

After Iraq

As soon as the long-anticipated war with Iraq has been brought to a temporary close, the United States will be able to get on with the post-September 11 agenda declared by President Bush: the eradication of evil. Even a minimal definition of *evil* would include the acts of terrorism inflicted every day by Islamic extremists against the West and its allies. No war against Islamic terrorism will accomplish much, however, if it is not accompanied by an honest evaluation of the reasons why Muslims around the world look upon the United States as the enemy.

Part of this hatred may be inevitable: the hatred of the have-nots for the haves, of the defeated for the victors. But some of the antipathy expressed not just by terrorists but by traditional Muslims stems from what they perceive as American arrogance. Not content with boasting of our superior firepower and greater wealth, our leaders and pundits, whenever they speak on the subject, claim that people in traditional societies envy our freedom and our way of life; that Muslims, in particular, hate us because of our moral and cultural superiority and not because of anything we have ever done wrong. Such rhetoric is as insulting as it is false. Like other Western countries, the United States is undergoing a moral crisis whose dimensions are measured by the rates of divorce, abortion, drug use, television watching, and suicide.

It is time for Americans to turn the volume down on our self-glorification and to consider what lies within our power. If we really want to succeed, not just in killing terrorists but in reducing the level of hatred in the Muslim world, we shall have to deal with one of the primary causes of that hatred: the festering conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Only the United States, with her great wealth and preponderant military forces, has the necessary authority to bring peace to the Middle East, and if, as is likely, the second Gulf War is quickly and successfully prosecuted, the next president—either George W. Bush (reelected against whatever token opposition the Democrats finally put up) or someone who promises to put Americans back to work and to save their pensions—had better return to

the most important piece of unfinished business left behind by George Bush I and Bill Clinton. This is what The Rockefeller Institute team was told by Shai Feldman, director of the prestigious Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, when we visited at the end of February.

It is not the task of a foreign government (much less a magazine) to dictate the terms of a settlement. Israel is a sovereign state, possessed of the right of all sovereign states, which is to protect her own interests. However, Israel's excessive dependence on U.S. support (of which the billions spent in foreign aid may be the smallest part) has given our government enormous power, which we have not always used wisely. Before entering, once again, into the perilous waters of the peace process, any U.S. administration should keep in mind a few essential points.

First, Israel is here to stay, and it is entirely unreasonable to demand that any Israeli government sacrifice her security interests. So long as the Palestinians continue to practice terrorism against women and children, no Israeli government will be able to negotiate. Israel might never have existed were it not for the terrorist activities of people like Menachem Begin and Itzhak Shamir, but (as the hawkish Efraim Inbar of the Begin-Sadat Center explained to us), Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's decision to shoot Israeli terrorists proved the legitimacy of the Israeli state. Now, it is the Palestinians' turn. Until they find a substitute for the thoroughly discredited Yasser Arafat, however, negotiations will be impossible. The same may be said of Ariel Sharon. Although some Israelis continue to hope that Sharon, as an extreme hawk, will have the necessary credibility to make concessions, his record of brutality and deliberately provocative style may make his removal a *sine qua non* of the peace process.

The model for an agreement should not be the Versailles Treaty, which ended World War I and started World War II, but the practical negotiations that enabled Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin to come to an agreement. On that occasion, Begin's decision to withdraw

Jewish settlements from the Sinai was the key to the treaty's success, and any future agreement will require an Israeli withdrawal from some, but by no means all, of the West Bank settlements. Virtually everyone in Israel acknowledges that a Palestinian state, in some form, is the only possible guarantee of Israel's security. The alternative is to sit back and wait for the high Palestinian birthrate to accomplish what three wars and numberless uprisings have failed to achieve.

A second prerequisite for peace is that the parties must eschew utopian and religious dreams. The Palestinian exiles, who still brandish the keys to their old houses and are deliberately kept in a state of despair, are the most unyielding obstacle to peace. They must simultaneously be offered cause for hope—opportunities for citizenship, education, a normal life somewhere in the Arab world—and told plainly that they will never return to occupy Israel. On the other hand, American evangelicals, with their newfangled millennialist theories that justify the infinite expansion of Israel, must be firmly excluded from all political influence, both over Israel and over U.S. foreign policy.

For their part, Israelis had better understand that American support is neither unqualified nor unlimited. The day will come, and it may come all too soon, when ordinary American voters, tired of apparently endless carnage, will force their government to abandon Israel just as it abandoned other allies, such as the Diems of South Vietnam, Marcos in the Philippines, the Somozas in Nicaragua, and the shah of Iran. Israel's destiny should be in the hands of Israelis and not in those of American politicians and religious eccentrics.

Peace will not come with a bang to the Middle East, for, in Yeats' words, "peace comes dropping slow." It will require the painful efforts of men who have learned not to trust one another but know that, if they fail to proceed cautiously, it may mean the destruction of Israelis and Palestinians alike and a *jihad* against the United States of which September 11, 2001, was only a foretaste.

WAR WITH IRAQ loomed large as I was flying home to my district on February 6, reading glowing reports in the *Washington Times* of Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations the day before. Then, I turned the page and read these words from Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew: "I'm hearing a lot of things about the United States, . . . a lot of anti-Americanism, stronger than I've heard in the past, and that worries me a great deal." He made these remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington.

Just a little over three weeks earlier, I had made my first visit to Australia, with a U.S. congressional delegation. When I arrived on January 13, I opened that day's *Sydney Herald* and found nine letters opposed to war with Iraq and none in favor. Adam Lyons, for example, wrote: "When our [Australian] servicemen go overseas this time it will be with the clear interest to plunder Iraq. It will not be to make the world a safer place; it will not be to protect a threatened nation." While I do not believe U.S. troops intend to plunder Iraq, this letter is typical of the depth of feeling in many other countries.

That same day, the *Sydney Australian* carried a column by Gabriel Kolko, research professor emeritus at York University in Toronto. Professor Kolko wrote: "Things go wrong for every great nation whose ambitions exceed its power and reality, and the U.S. is no exception."

During our stay in Australia, we met with the U.S. ambassador, a very nice man who once ran the Texas Rangers for a group of owners that included George W. Bush. Our ambassador said that the Australian government was "ahead of the people" in supporting the war and that it was "very heavy lifting" and a "hard sell" for him and the Howard government to convince Australians to go along with it.

The nonpartisan *National Journal* magazine claimed, in its December 21, 2002, issue, that "signs of resistance to U.S. foreign policy leadership are growing, as is widespread resentment about the long shadow the American Goliath casts across the globe." Columnist William Schneider wrote: "Throughout the Middle East, anti-Americanism has grown along with U.S. influence. So what has really changed in the Middle East since 1991? The United States is in a stronger position strate-

gically and a weaker position politically. The lesson: Great power breeds great resentment."

Even in South Korea, which the United States has defended for many years, anti-Americanism "deepens," according to the *Washington Post*, and *Newsweek* wrote that "anti-U.S. protests have drawn thousands . . ." On February 9, *60 Minutes* ran a segment about this growing anti-American feeling in South Korea, saying that most South Koreans fear the United States more than they do North Korea, in spite of the fact that our taxpayers spend three billion dollars per year to "protect" them.

The *National Journal* article claimed that these anti-American sentiments are "deeply rooted and intensely held" throughout the world, even in Europe and South America.

I gain no pleasure from writing about anti-Americanism. In fact, it is precisely because I love my country that I point out the problems that our interventionist foreign policy is causing for us around the world.

During his campaign, George W. Bush argued that the United States needs a more "humble" foreign policy. I agree. In recent years, U.S. taxpayers have spent hundreds of billions of dollars on foreign countries, and no other nation has even come close to doing as much for others as ours has.

Why, then, do so many dislike us? I believe it is because we have involved ourselves in far too many religious, ethnic, and political conflicts around the globe. We gave money to Saddam Hussein in the 1980's and Osama bin Laden in the 90's. And we ended up fighting people we had supported in the former Yugoslavia.

President Eisenhower warned us many years ago about the military-industrial complex. He would be shocked by how far we have gone down that path.

Many multinational corporations promote a hawkish foreign policy through donations to think tanks and elected officials and payments to lobbyists. They reap huge profits even during—or, perhaps, *especially* during—unnecessary wars.

Now, as Chris Matthews said on *Hardball*, the American people are being "herded into war" against Iraq. Iraq is a third-

rate power whose total military budget is approximately \$1.4 billion, less than three tenths of one percent of ours. Her manpower and weaponry is less than 40 percent of what it was at the time of the first Gulf War, when her troops surrendered to camera crews or anyone else who would take them.

A swift U.S. victory is about as certain as anything can be. However, the Congressional Budget Office has warned that even a short war followed by a five-year occupation will cost American taxpayers \$272 billion. And, even if Hussein backs down, we have already spent billions moving troops, planes, ships, and equipment into the region.

Those who favor this war have conducted a masterful p.r. campaign to convince the American public that the only ones who oppose it are peacenik leftists. In a White House briefing, however, I told National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and CIA Director George Tenet that conservatives have traditionally opposed the notion that the United States should be the world's policeman and have been against huge deficit spending.

It is also a traditional conservative belief that it is unfair to the U.S. taxpayers and to our servicemen to require them to carry almost the entire burden of enforcing U.N. resolutions.

Charley Reese, whom C-SPAN viewers selected as their favorite columnist, may have summed it up best when he wrote that a U.S. attack on Iraq "is a prescription for the decline and fall of the American empire. Overextension—urged on by a bunch of rabid intellectuals who wouldn't know one end of a gun from another—has doomed many an empire. Just let the United States try to occupy the Middle East, which will be the practical result of a war against Iraq, and Americans will be bled dry by the costs both in blood and treasure."

—Rep. John J. Duncan

VLADIMIR PUTIN, during his February trip to Germany and France, surprised Kremlin watchers east and west by threatening to veto any U.S.- or U.K.-sponsored resolution on military action against Iraq. In Paris, Putin told reporters that, if a resolution on the "unreasonable use of force" against Baghdad were made "today," Mos-

cow “would act with France or alone” to block it. He subsequently repeated the warning, calling it a “grave error” for the United States, which was threatening to act without the approval of the U.N. Security Council, to move against Iraq “outside of international law.” Putin had earlier endorsed a proposal made by France and Germany to intensify U.N. weapons inspections as an alternative to war.

It is one thing for Moscow to endorse such a plan, while allowing France and Germany to take the political heat from the United States. (Indeed, Washington did not appear to blame Russia for the proposal.) It is quite another, however, for the Kremlin to risk a direct confrontation with the Bush White House, something Putin had studiously avoided since Moscow declared itself an American ally in the War on Terror.

By pledging to aid Washington’s War on Terror, Moscow had dramatically shifted the focus of its foreign policy, which had previously emphasized reestablishing ties to Soviet-era allies in the Middle East and Asia. Since then, the Kremlin has gone along with the Bush administration’s decisions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, to increase the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus (Western firms are discussing pipeline routes for transporting the regions’ oil and gas through Pakistan and Georgia, while U.S. military advisors are training Georgian troops, and Georgia is contemplating joining NATO), and to support NATO expansion to Russia’s Western border.

Moscow had appeared to accept Washington’s planned “regime change” in Baghdad in exchange for assurances that Russian economic interests in Iraq would be protected. In addition, Washington put a Chechen lobbying group on its blacklist of terrorist organizations, and Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged that the Chechen separatists were cooperating with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. President Bush further advised Congress to forego Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Russia (which are renewed or lifted yearly). Moreover, many Russian observers say the February partnership deal between British Petroleum (BP) and Russia’s TNK oil firm is, as one observer put it, a “down payment” on

the economic payoff to Russia for her unspoken agreement to regime change in Iraq.

Judging by the recent actions of Washington and London, it appeared that both fully expected that Russia would not seriously attempt to block military action against Iraq. Russia would publicly criticize any rush to war, of course, but would not veto any U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution. And, in late January, Putin even hinted that Russia might agree to a new U.S.-backed resolution on Iraq, stating that, “If Iraq begins to make problems for the work of the [U.N.] inspectors, then Russia may change its position and agree with the United States on the development of different, tougher UN Security Council decisions.”

So what changed between late January and mid-February, when Putin made his threats?

One theory is that Moscow may not have gotten all it wanted from Washington and London and is merely upping the ante, seeing the French-German proposals as an opportunity to pressure the Atlantic alliance while enhancing Russia’s international status by taking on the role of arbiter between “Old Europe” and the Washington-London axis. (Exploiting divisions among the Western powers was an old Soviet game.) This theory, however, does not explain why Putin would be so brash as to risk a direct confrontation with the Bush White House. It would have been enough simply to endorse the inspection plan put forth by France and Germany: Washington surely would have gotten the message and reopened talks with Moscow. Meanwhile, Putin would have been courted by the continental European powers. Moscow had already helped to entangle Washington with the U.N. Security Council, something that the Kremlin has wanted since last fall, when the wrangling over Iraq began.

Putin’s actions, however, may stem from internal Russian politics, which most Western observers consistently ignore. Putin’s cooperation with the Bush administration has been very much in line with the interests of the Boris Yeltsin “family” and its allies, who have backed Putin’s presidency. This elite’s leading lights have accumulated vast fortunes

through Russian oil exports—and many of the oil oligarchs plan to break into the American market. Media sources connected to these factions have consistently taken a pro-American line and have been enthusiastic about the Kremlin’s cooperation in the War on Terror. Putin, some Kremlin watchers claimed, would facilitate the oligarchs’ projected American deals and, thus, guarantee his reelection in March 2004.

There may, however, be a pothole on Putin’s road to victory: The family and its allies may be planning to dump him. In January and February, various Russian media sources and political figures began hinting that Putin may not (or should not) run for a second term. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, an ultranationalist politician and a favorite Kremlin vehicle for floating political trial balloons, claimed that Putin may not run again. Subsequently, articles began appearing in influential, elite-oriented newspapers, complaining of “stagnation” under Putin and warning that Russian voters were growing tired of Yeltsin’s successor.

It is not clear why the family and its allies may have soured on Putin, though the ex-KGB officer has, at times, attempted to assert his independence from the Yeltsin clan, who many Kremlinologists believe to be blackmailing the Russian president, securing their own safety from competing clans and assuring Putin’s loyalty. Nevertheless, signs of the family’s designs for an early retirement for the 50-year-old president were evident early this year.

Thus, Putin may have tilted away from Washington in reaction to the family’s plans: His likely alternative sources of support would be found among a group of oligarchs who are not well connected in America (and, thus, less able to exploit possible deals with U.S. oil firms) or among the major remaining state-controlled oil companies, such as Rosneft, which have often clashed with Yeltsin-connected private firms and have maintained friendlier ties to Saddam Hussein’s regime. Moreover, there are probably elements in the Russian military and security apparatus that are less than enthusiastic about increasing American influence in the former Soviet Union. Putin’s U.N.-veto threats might have been a desperate fishing expedition, with Putin hoping to get a few bites from those elite factions unhappy with Yeltsin and his family’s continuing dominance over Russia’s postcommunist political and economic system.

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By the time you read this, the United States may have either secured U.N. support for a war on Iraq or acted unilaterally. In either case, Russia's behavior could tell the Bush administration what is going on in the Kremlin and what to expect from Russia in the future. Whether Putin stays or goes is of far less importance.

—Wayne Allensworth

CELEBRITIES—America's "creative community"—start getting agitated whenever the country is on the verge of war. They march in antiwar rallies; they publish antiwar ads and petitions; and, most significantly, they don antiwar clothing.

Well, it's a free country, and I can abide the speeches, the petitions, and the ads, even when they are imbued with that unique celebrity combination of self-satisfaction and terror of being thought airheads. What is hard to take, however, is the protest clothing.

USA Today recently ran a piece, accompanied by photographs, on antiwar T-shirts and the celebrities who wear them. The article began with the glib prose that is the trademark of entertainment reporting: "As war looms with Iraq, some celebrities are trading their designer duds for anti-war garb." Among those mentioned was singer Sheryl Crow, who appeared at a recent event in a shirt that was, according to the paper, covered across the chest "with the message 'War Is Not The Answer' in sequins." For the record, the shirt surrounding the sequins was tight, tiny, and low-cut. Also featured was actress Shiva Rose, who went public in "a blue T-shirt with the slogan 'No Blood For Oil' in red letters by designer Hayley Star."

It is easy to understand why, when it comes to politics, celebrities fear not being taken seriously: They are forever doing things that make it impossible to take them seriously. In reality, neither Crow nor Rose was making a political statement with her slogan-spattered clothing. Instead, both were trying to make a fashion statement while hoping to be credited with political commitment. But if you truly want to communicate that war is not the answer (by the way, what is the question?), you don't do it with sequins stitched across your bustline. (Is there any female adornment—with the possible exception of feathers—that suggests less seriousness than sequins?) And if you really believe in the notion of no blood for oil, you don't need a fashion designer

to express your thoughts.

All of this seems lost on both the fashion world and the celebrities who inhabit it. Regarding political T-shirts, *USA Today* quoted Lesley Jane Seymour, editor of *Marie Claire* magazine: "You can measure the zeitgeist of the nation with them. It's a cool retro fashion trend and a serious issue." Miss Seymour, of course, has it exactly wrong: It's a cool retro fashion trend or a serious issue. It is not the *Zeitgeist* of a nation that is being measured here; it's the *Zeitgeist* of nitwits. Sheryl Crow and Shiva Rose looked ridiculous precisely because they combined a fashion trend with a serious issue. While desiring to appear profound, they succumbed to the need to look cool. Vanity: that big U-turn on the Profound Highway of life.

This was especially true in the case of Rose, whose "T-shirt" was actually more of a bib, a skimpy garment that tied under the arms and hung revealingly off one shoulder. She accessorized her outfit with a facial expression of utter solemnity—a requirement, I suppose, when one is dressed in a designer antiwar bib with the word *blood* on it. Most noteworthy, however, was that Rose was not, as *USA Today* stated, doing anything so radical as trading her "designer duds for anti-war garb." In fact, she did no trading at all. Instead, she bought herself some antiwar garb that qualified first as designer duds. Issues of war and peace may be important, but they are no reason for a girl to lower her fashion standards.

Message T-shirts are repellent, whatever the message—and whatever the *Zeitgeist*. They are aggressive and juvenile, which is why they seem to appeal mainly to celebrities and college freshman. No opinion is so interesting that it must come screaming off an article of clothing. In fact, anything printed on a T-shirt, from antiwar sentiments to Bible verses, is trivialized by virtue of its context. Add sequins to the mix, and you go from the trivial to the absurd. You go from the statement "War Is Not The Answer" to the message "War Is Not The Answer And Check Out My Breasts."

If you absolutely must use your clothing as a billboard, however, a little integrity is called for. If Sheryl Crow and Shiva Rose had cared first and only about their political beliefs, they would have taken a Magic Marker to an old Fruit of the Loom and worn *that* in public. It might not have looked cool, but it would have suggested a certain purity of pur-

pose. There are times, the *Zeitgeist* notwithstanding, when it's simply uncool to be cool.

—Janet Scott Barlow

OBITER DICTA: With only hours before this issue goes to press, the BBC has reported that Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister of Serbia, has been assassinated. Despite what you may read in press accounts about Djindjic's "pro-reformist," "pro-democracy," "anticorruption" record, his political career was anything but spotless. For a different view of Djindjic's legacy, please read Srdja Trifkovic's "Letter From Belgrade: Privatization in Serbia" on p. 43 of this issue.

We have already begun taking registrations for this year's Summer School (see the inside front cover). Registration is limited, so tarry not and register anon. Last year, the Summer School sold out. Note that returning students may deduct \$25.00.

The Rockford Institute's Paris Convivium has sold out. For our next international convivium, we will resurrect our Balkan adventure, which September 11 forced us to postpone. (See the ad on page 31.) If you have any questions about these events, call Christopher Check, executive vice president, at (815) 964-5811.

Our first poet this month is **Catharine Savage Brosman** of New Orleans. Her poetry and prose have appeared in the *New England Review*, the *American Scholar*, the *Southwest Review*, the *Southern Review*, and the *Sewanee Review*, among others. Two collections of her verse, *The Swimmer and Other Poems* (R.L. Barth) and *Places in Mind* (LSU Press), were published in 2001.

Lawrence Dugan, a librarian who lives in Philadelphia, is our second poet. Mr. Dugan's poetry has appeared in numerous national and international publications, including the *New Republic*, *Southern Review*, the *Spectator*, *Encounter*, *Commonweal*, *Tar River Poetry*, *Irish Edition*, *Poetry Australia*, *First Things*, *Modern Age*, and the 20th anniversary issue of *Poetry East*.

Our cover and inside illustrations are provided this month by **Stephen Warde Anderson**, a self-taught artist from Rockford, Illinois. Mr. Anderson is affiliated with the Phyllis Kind Gallery in New York, Dean Jensen Gallery in Milwaukee, Aron Packer and Earth Works Gallery in Chicago, and Webb Gallery in Waxahachie, Texas.

Remember From Whence Thou Art Fallen

“Forget about Europe!” shriek the neo-isolationists. “Only Britain and Israel matter. We saved the French twice in one century, and they still think they have a right to follow their own foreign policy.” Americans used to have somewhat longer memories. When General Pershing arrived in Paris in 1917, his aide and orator declared, “Lafayette, we are here!” not only in remembrance of the Marquis de Lafayette’s services during the Revolutionary War but in acknowledgment of the fact (not often recalled) that the French navy and army rescued the American cause at Yorktown. There were, in fact, more French than American troops on the ground when Cornwallis surrendered.

The American victory was important to the French army, whose memories of glory went back to the first half of Louis XIV’s disastrous reign, but, under the nationalist governments of the Revolution and the Empire, French arms dominated Europe. French soldiers fought and died bravely in World War I, and, although the nation was too worn out to sustain a second war against Germany, French volunteers in British forces and the soldiers of the Free French, led by the greatest statesman of the 20th century, made a good showing. My late friend Marcel Boisot, an heroic pilot who flew his plane out of Vichy France and crash-landed in Spain, flew many missions for the RAF and was highly decorated by both the British and French governments.

This is the nation of cowards currently being reviled by internationalist leftists who insist on describing themselves as patriotic conservative Americans. Most are none of the above. (How many have ever shot skeet, attended a church picnic, or joined the Boy Scouts?) The ironies do not end with the neoconservatives. Few anti-imperialist or “isolationist” conservatives know how to respond to the call for renewed patriotism. Libertarians can rightly say that they oppose all wars among nations, because they do not believe in nations, not even their own. But what can Pat Buchanan’s friends, who for years have been banging the nationalist drum, say in response to the neo-ingoists?

Few nationalist conservatives, in fact,

support the projected war against Iraq, but they ought to be happy with the upsurge of patriotic rhetoric. We know they are not, but why? Surely not because they like Saddam Hussein. The nationalists would say that the war against Saddam is an unjust war, is not in the national interest, and is being undertaken out of a combination of bad motives: greed for Iraqi oil and a desire to protect Israel.

To a true nationalist, however, bad motives should be a small obstacle. “My country, right or wrong” is a nationalist cliché. If the success of the nation is the highest good, then how can it be right to promote divisions within the nation and to undermine the expansion of the nation’s power? At a time like this, nationalists would be expected to be found playing on the national team, not coaching from the bleachers. It is difficult for men who have spent their careers despising the ACLU suddenly to deplore the erosion of civil liberties and states’ rights over the past year and a half, much less the eruption of vulgar patriotism—the cult of the flag, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the incessant droning of “God Bless America.”

The words *nationalism* and *patriotism* are often confused, and, even when political theorists draw a contrast, the result is often a distinction without a difference or a bizarre twist of meaning that defies everyday usage. The modern concept of nationalism (just like the concept of internationalism) took shape during the French Revolution, which implemented Rousseau’s theory of the general will and continued the process of centralization inaugurated by the monarchy.

According to 19th-century nationalists, the will of the nation—where *nation* is defined as an historic community of blood and tongue—had to find expression in a common and unified state. Hence, the Italian nationalist Mazzini, whose political lineage went back to the Revolution (by way of Buonarrotti, the disciple of Babeuf), spoke always of the twin principles of unity and nationality. Italy presented a special case of a people that had not been unified since the fall of the Western Roman Empire and had been divided up into competing principalities, some of which were controlled by foreign dynas-

ties (e.g., the Bourbons of Naples) and foreign powers, particularly Austria. To liberate and unify Italians in a centralized state was the nationalists’ goal, one that naturally overrode all the local patriotisms of Sicilians, Venetians, Latins, and Tuscans—to say nothing of Catholics loyal to the pope, whose estates were rudely stripped away by the French-speaking rulers of Piedmont. That process of unification culminated in the 1860’s, when the more developed North conquered and subjugated the agrarian South. The parallel with the American *Risorgimento* did not escape the notice of Pope Pius IX, who regarded Jefferson Davis as a fellow victim of nationalist aggression.

Most 19th-century liberals were sympathetic to patriotic and nationalist movements of liberation and unification, and even archindividualist John Stuart Mill embraced the notion that every distinct nation should have its own state. However, other liberals condemned the nationalist state as spiritually and culturally mortifying. Jacob Burckhardt pointed out that a divided Germany had produced Haydn and Goethe, but the unified nationalist German state was eager only for power, not for civilization, “hence the hopelessness of any attempt at decentralization, of any voluntary restriction of power in favor of local and civilized life.”

In England, Lord Acton condemned nationalism as the principle most inimical to human liberty, and he viewed a federal system, such as that of Switzerland or the Holy Roman Empire, as the best solution to ethnic conflict. States built on the national idea were, he argued, too confining to inspire the generous, cosmopolitan civilization that had been characteristic of European man.

If the nationalist standpoint narrows the human outlook, it also implies a willingness to divide the human race into the categories of *us* and *them*, and to define *them* as an enemy to be eliminated or subjugated. This attitude, as George Orwell pointed out, stems from “the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘good’ or ‘bad.’” By identifying ourselves with a nation, he