



"Chac 4 Ans," or "Every Four Years," is a slogan in the push for democratic Haitian elections.

Harriet Hirschorn

including moderate and more radical democratic leaders, union officials, community organizers and the representatives of the progressive church. But he refuses to consider keeping the military in power, or letting CNG head Gen. Henri Namphy share in the task of guiding Haiti to free elections. He and other opposition organizers think that unless the CNG goes, only 5 percent of Haitians will vote. "Our priority must be the full participation of all Haitians in this election, even if it means putting it off for some time," he said.

Moderate leaders fiercely disagree with this analysis. "We must have elections, and we must make a compromise to avoid a confrontation between these opposition groups and the CNG," said presidential candidate Leslie Manigat, who heads the Assembly of Progressive National Democrats. "Right now the situation is so grave that if it continues it will destroy the country and the electoral process."

Manigat has presented a proposal that may unite moderates. It's a plan to enlarge the CNG with civilians but retain a member of the army selected by the army. As Manigat sees things, the army will not agree to give up power regardless of strikes, protests and other popular manifestations of discontent with the military's domination of Haiti. "We need to politically negotiate with the CNG—it's our only way out," Manigat concluded.

Uncle Sam's vote: The U.S. agrees with the moderate camp about the need for elections. An embassy source said that the U.S. has continued to support the CNG because the provisional council represents "the best hope for stability in Haiti at this time." And although the State Department last month reproached the Haitian military government for its human-rights record, the criticism came as the U.S. released military aid it had withheld from the CNG all summer. Observers interpreted the release of the last \$500,000 of \$1.6 million in 1987 U.S. military aid as an effort to stabilize the CNG.

While the U.S. officially supports all democratic efforts in Haiti, U.S. officials have a clear alliance with certain individuals.

Dr. Louis Roy heads the list of U.S. favorites. The head of the Association for the Defense of the Constitution, Roy may be tapped to step up to the CNG, according to high-level Haitian and U.S. sources. In Roy's case, there is the political advantage that he is considered "clean." He never served in Duvalier's government, unlike several leading presidential candidates.

Roy, who is not a declared candidate, hopes that the moderates and the radicals, including the small-but-growing Haitian United Communist Party, can come to some understanding or joint position with regard to the CNG, in order to "save the election." To him, unity is necessary to fight the *Macoutes* and their right-wing civilian counterparts, the Duvalierists, as well as the far-left groups who are now advocating armed revolution to oust the CNG.

"The '57' realize the danger of the generals. That is why there is a timid gesture to reconcile with the moderate camps," said Roy.

But Bajoux explained the Committee of 57's outlook this way: "We are now trying to provoke a mobilization in the entire country. There are two possibilities as we see it: Either we have a quasi-official government and we have 300,000 boat people arriving in Florida, or we have democratic elections." □

Anne-christine d'Adesky is a U.S. journalist.

Wave of violence undermines democracy

By Anne-christine d'Adesky

PORT-AU-PRINCE

A WAVE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS SHAKEN Haiti recently, and has undermined an already fragile democratic process. While the national goal remains open presidential elections in November, the political reality today is one of random violence, assassination and the disappearance of civilians by armed, uniformed men.

This anonymous violence has accompanied weeks of anti-government protests by a coalition of opposition groups made up of political parties, unions, student groups and religious organizers. Many Haitians believe the slayings that have occurred are the work of the infamous *Tonton Macoutes*, a private militia that governed Haiti by terror under former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier.

More importantly, political leaders here believed that the provisional National Government Council (CNG) is at least partly responsible for allowing the *Macoutes* to reorganize and undertake their campaign of terror. While moderate presidential candidates are pleading with the CNG to take charge of the situation and stop the killings, many Haitians have joined the opposition groups calling for the CNG to step down.

"The mentality of fear": "The CNG has lost control of the situation," said Haitian lawyer and human-rights advocate Gerard Gourgue. "It's the mentality of fear and repression by the army that have made people afraid."

So far at least 30 people have been killed and 200 injured in anti-CNG demonstrations since early July. The protests were prompted by the CNG's failed effort to effectively organize the upcoming elections. Soldiers fired shots into crowds of unarmed civilians and used tear gas to break up the protests.

These official acts of violence were ac-

panied by two separate incidents where civilians were killed in which the army and the *Tonton Macoutes* are being implicated. On July 30 at least 150 peasants and 10 Catholic missionaries were found massacred by machetes in an apparent conflict over land reform.

And on August 2, a prominent Haitian democratic political leader and avowed anti-communist was similarly slaughtered, along

HAITI

with two aides, by a crowd of 150 peasants. According to the opposition coalition, the "Committee of 57," well-known *Tonton Macoutes* who have been integrated into the small Caribbean country's army, are behind the murders.

Although the CNG officially disbanded and disarmed the *Macoutes* after Duvalier fled Haiti in February 1986, committee members say that the ex-militia is now armed again. Some *Macoutes* are members of the newly-formed militia corps called the Service for

Criminal Research, a kind of security branch, they said.

According to Dr. Jean-Claude Bajoux, a prominent member of the Committee of 57, this new corps is backed by military strongmen Col. Jean-Claude Paul and Col. Prosper Avril, men considered *Macoutes* by many Haitians.

Bajoux heads the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights here, a place where Haitians from all over the island have been coming nearly every day to relate the disappearance of a family member or friend. To date, Bajoux has received no response from the CNG or army to the many complaints of disappearances he has documented since this latest round of violence began two months ago.

Elections and the army: As Bajoux sees it, "The political reality is that the government wants to provoke a mass absenteeism at the elections, which is why they have started their campaign of terror."

Bajoux believes the CNG, which is made up of two army men and one civilian, must be replaced with a coalition of civilians—

Political violence has accompanied weeks of anti-government protests by a coalition of opposition groups. Many Haitians believe the slayings that have occurred are the work of the infamous *Tonton Macoutes*, a private militia that governed Haiti by terror under former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier.

By David Niddrie

JOHANNESBURG

THE ENDURING IMAGE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN miners' strike is that of a single black miner held aloft on the shoulders of a dozen others soaked by the first chilly rains of the country's spring, using his helmet to beat on the huge metal doors of the Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg's financial district.

Officials peered nervously out of the windows at the 1,000 miners protesting outside on August 25, but the massive solidarity of the chamber building, typical of South Africa's mining industry, was unmoved. So, too, was the strike itself. Once the six mining corporations grouped in the Chamber of Mines closed their door on the miners' demand for a 30 percent wage increase—which would have given the average gold miner a monthly wage of \$260—the 300,000 strikers could inflict damage but not defeat.

The three-week strike, numerically the biggest in South African history, "demonstrated the ability of both employers and employees to deliver and withstand pain," Anglo American Corporation labor relations adviser Bobby Godsell conceded afterward. The industry's pain was worth more than the \$150 million in foregone profits, according to calculations by the independent Labour Monitoring Group. The miners gave up about \$15 million in lost wages.

But the chamber has a high pain threshold: Mine exports account for more than two-thirds of South Africa's total foreign earnings of \$19 billion (gold and coal alone bring in just about half). And Anglo American, the biggest of the six chamber members, owns or controls more than 60 percent of the companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Sanlam and Liberty Life, which own or control respectively Gencor and Gold Fields of South Africa—ranked second and third in the chamber line-up—account for a further 15 percent.

Dipping down: The August 9 strike by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was thus not so much an attempt to pressure the strikers' immediate employers, the mine bosses, as to take on the entire South African economy.

To top the scales further, the chamber could dip into the mass ranks of unemployed in rural "homelands" and in neighboring countries to replace any strikers they chose to sack. In Lesotho, where an estimated three out of four economically active males migrate to work in South Africa's mines, 5,000 unemployed workers flocked to the chamber's recruiting office in Maseru when Anglo American began firing workers a week into the strike. And in Mozambique, 10,000 former miners live permanently outside the chamber's employment office at Resanno Garcia, near the South African border, waiting for work. And with most of the strikers living in company hostel compounds, controlled by the mines' paramilitary security forces, the mines were able to ban meetings throughout the strike and isolate strikers from union leadership for most of the three weeks. Finally, the mining houses could, and to a limited extent did, benefit from government intervention. Pretoria helped either through the actions of its police or by cutting off foreign financial aid to the union, a crucial factor in a country where strike funds are illegal.

In a strike started just two days short of the 31st anniversary of the last major miners' strike—in which the mines called in police to break the walkout by forcing 70,000 workers down the shafts—both mining manage-

The miners' strike: Not a victory, but it was far from a total defeat

ment and the government actively limited visible state intervention in the strike. Most of the six striker deaths and 500 injuries came in clashes with mine security. Police intervention was localized and did not decisively influence the outcome. The South African Reserve Bank moved to suspend funding to the NUM only in the strike's third week.

The chambers' winning card—played mainly by Anglo American, the worst hit of the six, losing an estimated \$96 million—was to begin systematically dismissing workers mine-by-mine at the 40 affected gold and coal mines, and to step up recruitment mainly in Lesotho. According to NUM General Secretary Cyril Ramaphosa, this forced the union to begin settlement talks that concluded with agreement on the chamber's original offer of 16 percent to 23.5 percent increases on miners' average \$200 monthly income. At the start of the strike, NUM had

"We taught them a very expensive lesson. They didn't teach us the lesson they expected to teach us. They didn't break the union." —union leader Cyril Ramaphosa

been counting on avoiding mass dismissals because of the mines' assumed need to rapidly resume production. It was a miscalculation that cost the union the strike.

By August 27 Anglo American had sacked 30,000 strikers. The process has continued since the settlement, with a further 41,000 workers sent home. Union officials charge

that the process will enable management to exclude union officials and organizers from the mines.

Lessons learned: The union had not banked on the mines being able to lose \$8 million a day in profits for a long period, and a proportion of that after the strike's end, merely to weaken the union. "We thought we

SOUTH AFRICA

knew how tough this industry was," a despondent Ramaphosa admitted shortly before publicly announcing the end of the strike. "We didn't."

Then in a flash of defiance he added: "We taught them a very expensive lesson. They didn't teach us the lesson they expected to teach us. They didn't break the union."

The strike did teach NUM and its parent organization, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), one bitter lesson. The walkout might have been the biggest wage strike in South African history involving almost half the country's 760,000 mine workers, but it wasn't big enough to force Anglo American and the other five mining corporations to improve their wage offer.

"When you're trying to force something out of the monopolies that run the economy, you can't do it with half the workers in just one sector," a COSATU official said as the strike wound down August 28. And COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo said, "Next time we will have a more coordinated response."

COSATU did not begin debating large-scale solidarity action until the strike's second week. It agreed on a response—a two-day stay-away by 500,000 other COSATU members—only during the third week, shortly before the strike ended.

Mine union head Cyril Ramaphosa: "We thought we knew how tough this industry was. We didn't."



In the future: But COSATU promises of a more coordinated response "next time" raises the question of whether there will be a next time. In the wake of the defeat of South Africa's first mass black miners' strike in 1920, it took 26 years to reorganize the mines. And a full generation passed after the 1946 strike before Ramaphosa and NUM's initial staff of six began organizing miners in 1982.

Yet several factors suggest that NUM will not go the way of previous miner groupings. First is the return to work by the strikers. Despite the fact that only about two-thirds of them were NUM members, the return to work since August 30 has proceeded without striker resistance. There has been no wild-cat action that would indicate opposition to the union's decision.

Just two days before that decision, during mass meetings at all of the affected mines, miners voted unanimously to stay out. But Ramaphosa said later that continuing the strike would have led to mass dismissals, badly damaging union infrastructures at the mines. The strikers, he said, recognized this.

"They also recognized that the strike was not an event existing in isolation, but part of a protracted struggle going back decades," he said.

NUM sent back the strikers with its local infrastructures largely in place. And despite post-strike sackings the union still enjoys widespread support, even from non-members.

NUM's ability to sustain the strike for three weeks, when even many in its own ranks doubted the miners' ability to stay out past three days, also appears to have boosted its prestige at the mines. One factor suggesting that NUM will bounce back next year, or more likely in 1989, has been the rapid expansion of the union movement as a whole and the parallel increase in industrial action.

Membership of COSATU's 13 affiliates, just over 400,000 in 1985, had by this June rocketed to 760,000—a daily average increase of more than 500. By year's end COSATU officials predict one million will have signed up.

With more than three months left in the year, strikes in 1987 have cost the South African economy a conservatively estimated 5.5 million working days. Last year's figure was 1.3 million working days, at the time a record. COSATU officials attribute the upsurge in worker militancy at least in part to the mobilizing impact of their federation's Living Wage Campaign. However, they admit that the campaign, launched in March, has been organizationally weak.

The Living Wage Campaign, Naidoo said prophetically earlier in the year, had "the potential to capture the imagination of millions of organized and unorganized workers."

Apparently it has, and the wave of shop-floor militancy—fueled by the climate of South Africa's emergency rule—shows no sign of peaking. By "next time," the union movement will almost certainly be in a stronger position to back the miners and will do so more quickly. Then the result could be different. □

David Niddrie is a South African journalist.
IN THESE TIMES SEPT. 9-15, 1987 7