

On another occasion, the administration emphasized that the United States would not “permit the world’s most dangerous regimes” to pose a threat “with the world’s most destructive weapons.” That standard would seem to apply to North Korea even more than it did to Iraq.

In other words, U.S. behavior may have inadvertently created a powerful incentive for nuclear-weapons proliferation. American officials dismiss the fears of North Korea as manifestations of paranoia. But as Henry Kissinger once pointed out, even paranoids have real enemies. And there is little doubt that the United States is an enemy.

The wide range of possible motives for North Korea’s actions underscores a crucial point: it is difficult to determine whether Pyongyang is merely using the prospect of nuclear weapons to force negotiations or whether North Korea is serious about becoming a nuclear power. The first scenario means that there is a good chance that negotiations can ultimately resolve the crisis. It would suggest that Pyongyang’s hard-line position is merely a bluff and that in the end North Korea will give up its nuclear ambitions in exchange for U.S. concessions. The second scenario means that the crisis will almost certainly intensify and that North Korea is unlikely to renounce her nuclear program under any circumstances.

It is imperative that we find out, and there is one reliable way to do so. The United States should offer a grand bargain to North Korea. Washington should agree to a non-aggression pact and the full normalization of relations with Pyongyang. In addition, the United States should also resume the fuel-oil shipments and construction on the two light-water reactors as provided for in the 1994 agreement. Finally, the U.S. should express a willingness to withdraw gradually all U.S. forces from South Korea.

### **Some political advisors to President Bush hope to persuade the president to dump Vice President Cheney from the 2004 ticket.**

The campaign, supported by Karl Rove, is being orchestrated by James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, senior advisors to former President Bush, who have told Bush *pater* that his son’s re-election campaign is at risk because of the miscalculations of the Cheney-led neoconservatives. Cheney is aware of the campaign and is fighting back. He persuaded the president to state publicly (to David Frost) that Cheney would be around for a second term. Cheney’s Iraq record is prime fodder for the critics, but he also has domestic liabilities including his contretemps with the energy-policy task force and allegations of influence peddling in the no-compete \$300 million Iraq contract awarded to Halliburton. Some of President Bush’s Texas loyalists want to have Secretary of State Colin Powell replace Cheney on the ticket. It is too early to predict whether Cheney will remain, but the White House will have to sacrifice some of the architects of the Iraq war before the 2004 election. According to a White House official, the president may already have made that decision.



### **The administration has tentatively selected a prominent physician, Ibrahim Jaafari, to head the provisional Iraqi government.**

The American plan to speed the turnover of political power as part of its exit strategy has been hobbled by the lack of a consensus leader similar to Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. Ahmad Chalabi the neocon-preferred candidate and protégé of Perle, Feith, and Wolfowitz, has little support in the country and has already used his position on the Governing Council to award reconstruction contracts to cronies. Jaafari is a moderate Shi’ite Islamist acceptable both to many Sunnis and to Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, the most prominent Shi’ite clergyman. Jaafari is likely to be opposed by the Kurds, and his selection will have to be negotiated with other, often fractious, Council members. The U.S. intends to empower the Shi’ite majority to derail CIA predictions of a Sicilian-Vespers-style popular uprising that would make the occupation untenable.



### **The American and British publics may have been reassured by the Bush-Blair disingenuous claim that bombs in Istanbul have no connection with Iraq,**

not to mention the absurd contention that terrorists terrorize because they hate “freedom,” but the Turks are a tougher nut altogether. Demonstrators throughout Turkey, who do not wish to become a new front in the War on Terror, have clearly seen a linkage and have laid the blame unambiguously at the American door. Most intelligence experts would agree with the Turks, noting that the war in Iraq has unleashed a wave of *jihadi* extremists who are eager to confront the United States and its allies globally. The notion that the overthrow and occupation of the ancient capital of Islam’s Caliphate might occur in isolation without negative consequences may be unique to the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans and its neocon Myrmidons. The anticipated positive development, that democracy would sweep through the Middle East like a refining fire, has yet to emerge.

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Such concessions would cost the United States relatively little. Even the most reckless hawks hesitate about advocating an attack on North Korea to achieve regime change. Using military force might trigger a major war on the Korean Peninsula and perhaps a general war throughout East Asia. As that is a risk no rational person would take, giving North Korea a non-aggression pact merely renounces an option we would not want to pursue in the first place.

Similarly, establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Pyongyang is a step we should have taken years ago. Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a key component of U.S. foreign policy in the region was a proposal to Moscow and Beijing for cross recognition of the two Korean states. At the end of the Cold War, Russia and China both recognized South Korea, but the United States never kept her part of the bargain by recognizing North Korea.

Diplomatic recognition does not imply moral approval of a regime. We have diplomatic relations with a good

experienced the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution—with considerable success.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea is also a process the United States should have begun years ago. Those forces were deployed in the aftermath of the Korean War when the South was a war-ravaged hulk that confronted not only a more powerful North Korea, but also a North backed by both Moscow and Beijing. That situation has changed beyond recognition. Neither China nor Russia has any inclination to support a North Korean move to reunite the Korean Peninsula by force, and South Korea has enormous advantages over her communist adversary. South Korea has twice the population and a vastly more sophisticated economy estimated to be at least 30 times greater than that of her northern neighbor. A country with those characteristics should be able to build whatever military forces she needs to defend herself. Washington's long-term goal should be to reduce her risk exposure in Northeast Asia, and a troop withdrawal from South

The main point of offering a grand bargain to North Korea, however, would be to create an acid test for Pyongyang. If North Korea is truly developing nuclear weapons only because she fears U.S. intentions, Pyongyang should accept the proposed bargain without hesitation. But if she demands other concessions or balks at a requirement for inspections, then we know that there are ulterior motives. Indeed, it would then be apparent that Pyongyang is not using her nuclear program merely as a bargaining chip but is deadly serious about becoming a member of the global nuclear-weapons club. At least we would then know where we stand and could discuss relevant options. That is far preferable to another round of fruitless talks that perpetuate ambiguity and impasse.

Given the consequences of risking a major war in East Asia to keep North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, the options cannot include launching pre-emptive military strikes. Instead, we must consider such possibilities as encouraging a regional nuclear balance of power in which Japan and South Korea develop their own nuclear deterrents to offset a North Korean arsenal. We might also have to consider ways to prevent Pyongyang from selling nuclear technology or weapons to anti-American regimes and terrorist groups.

None of the available options is easy or without drawbacks, and we all hope that we will not need to pursue them. But the only way to know is to smoke out North Korea about her true intentions. ■

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GIVEN THE CONSEQUENCES OF **RISKING A MAJOR WAR** IN EAST ASIA TO KEEP NORTH KOREA FROM BECOMING A NUCLEAR POWER, THE OPTIONS CANNOT INCLUDE LAUNCHING **PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY STRIKES**.

many odious and repressive governments. (The government of Saudi Arabia comes readily to mind.) Maintaining such relations merely acknowledges that it is in our interest to deal with the country in question. Likewise, economic ties do not imply moral approval. In North Korea's case, ending economic sanctions might help open up that closed country to the outside world. It is a strategy that we used with China in the 1970s—a country that had recently

Korea would be an important first step.

In exchange for these concessions, Washington should make one non-negotiable demand. It is not enough to get North Korea to promise to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework and re-join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea has demonstrated repeatedly that her word means nothing. This time, there must be intrusive "on demand" inspections of all known and suspected North Korean nuclear facilities.

# Conscientious Objector

A senior Air Force officer watches civilians craft the war plan.

By Karen Kwiatkowski

*Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, a former Pentagon insider, continues her revelations in this second of a three-part series.*

BY THE END of the summer of 2002, our Near East South Asia (NESAs) office spaces were beginning to get crowded. Several senior people, including Abe Shulsky had moved into some of the enclosed front offices, and the cubicles were entirely filled, as were some less than ideal workspaces in the hallway.

Chatter swirled, and word went out that NESAs was looking for additional space. By late August, a large office was located upstairs on the fifth floor. At a staff meeting, we were told that the expanded Iraq desk would become the Office of Special Plans and would move out. We were told not to refer to this office as the Office of Special Plans and, if pressed, we were also not to confirm that it was the expanded Iraq desk. This instruction came across as both surreal and humorous. When someone asked whether we could tell our Joint Staff counterparts, Bill Luti said no, to deny knowledge of the organizational shift. In my experience, our canny, connected, and cynical Joint Staff counterparts probably already knew more about it than we did, and this suspicion was later confirmed in conversations with some of them.

The subterfuge was not necessary in any case, as several weeks later Luti was announced as the new Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, NESAs and Special Plans, allowing him to work

directly for Undersecretary Doug Feith. Luti had always seemed to work directly for Feith. In one staff meeting, interrupted by a call from Feith's office, Luti, in his famously incautious manner, proclaimed to all present, that Feith couldn't wipe his ass without his [Luti's] help.

The establishment of the Office of Special Plans, under Abe Shulsky, and including several military folks, a civil servant or two, and the larger group of neocon-friendly appointees or contractors, meant to the rest of us that we would have more space and a reduction in cross-regional chatter. The Iraq-war planning aspect would now be isolated from the rest of NESAs and would establish its own rhythm and cadence, separate from the non-political-minded professionals covering the rest of the region. In planning a war, loose lips sink ships, and if anyone didn't remember this World War II slogan, the Pentagon had several posters in common areas to remind us. (Interestingly, the planning and execution of wars—writing and implementing war plans—is the function of the Combatant Commander, with the Joint Staff as chief technical advisor and the Undersecretary of Policy as policy advisor. The Secretary of Defense approves, but combatant commanders work directly for the president. Nowhere in OSD should one, by law, custom, or common sense, find people busy developing and writing war plans, even if they are special.)

If they were not writing war plans, the Office of Special Plans did produce something related to the upcoming war.

By August, only the Pollyannas at the Pentagon felt that the decision to invade Iraq, storm Baghdad, and take over the place (or give it to Ahmad Chalabi) was reversible. What was still being worked out at that time was the propaganda piece, a sustained refinement of the storyline that had been hinted at in neoconservative circles and the White House for months, even years. Based on the successful second leak of the war plans in July, Washington's initial reactions of "Oh, no—so many troops!" was shaped masterfully by the Pentagon publicity machine with offended and vociferous denials of the stories, claiming that the operation would not require nearly that many troops. It was a propaganda coup of understated elegance and razor-edged acumen.

That genius, in some ways, was due to Abe Shulsky. A kindly and gentle-appearing man who would say hello in the hallways, he seemed to be someone with whom I, as a political-science grad student, would have loved to sit over coffee and discuss the world's problems. Seeing me as a uniformed and relatively junior officer, I doubt he entertained similar desires. In any case, he was very busy. I didn't see much of what Abe did on a daily basis, but I know that he approved a particular document produced by the Office of Special Plans for the staff officers in Policy. Desk officers write policy papers for our senior officers to help prepare them for meetings, speeches, or events where they will need to communicate U.S. security policy. In early Septem-