

many years remain in which we can appreciate his intellect and wit in biographies such as this one.

Sean P. Dailey is editor-in-chief of *Gilbert Magazine*, a literary journal dedicated to the writing and thought of G.K. Chesterton.

## Millions for Tribute

by James O. Tate

Uncle Sam in Barbary:  
A Diplomatic History

by Richard B. Parker

Gainesville: University Press of Florida;  
285 pp., \$59.95



That imperial anthem, the hymn of the U.S. Marine Corps, is today somehow an obscure exercise. The halls of Montezuma? The shores of Tripoli? Our gum-popping, Gucci-schlepping youth can no more respond to its referential difficulties than could the Ivy League-credentialed savants of the War Party. What's more, the pseudopatriots would be shocked to know that the music to the hymn was written by a croaking frog, Jacques Offenbach, for his *opera bouffe*, *Genevieve de Brabant*, in 1868.

Our latest Bush-directed engagement with another host of wogs may have the benefit of stimulating some historical reflection, such as that Mesopotamia, a.k.a. "Iraq," has been called the Cradle of Civilization, and for good reason. Another reflection is that our country has had some experience in dealing with violent Muslims, and we would do well to recall what has been so elaborately forgotten (or, I should say, erased). And it is just at this point that Richard B. Parker, diplomat and professor, has made such a useful contribution.

Mr. Parker has served as ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco and taught at the University of Virginia and Johns Hopkins University, among other institutions. His sense of the past and of cultural distinctions is both practical and academic, and he has brought this sense to bear most effectively in his latest of his books. His point, if I understand him, is that our experience has been both forgotten and misunderstood. Parker insists on a diplomatic history of events that are

dimly and erroneously recalled as military history.

The Algerine and Tripolitan wars of the early years of the 19th century actually began as hostage conflicts in 1785, when America had no navy and no British treaties to hide behind. The North African policies of privateering and enslavement were not so much outrages as routine business that had long since developed into cozy corruption. It is remarkable to think how far-flung the slave-raiding sometimes was. Algerian corsairs took 302 men, women, and children from Iceland in 1627 and 129 men, women, and children from Baltimore, Ireland, in 1631. As late as 1798, the Tunisians took 900 captives, the majority of whom were women and children, from the village of Carloforte on the island of San Pietro off southwestern Sardinia. Of course, slave-raiding in the opposite direction was far from unknown. Many French, Spanish, and Italian galleys were manned by North African slaves at the oars. As the years passed, the hostilities in the Mediterranean had become something of an arrangement.

As the Americans tried to take control of their own affairs, they found that jingoistic attitudes were not effective. Thomas Jefferson said one thing and did another, as political situations often require. "We prefer war in all cases to tribute under any form and to any people whatever," he wrote, but John Adams disagreed, and his views were justified by events. Jefferson recommended and signed off on deals to buy captives, because he had to. And this is the part that is remembered wrongly, if at all. Decatur's naval engagements were brilliant but not decisive. Eaton's march on Derna ("the shores of Tripoli"), over terrain the Afrika Korps and the Desert Rats would later know, was of no consequence. His heroics had been overtaken by events, and his allies were betrayed. Considering all the huffing and puffing, the many thousands of dollars that the Americans actually paid to the sleazy ransom artists of Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco are rather astounding.

The myth is all on the other side. The motto, "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute," was not uttered by Jefferson, nor by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, but by Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, in 1798. Jefferson did say something to the same effect about Barbary, and the motto was a popular rallying cry during the Barbary crisis. In truth, however, the Unit-

ed States paid off. And she paid off to the Iranians in 1980, under the table; and the Algerians were very helpful in these negotiations! In Iran and in Lebanon, diplomacy, not force, secured the release of American prisoners. As Parker says, "When things go wrong, as they often will, it may help to remember that George Washington saw nothing immoral about buying our way out of a fix in 1795." And as he also says, "It is possible for diplomacy to work without force, but force will not avail much in the end if it is not backed up by effective diplomacy."

There are many benefits and pleasures to be derived from Parker's study. One of these is the registration of connections, such as with Napoleon and Talleyrand, not to mention the roll call of Founding Fathers and the presence among the early diplomats of Joel Barlow, who wrote that ponderous epic *The Columbiad* and the delightful mock-epic *The Hasty Pudding*, which would be the greatest work of its kind in English, were it not for Pope's *Rape of the Lock*. I think that Royall Tyler's *Algerine Captive* of 1797 could be mentioned here, for obvious reasons, as perhaps the finest fiction written in America in its day.

There is one other implication, at least for me, in Richard Parker's imposing and provocative study. Without at all intending to do so, this scholar and career diplomat has written the most powerful argument for isolationism that I have seen in a long time.

James O. Tate is a professor of English at Dowling College on Long Island.

## The Unlovely Republic

by Paul Gottfried

The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism

by Stanley G. Payne

New Haven: Yale University Press;  
377 pp., \$35.00



The most respected historian specializing in the Spanish Civil War and the history of fascism, Stanley G. Payne has never hesitated to challenge received opinions in his field. Like his mentor

and friend Burnett Bolloten, Payne has been properly critical of the Spanish Republic, the regime against which the Spanish military and much of the Spanish middle class rose up in revolt in 1936. Payne notes the murders and violence this government winked at; observes the failings of its leaders, Manuel Azaña, Largo Caballero, and Joan Negrín Lopez; and repeats Bolloten's sarcastic remark at the expense of the Spanish Cortes's first gathering after the civil war had commenced:

[I]t was a strange parliament because so many of the opposition leaders had either fled or been executed [in some cases before the uprising]. Nonetheless, the left Republican *Política* would declare on December 2, that "the Republic confirms the existence of a flourishing and vigorous constitutional life," even though mass arbitrary executions had not yet come to an end.

Payne is at least equally cold toward the Soviet Comintern and Stalin, who provided limited aid to the Republican side at an exorbitant price, using the 5,000 or so Soviet soldiers and Soviet agents sent to Spain partly to wipe out leftist revolutionary rivals and to force through, by the end of the conflict, Soviet-style political and social changes. He makes abundantly clear Stalin's less-than-keen interest in winning the war, despite its being showcased (particularly after the arrival of Italian fascist forces and planes and pilots from Nazi Germany) as a struggle between the progressive left and fascism. For Stalin, Soviet intervention in Spain was a limited investment, intended to raise money through the sales of arms, underscore Soviet control of world communism, and increase influence over an economically backward Western European country. The eradication of Soviet enemies on the left was only an extension of what Stalin's government was doing elsewhere. Stalin could not afford to be generous with manpower, since he was then involved in a war against Japan and still engaged in purging his own officer class. He would help Spain on the cheap, while trying to cut a deal with Nazi Germany. In optimal circumstances, he would leave it to volunteers (such as the American Abraham Lincoln Brigade) and to the Republic's military and financial resources to repulse Gen. Francisco Franco and his Nationalist Legions.

Although Payne glorifies neither the Nationalist side nor the Soviet government, he lays the blame for losing the war on the Republic itself. Its wholesale killing of suspected enemies, brutalization of Catholic clergy, and stunning inability (apparent before July 1936) to maintain civil order contributed significantly to the Republic's loss and explains why it became, with the ascension of the far-left Negrin government in May 1937, dependent on Soviet direction. One has to feel sorry for Stalin, stuck with those losers. In land, military equipment, financial resources, and entire branches of the armed services, the Republic had a decided advantage over the insurgents until well into the struggle.

Payne's densely written work on the Soviet intervention in Spain differs from his related studies, which focus on the right. In his studies of fascism, the Spanish Falange, and the life of General Franco, though his sympathies were clearly with the European bourgeoisie, he showed the ability (what the Germans call *Einfühlung*) to empathize with the national revolutionaries grouped around José Primo de Rivera and the Spanish Falangists. His view of the Soviets is more clinical but also free of the ideological bitterness characteristic of other treatments of Stalin's role in Spain. A series of testimonials, from George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* to Ronald Radosh's *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War*, has treated the Spanish Republic as a progressive democracy that was brought down by malevolent fascists and Stalinists. In recent years, neoconservatives have run with this view, while celebrating Radosh's rediscovery of the Trotskyist and socialist party line on Spain. Significantly, POUM (the group that Orwell joined), founded in Barcelona in September 1936, was a Marxist-Leninist formation that declared itself for "democratic centralism" and established close working ties to the Trotskyist International Communist League. It is hard to grasp how these socialist revolutionaries would have protected constitutional freedom better than the conservative national side that triumphed in March 1939.

Harder still is to read Payne, or the earlier work done by Bolloten at the Hoover Institution, and cling to illusions of good democrats having been defeated by fascists. Although an authoritarian military leader who accepted German and Italian support, Franco did not create a Spanish equivalent of Nazi Germany or fascist Ita-

ly. Instead, he ended his caretaker rule by turning Spain into a constitutional monarchy. The Spanish Republic was neither a true constitutional regime nor a protector of life and property. It was complicit in organized murder against the right, including Spanish Catholic parliamentarians, and did nothing to control its Anarchist allies, who were killing property owners and churchmen. The most one could say in its defense is that not all of its leaders were equally contemptible. The president at the time of the uprising, Manuel Azaña, hoped to preserve parliamentary amenities but was colossally inept in accomplishing that—or anything. With due respect to Radosh, there was nothing the West, or even the Soviets, "betrayed" by not riding to the Republic's rescue.

*Paul Gottfried, a professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College in Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania, is the author, most recently, of Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt (University of Missouri Press).*

## The First New Deal

by Laurence M. Vance

**Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War**

by Mark Thornton and Robert B. Ekelund

Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources; 124 pp., \$65.00



**A** calm image of businessmen and clerks engaged in the buying and selling of cotton on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange is not what you expect to find on the dust jackets of books about the Civil War. The Edgar Degas painting that graces the cover of *Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation*, however, tells the reader that this is no ordinary book on the War Between the States. One searches its pages in vain for depictions of battle scenes, accounts of heroic acts, or descriptions of weapons and uniforms. Instead, there are clear explanations of how economic issues were driving forces behind the causes of the Civil War.

Mark Thornton and Robert Ekelund have collaborated on many articles on the Civil War that have appeared in a vari-