whatever shape it assumed. The result of his book, however, was the unleashing of a journalistic and professional criticism of coercive psychiatry that is, in fact, doubly selective: It is aimed only at Russian

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psychiatry and ignores the parallel problems and practices in Western countries; and it is aimed only at protecting so-called "sane intellectuals" or "political dissidents" from psychiatric imprisonment and torture, and ignores the predicament of "insane nonintellectuals" or "nonpolitical dissidents" subjected to identical persecutions and punishments. I shall remark on each of these matters presently. Before doing so, however, I want to deliver the exhumed body I promised.

IN THE NOVEMBER 1969 ISSUE OF the *International Journal of Psychiatry*, Mike Gorman, then the celebrated executive director of the National Committee Against Mental Illness, published a report entitled "Soviet Psychiatry and the Russian Citizen." To call Gorman's article adulatory would be an understatement. A single quotation from it should suffice to illustrate his views: "Leaving aside the paramount virtue of a psychiatric system that brings a high quality of care to all those in trouble without any invidious economic distinctions, it is my considered opinion that the tailoring of psychiatric care in all kinds of settings—in the school, in the factory, in the dispensary, in the emergency services, in the home—to the individual needs of each patient is the crowning achievement of Soviet psychiatry."

Gorman's own crowning achievement as a mental health propagandist was, of course, that in listing all the "settings" in which Russian psychiatrists dispense their cures, he managed to omit the two most important ones: the courtroom and the psychiatric concentration camp called "special hospital." In addition, it was no doubt also an achievement, testifying to Gorman's own mental health, that he could sleep at night while deliberately covering up for the crimes of the psychiatric Robespierres and Marats of his beloved Soviet mental health system.

Accompanying Gorman's article was a "critical evaluation" of it by Zigmond Lebensohn, a card-carrying institutional psychiatrist and longtime spokesman for APA policies. "As a Gorman-watcher of many years standing," wrote Lebensohn, "I read his paper and could hardly believe my eyes! Gone were the sharp barbs and telling innuendoes, which have characterized so many of his diatribes on practically all aspects of psychiatry in the United States. Instead, we find him in a mellow and expansive mood, describing Soviet psychiatry in roseate terms with enthusiasm, eulogy, and panegyrics."

In the late 1960s, Gorman was, of course, articulating the then "correct" American

psychiatric position on Russian psychiatry. His voice was in perfect harmony with the views of leading American psychiatrists and the APA. For example, in 1968 Dr. Ari Kiev, a recognized expert on Soviet psychiatry, edited and contributed two chapters to a book entitled *Psychiatry in the Communist World*, in which there is not a single reference, however oblique, to the psychiatric incarceration of political dissenters. (Both the Tarsis case and the case of General Grigorenko had at that time already been widely reported in the newspapers.) In 1969, Dr. Kiev published an article in the magazine *Attitude* reviewing Soviet psychiatric theory and practice, again without any reference to psychiatric abuses.

I SHOULD LIKE TO PAUSE HERE IN my presentation of the evidence against American psychiatry's posture vis-à-vis Soviet psychiatry and note that, even before 1970, the American mental-health establishment's hypocrisy on this subject

That the Soviet Union is a police state is too simple for observers of the political and psychiatric scene to admit.

was glaringly obvious. When American newspapermen then looked at Soviet psychiatry, they saw its horrors clearly and reported them honestly. In December 1969, for example, *Time* magazine ran a piece entitled "Dissent = Insanity," reporting on General Grigorenko's psychiatric persecution. On February 2, 1970, *Parade* magazine published a long essay by Lloyd Shearer denouncing Soviet psychiatric atrocities. However, when American psychiatrists and mental health experts looked at the same scene, all they saw was a Russian psychiatric paradise, which Americans could not emulate fast enough.

To appreciate fully the APA's support of Soviet psychiatric practices, it is necessary now to name two of the leading Soviet psychiatrists responsible for them. The highest-ranking, best-known, and most influential psychiatrist in the Soviet Union is Professor Andrei V. Snezhnevsky, director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sciences. All Russian critics of Soviet psychiatry identify Snezhnevsky as the person most responsible for the psychiatric persecution of dissidents. In 1970, at the annual meeting of the APA held in San Francisco, the association honored Snezhnevsky by naming him a "disting-