

## THE REAL WORLD ORDER: ZONES OF PEACE/ZONES OF TURMOIL

Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky

Chatham House/212 pages/\$25

reviewed by PETER J. SPIRO

**F**oreign policy thinkers continue to cast about for a unifying framework with which to confront the post-Cold War world. The aim is for something in the nature of George Kennan's pathbreaking "X" article at the onset of the last seismic shift in world affairs. Kennan's task was a cakewalk compared to that of his successors; where he confronted only changed relationships among states, today's observers must consider the prospect of a world in which the whole dynamic of global relationships may have changed.

Max Singer and the late Aaron Wildavsky have taken a shot at the problem in *The Real World Order*. They posit that international affairs in the post-Cold War world will be driven by a new bipolarity—between the zones of peace and democracy on the one hand, and the zones of turmoil and development on the other.

Within the democratic sphere, war is no longer a serious possibility, nor—for the first time in modern history—will state-to-state relationships be determined by the balance of military power. The zones of democracy now comprise Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan, or about 15 percent of the world's total population. (Costa Rica, Israel, Botswana, South Korea, and other countries may be democratic, but are not part of a "zone.") Unlike during the Cold War, the peace these countries now enjoy is a *real* peace, "not only the absence of war but also freedom from fear of war."

With this security will come the

*Peter J. Spiro is a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow.*

capacity to devolve powers of governance to more responsive local levels. Subnational ethnic groups such as the Québécois, Scots, and Catalans will be afforded more self-government, even independence. Paradoxically, a greater cohesion will develop among the democracies, as other identities—"I am an environmentalist, a manufacturer, a city-dweller, etc. before I am German, English, or American"—cut across national loyalties and give rise to alternative institutional allegiances, further diminishing the possibility of armed conflict. National governments within the zones of democracy will no longer enjoy anything approaching a monopoly over foreign-policymaking, challenged not by one (half-) world government from above, but rather by a multitude of uncoordinated transnational ties and institutions from below.

**O**n the other side of the new world divide, in the Bosnias, the Somalias, and Chinas of the world, it will be pretty much business as usual, "the same old stuff of war, famine, and mutual carnage." Power will continue to be either centralized in the hands of the nonaccountable or fractured into anarchy. In the short term, conditions in the zones of turmoil will likely get worse, as characterized most notably by aggravated instability in the former Soviet Union. But in the long term, this book predicts, countries in these zones will inevitably move towards democracy; they are zones not just of turmoil but also of development. Economic development will bring with it political development at the same time as the zones of democracy will provide a perfected model of sustained peace to which to aspire. Indeed, with

the end of Communism, democracy has attained "exclusive legitimacy" among world systems. Singer and Wildavsky maintain that the world will thus witness an inexorable, and ultimately total, extension of the zones of democracy to engulf the zones of turmoil.

In the meantime—the authors suppose the process might take a century or two—there is the matter of how the democracies should deal with the non-democracies, especially where they stumble along the road of progress. The pace and success of development in the zones of turmoil will be "overwhelmingly determined by local conditions," about which the democracies will have little control, or indeed interest. To the extent we can help, bilateral policymaking and foreign assistance should be aimed at persuading marginal or non-democracies to reduce legal and economic obstacles to growth created by their own governments.

As for direct intervention, the democracies should act only in concert and only to alleviate particular horrors of war and oppression. In the short term, the U.S. should continue to exert strong leadership among its counterpart nations; "in the long run, if the other great democracies are not going to be responsible actors in relation to the zones of turmoil, the zones of turmoil will have to get along without democratic intervention." Europe and Japan should be encouraged to join us as superpowers (the latter at least through such status symbols as a seat on the Security Council) so that they can participate as true equals in the process, enhancing the international authority of such interventions as are pursued. But this collective decision-making should not extend beyond the democracies; in particular, intervention should not be held hostage to the "vote-trading" process of the United Nations.

**S**o much for procedure. As for principles, the authors offer only that they will gradually develop through practice. On the one hand, the U.S. and other "great democracies" should be prepared, for altruistic reasons if no other, to intervene "to protect democracy, preserve peace, defeat aggression, and prevent or stop governments from killing large numbers of their citizens." On the other, we must under-



## Bolshie Ballet

by Jonas Bernstein

*As we go to press, Boris Yeltsin and his enemies from the dissolved Soviet parliament appeared to be nearing a showdown, as troops loyal to Yeltsin were preparing to storm the White House, held by supporters of Aleksandr Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov. Here is a last-minute report from our man in Moscow:*

Michael and I were relieved to see the phalanx of special interior ministry troops and OMON riot police as we left the White House grounds. "It feels like crossing back through the DMZ," he muttered. (I had told him to keep the English to a minimum during our half-hour walkabout; a CNN cameraman had been beaten with a lead pipe the previous day.)

Indeed, the territory of the rebel Russian government is not what you would call an oasis for two expatriate American Jews. The wall along the main road leading into the White House is now adorned with graffiti: "Yeltsin—Agent of the USA," "Yeltsin—Yid," "Kozyrev—Yid." A couple of full dumpsters had been spray-painted with the words "Gaidar's Box." (This struck me as too witty to have been done by the typical supporter of "President" Aleksandr Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov; I suspected an outside prankster.) A lone demonstrator stood at the first barricade inside the police cordon, waving a huge red flag reading "Our home is the Soviet Union!"

Anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, and paranoia are the order of the day. To call these people Communists would not be completely accurate. While there are certainly many members of Russia's new

Communist parties among them, most in this crowd are the kind who love Stalin but hate Lenin, Trotsky, and the other original Bolshies. (Who were Jew-Masons, you see.) Theirs is the politics of resentment, big-time. Perhaps you could call them National Bolsheviks.

I made my first visit to the Russian parliament building the evening after Yeltsin gave the hard-line legislators their pink slips. White House "defenders" with Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders were running all over the place. Most of the men are apparently volunteers from the Union of Officers, an organization of fascistic military men. (The following evening, the group's leader, Col. Stanislav Terekhov, led an abortive attempt to enter the CIS military command center, in which a policeman and an innocent bystander were killed.)

On a side street, several hundred yards from the White House, a TV crew was attempting to interview several OMON riot police. They were constantly interrupted by a middle-aged woman yelling "Foreigners out! Jews out!"—over and over again, just to drive the point home.

At the main entrance of the parliament building was a cardboard notice that here you could enlist as a White House "defender." A wall nearby was pasted with various proclamations and political tracts, one of which made repeated references to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Next to it was a Yeltsin poster, at the top of which was scrawled: "Who sold Russia?"

People were crowding around someone who was selling newspapers. I was lucky enough to purchase a copy of *Svyatoy Gorod* (Holy City), which bills

*Jonas Bernstein is a freelance journalist living in Moscow.*

stand that intervention often proves a long-term liability for all involved, by interrupting or distorting the necessary trials of political development.

Whatever the terms of interaction between the two spheres, however, it is clear that the developing world will not pose a threat to the democratic one. Peace is divisible. Combined with the absence of any such threat from within the democratic community (and no present democracy, Japan included, is likely to revert to nondemocracy), this conclusion has profound policy consequences. *The Real World Order* calls for maintaining a military force that "can quickly deliver military power anywhere in the world with intimidating and overwhelming effectiveness." But its analysis may more likely be used to justify greatly reduced military spending. For all the emphasis on quality over quantity, in this book and elsewhere, military might ultimately depends on how much money backs it up, as perceived domestic threats will naturally take an even bigger share of public resources if no such threats are perceived from abroad. Altruism won't count for much at the budget table, especially if, as Singer and Wildavsky hold, intervention will often do more harm than good.

The fact is that national power (including foreign economic aid, which Singer and Wildavsky would like to see increased) will much more likely be garnered and projected in the context of competition. Perhaps we shouldn't place all our bets just yet on effortless victory for the democrats. Democracy is, after all, indigenous to Western civilization only. As Samuel P. Huntington, another candidate Kennan, notes: "The very notion that there could be a 'universal civilization' is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism [of other cultures]." It is not now apparent, for example, that the Islamic world will inevitably arrive at democratic governance even within the course of a century. Singer and Wildavsky repeatedly describe countries in the zones of turmoil as moving through a necessary, difficult, and unpredictable "national adolescence" on the way to full democratic maturity. The analogy is a useful one, but adolescents do not always grow up to be like their parents, or even to be functioning members of society. □